This is an English translation of chapter 5 of our monograph and edition: A.V.Lebedev, Logos Geraklita. Rekonstrukciia mysli i slova, Sankt-Peterburg, «Nauka», 2014 = The Logos of Heraclitus. A reconstruction of his word and thought (with a new critical edition of the fragments), pp.96-134. Please, refer to the pages of the published Russian version printed in bold at the right margin. The fragments are quoted by double numbers like 131L/B114 where L stands for Lebedev, and B for the B section of Diels-Kranz. This edition contains more than 20 fragments that are not included in DK or other editions, in this case the second number is omitted. The Greek text of our collection of Heraclitus' fragments with apparatus criticus and English translation is accessible at this personal page in section «Books» in a pdf file titled «A new edition of Heraclitus' fragments… ». Table of contents of the Outline of the philosophy of Heraclitus 1. Fundamental principles. The main system of arguments ………………………… 96 2. Logos: metaphysics and theory of knowledge……………………… ……………. 103 3. Cosmos and fire: the philosophy of nature…………………………………………114 4. Man and soul: anthropology and psychology………………………………………121 5. Ethos: moral philosophy……………………………………………………………124 6. Polis and Cosmopolis. The practices of men. State and laws………………………128 7. Theology: the critique of popular religion and the manifesto of monotheism……...132 Bibliography at the end, pp.49-54 of the pdf file. [p.96] V. AN OUTLINE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS. 1. The fundamental principles. The main system of arguments. From the end of the 19th century on the mainstream of Preplatonic studies was dominated by a pseudo-historical evolutionism and hypercriticism. Pseudo-historical evolutionism is inextricably connected with Plato-centrism and the ill-defined and misleading category of «Presocratics». [By pseudohistorical evolutionism we mean a supposed scheme of historical development of thought which is “imposed” on the available historical data on some a priori grounds rather than 1 «retrieved» from them. In the case of Early Greek philosophy such «imposed» aprioristic scheme and the theoretical postulate on which it is based is the assumption that the «development» of thought always proceeds from the «simple to the complex», from the concrete to the abstract, from the tangible to intelligible, and hence from naturalistic «Presocratics» in the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. to Plato' idealism in the 4th. This pseudohistorical stereotype stands in flat contradiction with the following historical fact: idealist metaphysics combined with creationism is a much more archaic ontology and world-view than the Ionian concept of «nature» (physis) and naturalistic cosmogony based on it, the achievement of the Scientific revolution in the mid-sixth century B.C. Miletus. Plato's dualist metaphysics and immaterial concept of soul was an archaic revival (accomplished already by Pythagoreans in the second half of the 6th century B.C.) rather than a revolutionary innovation. In Preplatonic studies hypercriticism often takes on the form of “projectionism” (projectionism still remains the main reductionist tool of the “suspicious scholarship”, using J.Parker’s term), that rejects the ancient tradition as a supposed “projection” of later philosophical doctrines and concepts into earlier systems of thought.] John Burnet in his influential Early Greek Philosophy (1892) argued that all doxographical tradition on Heraclitus is marred by «Stoic» distorting influences. An important argument for Burnet (1930: 32 n. 1) was the alleged evidence of Philodemus that the Stoics practiced the method of "assimilation" (συνοικειοῦν) of the theological views of the ancient poets (Orpheus, Musaios, Homer, Hesiod, Euripides) reading into their poems Stoic doctrines (Philod., De pietate, c.13; Cicero, De nat. dor. 1.15.4).1 This method, according to Burnet, “has had serious results upon our tradition, especially in the case of Heraclitus” (1930: 32 n. 1). However, the critical remark of Philodemus refers only to the allegorical interpretation of poetic mythology. Heraclitus was a philosopher, not a poet, and the preserved specimen of a Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus by Zeno and Cleanthes, quoted by the Stoic Arius Didymus in Eusebius’ PE, does not contain any allegoresis: see our fr.67 L (cf. B 12) with a commentary. Cleanthes derives from Heraclitus Zeno's view of the soul as “exhalation from blood imbued with sense-perception” (αἰσθητικὴ ἀναθυμίασις), but this derivation and interpretation are historically correct. Doxographical excerpts from Arius Didymus, the most significant Stoic doxographer, preserved by Stobaeus, are among the best examples of this genre. Stoic allegorical interpretations could sometimes be far-fetched, but the Stoics' persuasion that the views of ancient poetstheologians display certain affinity with their own doctrines, is not totally unfounded. Of all the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic era, the Stoic pantheistic philosophy of nature was the 1 Burnet (1930: 32 n. 1) 2 most archaic, and precisely due to the influence of the archaic philosophy of Heraclitus: the Stoic definition of the «cosmos» as a «compound (σύστημα) of gods and men» is virtually a quotation from Heraclitus fragment 37L/B30, while the Stoic doctrine of the divine providence (πρόνοια) is just an explication in plain Hellenistic koine of Heraclitus' archaic and Ionic γνώμη (fr.140L/B41). Likewise, their terms for periodic “conflagration and world-formation” (ἐκπύρωσις καὶ διακόσμησις) are not “projections”, but correct “translations” into Hellenistic koine of Heraclitus’ archaic metaphors “excess and poverty” of fire (κόρος καὶ χρησμοσύνη). Stoic cosmotheism, like that of Heraclitus, was essentially a restoration of the (abolished by the Milesians) mythopoetic and religious world-view stripped of all anthropomorphism of poets. The Stoics could sometimes misinterpret individual fragments (for example, the Stoic source of Clement misunderstood the word τροπαί in fr. 44L/B31 as “transformations”, rather than «turning points» of the Great Year), but on the whole, their understanding of Heraclitus' philosophy was incomparably superior to that of Plato and Aristotle, first of all because it was based on a close reading and systematic commenting on the authentic text of Heraclitus' book as well as on a genuine congeniality of their thought. In the 20th century, the hypercritical tendency was reinforced by another influential work, Aristotle's Criticism of the Presocratic Philosophy by Harold Cherniss (1935). On the one hand, this work stimulated critical discussion