See attached compendium of FAA  AD’s (all at the NPRM – Notice of Proposed Rule-making - stage). It's at http://tinyurl.com/odp5v52

These draft AD's, covering oxygen hose fires, contain many surprises and eye-openers.

A skim review of Airworthiness Directives for oxygen hose related fires on the ground reveals that all Boeing models are in play. The search also surfaces (within those NPRM documents) mention of a 757 and a Bombardier RJ-100 fire, both being an identical cause/circumstance to the SU-GBP Egyptair 777  fire in Cairo.

The gamut of Boeing models affected by this defect is all-inclusive (i.e. all models and sub-species have Notices of Proposed Rule-making AD's). So you could say that it was an omnipresent threat across all the Boeings plying the skies of our globe. 

It's unsurprising then that the threat could/would explode into an actual fire now and again. It most probably required far more urgent action than an entreaty to fix “within 36 months” – given the scope of the issue across all Boeing models (i.e. how many in-service airframes world-wide??)

The following points are shown elsewhere but it's worthwhile re-presenting it again. Many of the AD's included here mention that the oxygen fire was triggered by a fault (i.e. an electrical short) in the close adjacent (to pilot's mask stowage) "audio select panel". That panel also gets a mention in the final NTSB Report on the 767 San Francisco fire.

Don't disregard or overlook that the oxygen masks include a microphone and that it has a hardwired connection to that audio select panel via the oxygen delivery hose. Much has been made of the MH370 final transmission:

"Goodnight, Malaysian 370". However to inspect further the relevance of that frequency sign-off's timing, should we ask what would have / should have happened immediately after that MH370 F/O's transmission? Quite simply, the copilot would have made a selection on that audio select panel to use another VHF box to call Hanoi, leaving the last used good frequency undisturbed on the original VHF set. Why not dial it up on the set already in use? It's easier than trying to recall the frequency that you were "last on" if comms with the new agency are unsuccessful, and thus sensible to just use another VHF set to call the new agency to which you've been transferred - in fact to already have that frequency set up on that second box. Use of another VHF set also "proves" the serviceability of that 2nd VHF set. This assumption of the incident (i.e. the electrical short) being triggered by that 2nd VHF box selection might logically also serve to explain why:

a.  Nothing further was heard from MH370 (i.e. difficult to transmit once that audio select panel has shorted out).

b.  Comms between pilots may have been affected (as intercom is routed through the same box).

c.  If full-face oxygen masks were donned due to smoke from the short, cross-cockpit conversation between pilots would be wholly reliant upon headsets and intercom being functional.... but they wouldn't have been. Would comms to the aft cabin been similarly affected? (i.e. once pilots had donned masks).

d.  The Cockpit Voice Recorder's contents might be questionable (i.e. to what extent would the recorded pilot and open area cockpit mikes feeding the CVR be affected)????

So, well may you pose the following question. What might be the two most critical systems in the event of airborne  fire and/or depressurization? Few pilots would answer: "The audio select panel" and “oxygen system”.

It's food for thought. Sometimes the simplest answer is Occam's Razor (in fact if you google "the simplest answer", the first 10 responses (in fact, the whole first page) show “Occam's Razor”). Once you've found that simplest answer, you just have to fill in all the gaps. I think that I've done that.... adequately.

i.e. Occam's Razor plus adequate accident precedents plus an infill explanation for all the mysterious "gaps" in the MH370 scenario and timeline.