of the value of doxography and correctly drew the attention of scholars to the fact the so-called «doxography» of Preplatonic tenets in Aristotle is not a detached «history of philosophy», but serves as a dialectical argument supporting his theoretical theses. [p.97] On the other hand, Cherniss' somewhat «angry» criticism of Aristotle sometimes turns into advocacy and hypercriticism; his emphasis on «exposing» doxographical «distortions» (instead of explaining calmly the forms and mechanisms of reception) reinforced the trend of the «suspicious scholarship» the results of which are always reductionist, and never constructive. Not only separate theories (for example, the genuine doctrine of innumerable worlds in Anaximander, the periodical ekpyrosis of Heraclitus etc.), but also individual philosophers, including both founding fathers of Greek philosophy, Thales and Pythagoras, fell victims of this anti-doxographic “cleansing.” Thales was thrown out of the history of Greek philosophy and science by Cherniss and Dix, who pointed to the unreliability of doxography2, while Pythagoras was first divorced 2 Cherniss 1935: 375 and Cherniss 1951: 323: Thales was a «culture hero of philosophy». According to Dicks (1970) 44, the astronomical views of Thales «did not differ much» from 3 from the Pythagorean school, founded and cherished by him, and then declared a shaman (Burkert).3 As a result of this, it became politically incorrect even to mention Pythagoras as a philosopher and take him into account in the reconstruction of the 6th century Western Greek metaphysics and philosophical theology.4 Under the impact of the influential works of Kirk and Marcovich (both of whom laid much stress on «exposing» the imaginary Stoic fraud) the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus became dominant; the ethical verbatim quotations of Heraclitus in John Stobaeus (the authenticity of which is proved beyond any doubt not only by the Ionian dialect, but also by characteristically Heraclitean syntactical ambiguity alien to Stoic prose), were declared Stoic forgeries. 5 Any mention of the world-conflagration or of the concept of Fate (Heimarmene), attested in a verbatim quotation 53L/B137 and wrongly athetized by Diels, could bring an immediate charge of being "uncritical". [Diels’ denial of the authenticity of this verbatim quotation in Placita was based on an ill-founded assumption “Zitate Heraklits gibt es in Placita nichts” and on “suspicion” that εἱμαρμένα is a “stoische Terminus”, DK, I,182, adn.4. However the publication of the Derveni papyrus with the quotation of the sun fragment in col.IV – the same as in Placita II,21,4 – refutes this claim as factually wrong, and the participle form εἱμαρμένα δῶρα is attested in archaic poetry: Theognis, v. 1033. We defend its authenticity in the commentary to fr.53L]. [p.98] While philologists were engaged in exposing the imaginary «Stoic fraud», philosophers were doing their best in removing from the history of Greek philosophy everything that did not seem to be of theoretical interest from the point of view of a modern analytical philosopher, for example, the problem of idealism, although it is one of the central and fundamental problems in ancient Hesiod, contrary to the unanimous consensus of the ancient tradition starting with Heraclitus and Democritus and ending with Aristarchus of Samos. 3 Burkert 1972. The separation of Pythagoras from the Pythagorean school started already in 19th century with Zeller followed by Windelband. In Diels-Kranz Pythagoras (chapter 14) is strictly separated from the Pythagorean school (chapter 58). However, we argue in our paper on Alcmaeon (2017) that in Metaphysics Alpha Aristotle ascribes the Table of opposites to Pythagoras and the 6th century Pythagoreans. 4 L.Zhmud’ (2012) correctly objects to the shamanisation of Pythagoras and the denial of his contribution to science. At the same time he displays immoderate hypercriticism in his approach to the Pythagorean philosophy of number and mathematical metaphysics, committing what we call a “nihilistic fallacy” in doxographical analysis, i.e. failure to distinguish the authentic conceptual content from the later terminology, as a result of which “the baby is thrown out together with the bath water”. A more sensible approach to the Pythagorean philosophy of number we find in Kahn (2001), Riedweg (2005) and Horky (2013), among others. 5 Kirk (1962), Marcovich (1967), Marcovich (1978) and Marcovich RE. 4 philosophy, as well as a subject of continuous thousand-years debate on the nature of reality starting with Pythagoras, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Paradoxically, the misguided fight against the aberrations of ancient doxography led to much more serious, in our opinion, aberrations produced by modern academic “doxography”. Stereotypes, which are inseparable from the very notion of “Pre-Socratics” (Lebedev 2009 # 2), also contributed a lot to this, as well as the baleful heritage of Diels's Doxographi Graeci (1879), that monument of 19th century Quellenforschung in which conjectures are built on conjectures (for the criticism of Diels’ “Aetius” hypothesis and Pantheophrasteanism see now Lebedev 2016). We are talking about the mainstream which fortunately was not omnipotent. We should single out two scholars who saw the truth and went against the current. Charles Kahn recognized as genuine the alleged “Stoic” tenets in the philosophy of Heraclitus, including the periodical ekpyrosis, while Tony Long saw genuine borrowings of Heraclitus' doctrines by the Stoics rather than «projections» of them into Heraclitus.6 The Stoic reception of Heraclitus, unlike the casual superficial remarks with inaccurate quotations in Plato and Aristotle, was based on a systematic study and commentary of his text, as is demonstrated by the context of the fragment on river-souls, the best sample of Stoic exegesis of Heraclitus: Heraclitus' views on a certain subject are quoted with precision in the original Ionian dialect and then methodically interpreted. The «Stoic» Heraclitus, i.e. the ethical, political and theological thinker, is much more authentic and closer to his Ephesian prototype than the physicalist Heraclitus of Aristotle or the relativist epistemologist of Plato. The fundamental principle of Stoic ethics “to live according to nature” is almost literally formulated in the Heraclitus' fragment 100 (b) L / B112. Two out of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, physics and ethics, are essentially prefigured in chapters 1 and 2 of his work respectively, whereas their theology and allegorical method of interpretation of Homeric gods is prefigured in the chapter 3 «On gods». Only the logic of the Stoics has nothing in common with the dialectical logic of Heraclitus that rejects the law of non-contradiction since it contradicts the reality (physis). The denial of the Heraclitean roots of Stoic ethics and the philosophy of nature can serve as an instructive example of the methodological “error number one” in the historiography of ancient philosophy, the confusion of words and concepts. Heraclitus certainly did not use the later terms ἐκπύρωσις and διακόσμησις, but he expressed the concepts of alternating phases of the global conflagration and world-formation by archaic metaphors from the economic metaphorical code “abundance and poverty” (κόρος καὶ χρησμοσύνη). [p.99] 6 Kahn 1979: 135. A.Long, Heraclitus and Stoicism in Long (1996) 35-57. 5 When historians of Greek philosophy formulate the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Heraclitus, they commonly lay emphasis on his monism and the principle of unity (harmony) of opposites in metaphysics and on the doctrine of the universal substrate (fire) and the regularity (measure) of its changes in physics. It is impossible to deny that Heraclitus held these two theses, or to maintain that they were marginal or insignificant. But it would be wrong to represent Heraclitus as an abstract metaphysician (ontologist), exploring the purely logical relationship between the one and the many and seeking to find an answer to the question discussed in Plato’s Academy πόσα τὰ ὄντα “how many entities are there?” for its own sake. In the like manner, it would be wrong to represent Heraclitus as a “physicist”, who studied the factors of stability and “measures” in cosmic processes as a kind of “law of nature”, which was for him interesting and important in itself. And metaphysics, and the theory of knowledge, and the problem of "names", and the cosmic elements, and astronomy, and human nature, and animal behavior, and the world of arts and crafts, were subjects in which Heraclitus was not interested as such. He was interested in all this in the context of his comparative study of the divine (natural) and human world at the intersection of religion and politics. Moreover, such a comparative study was also undertaken not for its own sake, not for a positivist description of the facts of similarity and difference. The tacit assumption of Heraclitus - in a full accordance with the archaic worldview - was his belief that the structure of the divine world should be a model (paradigm) for the structure of the human world, the world of polis. Therefore, the work of Heraclitus set a practical goal: to show the similarities and differences in the organization of the world and the norms of behavior of gods and men (that is, nature and society), and to demand from co-citizens to bring the political, legal, moral and religious standards adopted by the Greeks of his time in line with the "divine" eternal standards; to bring local human forms of "justice", based on the subjective opinion (doxa), in line with the universal and shared-by-all (ξυνόν) Justice (Δίκη), corresponding to the objective and natural order of things (κατὰ φύσιν). This means that the book of Heraclitus was in its conception ethical-political, reformist in spirit and in many respects typologically coming closer to Plato's Politeia than to the Milesian physical-geographical treatises “On Nature”. [p.100] Hence the prophetic tone of Heraclitus (he speaks as a prophet of Apollo), the devastating criticism of all the authorities of Greek culture, and discontent with all spheres of Greek life. It is indicative that for Heraclitus, exactly as later for Plato, the poets (Homer, Hesiod, Archiloch) are “false authorities” guilty of the corruption of morality, false ideas about gods and bad form of government among the Greeks. Here we are witnessing the birth of the “ancient quarrel” (παλαιὰ 6 διαφορά) between philosophy and poetry mentioned in Book 10 of Plato's Republic 607b. The correct understanding of the general character and goals of Heraclitus᾽ book is attested in the invaluable testimony of the ancient reader of the Ephesian, the grammarian Diodotus who, unlike us, had in his hands the complete text of Heraclitus and wrote a commentary on it: “Diodotus, who says that the treatise (σύγραμμα) current under his name is not on nature (περὶ φύσεως), but on the form of government (περὶ πολιτείας), while what he says about nature is intended as a model (scil. of the ideal politeia)” (DL 9.16). Nature (physis), conceived by Heraclitus not as a blind material substance, but as a providential god, speaking to humans through the cosmic this logos, serves him as a “paradigm”, that is a norm and standard for the ideal organization and “mode of governing” of the society and the state, exactly as the intelligible world and the idea of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) in Plato. Cosmos in Heraclitus is a religious and political rather than physical concept. The cosmos of Heraclitus consists not of elements or corpuscles, but of “mortals and immortals,” “gods and men,” that is, of living wills. This archaic division of the world into heaven and earth, celestialdivine and lower-human, on which the Greek religion and the mythopoetic picture of the world were based, was abolished by the scientific revolution in Miletus in the middle of the 6th century BC. The Ionian physiologoi conceived the heaven and the stars not as divine beings, but as physical bodies consisting of the same elements: in Anaxagoras the Moon is a «celestial earth» with mountains and ravines. In the new cosmology the reverend Gaia of Hesiod was transformed from a «safe foundation» (ἕδος ἀσφαλές) of mortals into a point lost in the infinite Universe. In an isomorphic infinite Universe without a center, there is no up and down, and therefore there is no “heaven and earth” in the sense required by any traditional religion. A polemical reply to the new Ionian cosmology, undermining, as it seemed to many, the very foundations of religion and morality, was the idealist philosophy of Pythagoras who proclaimed that in the beginning was the immortal soul (psyche) and not the mortal body (soma). [p.101] Only the soul and the mind detached from bodily sensations have access to the «true» reality: the immaterial mathematical principles (limit and unlimited, even and odd) and the numbers generated by them, which are “imitated” by physical bodies. The Pythagoreans saved the “inherited from fathers” (patrios) faith in immortal gods, dismissed as a nightmare Anaximander's theory of the infinite Universe with innumerable planetary systems being generated and destroyed by a cosmogonic vortex. They replaced the Ionian «chaotic» (from the teleological point of view) infinite Universe with a beautifully «ordered» finite cosmos, constructed by a divine mind (nous) 7 as a work of art, whose wisdom is displayed in the cosmic harmonia and the movement of luminaries, and who has reserved a region of hell for the punishment for the sinners (the sublunary world) and a paradise for the «pure», the islands of the blessed in the Milky Way (or in the Sun region), i.e. for those who have been initiated in the sophia of Pythagoras himself and have purified their souls from the Titanic miasma of the body and sarkophagia. Justice (Dike), the concomitant of Zeus, has returned to the world of mortals: the Pythagorean Parmenides solemnly announced that Dike “guards” the boundaries of being, keeping it in the «chains of Limit», a transparent allusion the divine principle of Limit (Peras) in the Pythagorean table of opposites. Through this image, Parmenides indicated the primacy of religion over science, as well as the triumph of the religious philosophy of Pythagoras over the «godless» vortex-cosmogony of the Ionians. In the conflict that has arisen as a result of the scientific revolution between the scientific and traditional religious picture of the world, Heraclitus occupies a special position. He goes against the current alone, he opposes both the mythopoetic tradition and the new Ionian science. He shares some common features with Pythagoras, like Pythagoras he is primarily a moral and religious philosopher driven by a reformist spirit. He borrows some very important Pythagorean ideas (the harmony of the cosmos, catharsis the soul, ethics of self-restraint and following God, even the naturalistic analogue of the transmigration of souls), but at the same time he attacks him in rude and sarcastic invectives as an intellectual adversary, probably because Pythagoras' metaphysical dualism flatly contradicts his absolute and radical monism, as well as because of the Pythagorean «Egyptian» concept of god as immobile and immutable, whereas Heraclitus' god is «fire» and incessant drive towards «reversal» (trope, i.e. victory), a concept more suitable as a paradigm for psychological engineering and military ethics intended to contribute to the educations of ideal warriors who will stop the military aggression of the Achaemenid empire and save Ionian Greeks from slavery. Contrary to the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus, the subject of his work was not a study of the "nature of every particular thing" which is allegedly mentioned in Fr. 2 L = B 1. Heraclitus undoubtedly would have dismissed such task as an empty "knowledge of many things" (polymathia) in which he reproaches Hesiod, Hecataeus, Pythagoras and Xenophanes. In the text of Hippolytus (quotation of fr.2L/B1) whose text of quotations is generally more reliable and accurate than that of Sextus Empiricus, there is no word ἕκαστον ‘every single thing’; therefore the object of the verb διαιρέων ‘separates, divides’, and therefore, the subject of Heraclitus’s book, as delineated in the proem, is the pair ἔπη καὶ ἔργα “words and deeds». This pair 8 corresponds exactly to the verbs ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν 'to act and to speak', which at the end of fr. 2L/B1 and other paraphrases of the 2L/B1 fragment refers to the “deeds and words” of humans (ἄνθρωποι), and not to the natural phenomena, as the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus by Kirk and Marcovich wants us to believe. This is a comprehensive polar expression that covers all human activities: both their legomena or what they are saying (myths about gods, political speeches, laws etc.) and their dromena or what they are doing in their technological practices such as arts and crafts (τέχναι), but also in their religious rituals. [p.102] Consequently, in his treatise Heraclitus, according to his own words, undertook a comprehensive study of the “words and deeds” of the cosmic logos and the corresponding cosmic processes in a comparison with the “words and deeds” of humans in their technological, political and religious practices. This means that the subject and purpose of Heraclitus' book, explicitly stated in the preface to his book, was not «physical» and scientific, not an explanation of the nature of «everything» (the word ἕκαστον is a misleading explanatory addition of Sextus or his source, it is not found in the superior text of Hippolytus), but anthropological, ethical, political, sociological and theological. As we have already noted above, the unity (or rather identity) of opposites is a very important thesis in the philosophy of Heraclitus, but in his main system of arguments this thesis acquires its full and transparent meaning only in the combination with another, less known thesis of Heraclitus “the art imitates nature ", ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν. Investigating the "divine" (cosmic) and human (society, polis, religion) world, Heraclitus discovers that the fundamental "divine law" of the Universe, the law of the all-unity, is the law of the identity of opposites, which works flawlessly in the cosmos and cosmic cycles (Great Year , the seasons, the diurnal cycle), is also found in human nature (cycles of sleep and wake, life and death) and in the world of crafts and the arts, and more generally, all human practices with fixed procedures (what Heraclitus calls "deeds" of men in the preface to his book, fr. 2L/B1). This “technological” section of Heraclitus' book has been preserved in a free paraphrase (an adaptation to the purposes of dietetics) in the Hippocratic treatise “On Diet” I, 11-24. On the basis of these «empirical proofs» (tekmeria) Heraclitus concludes that man is an integral part of the cosmos, and that in his biological nature, in the physiological processes of the body, as well as his in technological practices (tekhnai), i.e. in the sphere of dromena, he “acts” “according to nature”, without realizing this. On the contrary, in the sphere of legomena, i.e. of politics, morality, religion, literature and art his behavior and his “words” are completely unnatural and resemble a drunken consciousness or a delirium of an 9 insane. Normal or conforming to nature (κατὰ φύσιν fr. 2L/B1), according to the divine law, is the subordination of the "many" to "one" in the paradigmatic “this cosmos” (i.e. divine order, fr.37/B30), i.e. in the polis of Zeus, and the subordination of the “many” (οἱ πολλοί) to “one the best” ruler (εἷς ἄριστος) in human politics, since unity is the principle of harmony of the opposites in physics mirrored as «civil concord» (ὁμόνοια) in politics: cf. the authentic political context about ὁμόνοια in fr.106L/B10 (not in DK or other editions) and the quotation in PDerveni col.IV according to which the Sun “rules the cosmos according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν) as an ideal or paradigmatic monarch. From this comparison and contrast between the natural norm and unnatural human convention Heraclitus draws as conclusion a revolutionary demand for radical reforms, a demand (χρή) to bring the social norms and laws into conformity with the natural (divine) norms and the fundamental principle of «single command» on which the Universe is based (fr.131L/B114). The unnatural polytheism should be replaced by natural monotheism, the unnatural popular rule by the power of “one best”, and the unnatural hedonistic cult of pleasures and greed (pleonexia) by self-control (σωφρονεῖν), contentedness (εὐαρέστησις fr. fr.101L/21, ὀλίγωι ἀρκεῖσθαι in bioigraphical tradition), the pursuit of one super-value, the eternal glory and apotheosis of heroes and the wise. [p.103] Let us now turn to a more detailed exposition of how Heraclitus demonstrates his main thesis of the superiority of one over many in his metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of language, the doctrine of fire, ethics, politics and theology. 2. Logos: metaphysics and theory of knowledge. The word λόγος is used by Heraclitus in a number of fragments in common, non-specific meanings: "measure" or "volume" fr. 45L/B 31, “speech” or “teaching” (12L/B 87, 139L / B108), “respect, honor” (129 / B 39). It is used in unusual sense, apparently in a new philosophical sense, only in three epistemological fragments and in Marcus Aurelius' paraphrase of this group deriving from beginning of Heraclitus' book. A neglected fragment from Clement fr.154L about the common logos of mortals and immortals should be probably added to this group. 1 (B 50 DK) Verbatim quotation Hippolytus, Refutatio, IX 9,1 οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ<δε τοῦ> λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν· σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι. __________ 10 τοῦ<δε τοῦ> supplevi, cf. fr. 2 || λόγου Bernays : δόγματος Parisinus || ὁμολογεῖν· interpunxi, infinitivus quasi imperativus : ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν, fere omnes || εἰδέναι cod. : εἶναι Miller, edd. Listening not to mine, but to this logos*, one must agree: wisdom consists in knowing all things as one. --------------Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: “Listening not to mine, but to this logos, one must agree: there is only one Wise being (i.e. god) to know (or to controll) all things” *i.e. to the visible “book of nature”, the Universe conceived as text. 2 (B 1 DK) Sextus. adv. math. VII 132; Hippolyt. Refutatio IX 9.1 [τοῦ δὲ λόγου ... ὅκως ἔχει] τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιουτέων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. ____________ τοῦ δὲ Hippol. : om. Sextus || αἰεί Clem. Alex. Str. V.111.7 : ἀεί Hippol. : om. Sextus || πάντων Hippol : om. Sextus || καὶ ἐπέων Hippol. : ἐπέων Sextus || τοιουτέων Hippol. : τοιούτων Sextus || διερέων κατὰ φύσιν Hippol.: κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον Sext. || ποιοῦσιν Sextus : ποιοῦσιν καὶ λέγουσιν, ut videtur, Marcus, vide fr. 3 infra. But although this logos exists forever humans fail to understand it both before they have listened to it and once they have listened. And indeed, although all /humans/ encounter this logos *, they look like ignorant of it even when they try /to understand/ such words and deeds as those which I expound by dividing them according to nature and indicating how they are. As regards the rest of humanity, they do not realize what they are doing awaken, just as they are oblivious /=unconscious/ of what they are doing when they sleep. ------------------* Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: “although all things happen according to this logos”. [p.104] "This logos" can be «heard» by anyone, and yet nobody understands it. What is the precise meaning of the term λόγος and of the phrase “this logos” (λόγος ὅδε) in these fragments has been 11 a subject of endless debate. The Stoics understood the Logos of Heraclitus as reason and identified it with the divine providential mind that governs the Universe, as well as with “nature”, the objective order of things. Since the nature of the cosmos in Stoic physics is fire, the Logos was identified with fire. Man has his own logos and his own nature; according to the imperative of Stoic ethics to achieve happiness (eudaimonia) one should “live according to nature”, bringing his private logos into perfect agreement with the universal logos. The Logos of the Stoics is a metaphysical and theological concept, which according to some influenced the Christological concept of Logos through the intermediate works of Philo Alexandrinus. It must be admitted that in the texts of Heraclitus the term logos never means “mind” or «reason» in the sense of a rational capacity of reasoning and thinking; this is a later, predominantly Hellenistic meaning of the word. From the 19th century on, in the interpretation of Heraclitus' logos, two main schools of thought opposed each other in a debate that resembles the medieval debate between the realists and the nominalists: the traditional metaphysical (realistic) understanding of "this logos" as an objective cosmic law (Weltgesetz) or divine reason was opposed by the “trivial” or verbal understanding of the expression “this logos” as a simple reference to Heraclitus' own work, to his “discourse” or doctrine.7 Some tried to find a compromise solution: while not recognizing directly the metaphysical interpretation of the logos, they emphasized that it is not just the doctrine of Heraclitus, but also its objective content, a certain “formula of things” or a “structure of the world ” (Conche HF 33).8 [p.105] The syntactic ambiguity in the text of fr.2L/B1, the ambiguous position of the adverb αἰεί 'always', which seemingly allows both the reading "always exists" (in favor of the realists, since in this case the logos is eternal), and the reading "always do not understand" (in favour of verbalists), did not allow any school to pull the rope over. Both interpretations, the metaphysical and the "verbalist" one, have their strong and weak points. It might seem prima facie that the verbalist interpretation is favored by the fact that the word λόγος never means “reason” in Heraclitus, and the fact that in early Ionian prose the word “logos” at the very beginning of a written work usually denotes the logos of the writer himself, that is, his book or his doctrine, and 7 «Though this Word is true evermore…», Burnet (1930) 133; «Of this my account, which stands throughout …» West (1971)117. 8 To this compromise position comes close Kahn's view as well, although he criticises the verbalist interpretation (Kahn ATH 98): «The logos can be his 'meaning' only in the objective sense: the structure which his words intend or point at, which is the structure of the world itself (and not the intentional structure of his thought about the world)». 12 not a divine law. But against the verbalist interpretation can be put forward three serious objections: 1) Verbalists, in order to get rid of the undesired “reality” of the Logos, interpret ἐόντος ἀεί not as “always exists”, but as “is always true” (or “always holds true”). But, as far as we know, when used with an adverb of time or place, the verb εἶναι in Greek language always has an existential, and never a “veridical” meaning. When Heraclitus himself in fr. 37L / B 30 states (κόσμος) ἀεί ... ἔστι, he means «(the cosmos) always is (=exists)», and not «always is true» (?). 2) The second objection constitutes a real stumbling block for the verbalists: in fr. 1 L/ B 50 οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας 'listening not to me, but to the logos' (according to MSS. reading) or "listening not to mine, but to this logos" (according to our supplement), the logos that people should attend is apparently the same logos as the one they fail to understand in fr. 2L/B1. It is explicitly contrasted with the logos of Heraclitus, i.e. with his discourse or teaching. Therefore the phrase λόγον τόνδε (λόγου τοῦδε) in fr. 2L/B1 cannot mean “this discourse of mine”. 3) The verbalists are kindly asked to explain how it could happen that the Stoics confused a trivial colloquial phrase («this doctrine of mine» or «this book of mine») with a fundamental concept in their metaphysics, theology, philosophy of nature and ethics? This is especially surprising given the fact that the Stoics had a complete text of Heraclitus and carefully studied it and commented on it. Therefore, they may have known other passages in the lost book of Heraclitus with specific use of the term logos. Any Stoic surpassed in his command of ancient Greek in general, and of philosophical ancient Greek in particular, any modern scholar (including myself) even of highest qualification. But there were hundreds ancient Stoics, and none of them in the course of many centuries did not notice this ridiculous mistake: is this a plausible scenario? Can we believe it? The realists, the supporters of the metaphysical interpretation of logos, avoid these difficulties, but they can also be asked to answer some difficult questions. How is it possible to “hear” a cosmic law (structure, reason etc.) and to describe it as something that is right there, in front of us? In Greek language the deictic pronoun ὅδε, τόδε «this» commonly refers to something that is before our eyes, something you can point to with your finger. Is it possible to point with one's finger to the divine reason (cosmic law etc.) and to say “here it is”? [p.106] The only way to avoid the difficulties of both interpretations is to assume that the expression “this logos” in two fragments of Heraclitus 2L/ B1 and 1L/ B50 is a metaphor that preserves the semantics of “speech” or «word» that can be «heard», at the iconic level, whereas at the referential 13 level it denotes the Universe, τὸ πᾶν.9 This interpretation, unfamiliar to modern scholars, was well known to the ancient readers of Heraclitus, in particular to Plato in the Cratylus and Theaetetus, as well as to Philo of Alexandria, Sextus Empiricus, Hippolytus, Diodotus and others.10 The basic mistake of many modern interpretations is that they understood the Logos of Heraclitus as “the logos of something,” as a principle, a law of the cosmic change, or an “intentional structure” (Kahn) of reality, that is, as an abstraction. But in fact, the metaphorical expression “this logos” referentially denotes the reality itself, the Universe itself, understood at the significative or iconic level of meaning as “Speech” or “Book of Nature” (Liber Naturae). It connotes "logos" with all the richness of the semantics of this Greek word, but it denotes the "visible world", directly perceived by the senses. This interpretation is supported first of all by a hardly accidental parallelism between the expressions «this logos» λόγον τόνδε in the beginning of the section on metaphysics and epistemology in fr. 1–2 L (B1, B50) and the expression «this cosmos» κόσμον τόνδε ‘this cosmos’ in fr.37 L (B 30) in the beginning of the section on philosophy of nature in chapter I Περὶ τοῦ παντός of Heraclitus Περὶ φύσεως / Περὶ πολιτείας. In both cases, the demonstrative pronoun ὅδε ‘this one’ indicates the immediate presence of the object, its obviousness, something we see directly in front of us. In both cases, the logos-cosmos is described as “common” (ξυνός) for “all” (πάντων). The “common” in Heraclitus' metaphysics and epistemology (as well as in ethics and politics) is opposed to the “private” or individual (ἴδιον) as something objective (existing “by nature,” that is, independently from our perception) to the subjective or doxastic, the product of the imagination of a «private intelligence», ἰδίη φρόνησις (Fr.7L/B2), like that of the poets, drinkers and Bacchic initiates. [p.107] The fact that by “this logos” Heraclitus means reality itself, and not just its abstract structure or logical principle (though the connotation of a logical arrangement as immanent feature of this reality is conceivable), is also proved by the words “although all men encounter (or «come across») this logos…” (Fr. 2L/B1) . The expression γίνεσθαι κατά τινα means in Greek «to come across» or «to confront» something or someone, to meet face-to face. It is synonymous with the 9 We use the term “iconic level” of a metaphor for the symbolic level, the level of imagery (cf. the “source domain” in Lakoff and Johnson’s terminology) and distinguish it from the referential meaning (cf. the “target domain” in Lakoff and Johnson). At the iconic level the metaphor “this logos” means “speech” or “text”, at the referential level it denotes the Universe, the visible world conceived as a “book of nature”. 10 See the testimonia collected in our commentary to fr.2L/B1; 106B L. 14 term ἐγκυρεῖν τινί «to stumble upon something», which Heraclitus uses in the closest context (fr. 5L/N17, cf. 3L/B72-73) in the sense of "raw sense data", a bare sensation that is not interpreted by the intelligent mind (νόος). “Confronting” an object and “coming across” it in Heraclitus’ epistemology stands for empirical “acquaintance” with an object without its proper “understanding” (γινώσκειν) and without grasping or perceiving it by the sound mind (φρονεῖν). An example of such a “sensation without perception or awareness” in Heraclitus is the case of “barbaric souls” (βάρβαροι ψυχαί, fr. 19L/B107): Persians can hear Greek language (they are exposed to it or «confront» it), but they do not understand the meaning of the words they hear. In the same way the unphilosophical crowd of hoi polloi hears, but does not understand the voice of Nature and the logos of the Universe because they are unfamiliar with the language in which it is written or «spoken out» by the divine cosmos. In fr.2 L/B1DK Heraclitus distinguishes 3 categories of "listeners" of logos: 1) those who have never tried to understand the voice or book of nature, the majority of people or the nonphilosophers; 2) those who have tried but failed, i.e. all other philosophers except Heraclitus; 3) those who have tried and succeeded. To the last category belongs only Heraclitus of Ephesus himself, who has deciphered the secret code of the Universe and read the message of the cosmic god addressed to all humanity. Specialists who could “translate” the messages of gods from the symbolic divine language of omens, dreams or oracles to the simple language of mortals, the Greeks called diviners (μάντεις). In the case of important issues concerning not the fate of private individuals, but the public sphere, matters of the state like questions of war and peace, the great oracles of Apollo at Delphi and in the Ionian Didyma were consulted. In the very first sentence of his book (fr.1L/B50) Heraclitus makes use of the prophetic formula “listening not to my logos...”, which means: it is not me, it is the God who is speaking through my mouth. This «Apollonian» metaphoric code is resumed repeatedly in the following text of all three chapters and in a manner typical for the archaic «circle composition» provides an effective finale of Heraclitus' book that compares Heraclitus' logos with the voice of Sibyl and the cosmic god speaking through her «inspired mouth» with Apollo. Not only Heraclitus, but also his contemporary and opponent Parmenides of Elea, also disguises his philosophical poem as an oracle, which the semi-divine Apollonian Kouros (Pythagoras of Samos) «heard» directly from the heavenly philosophical Pythia called Aletheia in Olympus, bypassing the mortal Pythia in Delphi. In the text of the fr. 2L/B1 the metaphor of "this logos" is synonymous with the expression “words and deeds” (ἔπη καὶ ἔργα), and this is an additional confirmation of the correctness of our interpretation of “this logos”. It is clear that this is not an isolated rhetorical or poetic metaphor, 15 but a philosophical conceptual metaphor and analogy, a carefully thought-out grammatical model of the cosmos. [p.108] If the world as a whole is a logos (speech, text), then individual things must somehow relate to the division of this text into “words” or names, syllables and letters. It should be borne in mind that when the alphabetic analogy is used, Greek philosophers often do not distinguish between the phonetic level (letters as phonemes) and the graphic level (letters as written signs). The Greek verb ἀκούειν ‘to listen’ is likewise ambiguous, it can mean both «to listen» to a spoken word and «to read» or «to understand» a written text. The title of Plutarchus' treatise Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν means ‘How young people should read (or understand) poets’ (literally ‘listen to poets’). We believe that in fr.1–2 L (B 1, B 50 DK) “to listen to this logos” means primarily “to read this book”, that is, to understand the visible “Book of Nature”. Heraclitus can be considered the father of the philosophical hermeneutics: the method of knowledge for him is not a causal or material explanation (in this he diverges sharply from the Milesians), but the art of interpretation of reality conceived as a text. Therefore, a philosopher for Heraclitus is an experienced and sophisticated reader who understands the language of nature or the language of the gods, which is the same, since Heraclitus is a pantheist, and knows the rules of reading and the cosmic grammar. Let us remember that the Greek writing in the archaic and classical times (and even later) was continuous, without word-division, the so called scriptio continua. Heraclitus makes it clear that he penetrates into the meaning of the book of nature by the method of the correct “division” or “distinction” of “words and deeds” in “this logos”. The verb διαιρέω «to divide» is used in grammatical contexts exactly in the sense of dividing words in reading, its synonym is διαστίζω, διάστιξις “punctuation“.11 In Greek school grammar logos (“speech” or text) is usually divided into “names” (ὀνόματα), names are divided into syllables (συλλαβαί), and syllables into letters (στοιχεῖα or γράμματα). How to read or to divide the scriptio continua of the cosmic logos according to Heraclitus? Let us try to answer this question taking as an example Heraclitus' fragment 43 L / B 67. This fragment uses not the grammatical (alphabet) analogy, but an analogy between a plurality of «sensible» incenses and imperceptible fire (single substrate), in order to illustrate the same relationship between one and many. [p.109] 11 LSJ, s.v. διαιρέω VI: «divide words, punctuate in reading», Isocr. 12.17; Arist. Rhet. 1401a 24. 16 We choose it as a sample for the elucidation of the logos-syllables-letters analogy primarily because we have here a list of four pairs of opposites in a verbatim quotation from Heraclitus in Ionian dialect, that preserves two peculiar features of Heraclitus' style: asyndeton (ellipsis of the copula ἐστίν «is») and the omission of the conjunction καί “and” between the opposites. This indicates that Heraclitus in this fragment speaks in the «language of nature» distorted, in his opinion, by the poets and hoi polloi. 1. ΗΜΕΡΗΕΥΦΡΟΝΗΧΕΙΜΩΝΘΕΡΟΣ = DAYNIGHTWINTERSUMMER a continuous text (undivided logos), sensory data, the cognitive level is ἐγκυρεῖν ‘to confront’, ‘to come across’ something without realizing what it is. 2. ΗΜΕΡΗ | ΕΥΦΡΟΝΗ | ΧΕΙΜΩΝ | ΘΕΡΟΣ = DAY | NIGHT | WINTER | SUMMER the wrong division of «this logos» by the crowd of hoi polloi, the division into 4 names generates 4 objects, the cognitive level is «opinion» (doxa, δοκέοντα). 3. ΗΜΕΡΗΕΥΦΡΟΝΗ | ΧΕΙΜΩΝΘΕΡΟΣ = DAYNIGHT | WINTERSUMMER a correct division “according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν: 2 names correspond to two objects which are joined pairs of opposites, the cognitive level is that of “knowledge” or «understanding» (γινώσκειν). In the fragment 43L/B67 the imaginary objects (separated opposites) are correlated with the “names” of the ordinary language, such as “day”, “night”, etc. The question whether in Heraclitus the grammatical analogy contained an alphabet analogy as well, as in Democritus and Plato, or it was limited to the division of logos into names and syllables only (but not into letters), should be rather answered positively: yes, it was both. The fragment 106L(cf. B 10 DK), in our interpretation, definitely speaks in favor of the complete grammatical analogy, including the alphabet analogy i.e. in favor of the division “logos - names - syllables - letters”, since the pairs of opposites in this fragment are not abstract metaphysical terms like «wholes and non-wholes» with mysterious and unintelligible “Zusammenfügungen” of Diels-Kranz, but are clear and simple examples taken from concrete tekhnai explicitly mentioned in the context of quotation: grammar, music, painting. The pairs of opposite taken from the arts of grammar and music are called “syllables” (συλλάψιες). In addition to a fragment of 106L in favour of the alphabetical analogy also speaks the evidence of Philo Alexandrinus in fr.106B L. In this case, the grammatical analogy between the cosmos and the logos (text) in the epistemology of Heraclitus can be represented as follows: Referential level world, Universe Iconic level this logos (book or speech) 17 pairs of opposites (like day-night, winter-summer) separated opposites (day, night, winter, summer) syllapsies (syllables) letters («voiced and unvoiced») From this it follows that the «names» (onomata) of the conventional human language are just «letters» of the language of nature, of «this logos», and consequently, lack autonomous substance and separate existence. [p.110] The advantage of this version is that it better explains the monistic symbolism of the grammatical analogy: all pairs of opposites (and there is not a single phenomenon in the world that would not be an opposition member) after integration turn out to be the "syllables" of a single logos, meaningful text. Most researchers of Heraclitus, regardless of whether they follow the metaphysical or verbal interpretation of the logos in the fr. 2L/ B 1, agree that the concept of the logos of Heraclitus, like the concept of harmony, is directly related to his main metaphysical thesis of all-unity (“everything is one,” πάντα = ἕν). However, the semantics of the word λόγος as such, that is, the lexical semantics (and not philosophical or metaphorical), contrary to all attempts to prove the opposite, are in no way connected with the concept of “unity” or “identity”. The interpretation of “this logos” as a metaphor of the universe based on the grammatical analogy for the first time explains the monistic connotation of the term, its intrinsic semantical connection with the principle of coincidentia oppositorum, as well as its theological implications, correctly understood and developed by the Stoics. The Stoics must have understood the meaning of the grammatical analogy and the metaphor of the «book of nature» in Heraclitus logos-fragments, and on the ground of this interpretation they have concluded that “logos” and “fire” are identical: after all, the referential meaning of logos in Heraclitus is the physical Universe, and the nature of the Universe is the divine fire. However, while relieving the Stoics from the allegations of distortions in their theological approach to logos (it was a theological concept in Heraclitus as well), one should not equate the semantics of Heraclitus' and Stoic use of this term. Heraclitus' logos remains an epistemological metaphor associated with acoustic speech or written text, and, in contrast to the Stoic logos, never means “reason”. In Heraclitus' vocabulary there are several mental terms for mind, reason, intelligence etc. (νόος, φρήν, φρόνησις, γνώμη), but λόγος is not one of them. Being inextricably linked with the semantics of language and speech, speaking, the logos of Heraclitus is rather a communicative (and therefore political and ethical, as well as religious) rather than a mental or psychological concept. But the fundamental principle of the Stoic ethics according to 18 which man's individual logos should be brought in conformity and agreement (homo-logia) with the universal and divine logos is already prefigured in the texts of Heraclitus and his concept of the «common logos» (xynos logos). More on the alphabet analogy in Heraclitus' metaphysics and philosophy of nature see above in the section on metaphorical codes and models of cosmos in Heraclitus. [p.111] The identity of opposites and the triadic structure in Heraclitus' metaphysics. The proponents of the naturalistic interpretation of Heraclitus (e.g., Kirk HCF: 222 ff; Marcovich 1967: 105 ff.) understand the unity of opposites as their “connection” or connectedness. The “connection” between x and y implies their separate existence: in order to be “connected”, x and y must exist separately from each other. But it is precisely this separate existence of the opposites that Heraclitus denies with his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum. In the authentic fragments we find another formulation: opposites are not «connected», but are “identical” (τωὐτόν) or are “one and the same” (ἕν). From his predecessors, both the Ionian naturalists and the Italian idealists, Heraclitus learned well that the whole sensually perceived world has a polar structure and can be completely analyzed into and reduced to pairs of opposites. Anaximander recognized such fundamental physical opposites as the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, corresponding to the four world masses (maxima membra mundi), in the Pythagorean Table of opposites the principal position is accorded to the immaterial mathematical essences of the limit and the unlimited, the even and the odd. The doctrine of opposites is not important for Heraclitus as such, i.e. as a scientific theory about the objective structure of the world. It is inextricably linked with his metaphysical holism (related with his theology, ethics and politics), with the idea of absolute casual nexus and interdependence of all phenomena, as well as the doctrine of fate and predestination. In the terms of the land-and-borrow or economic metaphoric code in the world of the phenomenal plurality nobody and nothing whatsoever is «self-owned», all are «debtors» who live «at the expense of others (their opposites)»; sooner or later they must “pay” for their lives to creditors, to whom they owe their existence and «property», i.e. being. Our reconstruction of the grammatical analogy in the metaphysics of Heraclitus shows that separately taken opposites (and therefore, all components of the physical world) are illusory objects, the result of the linguistic error of mortals, their inability to correctly read (ἀκούειν) the eternal Book of Nature (λόγον τόνδε). That the phenomenal cosmic opposites are not self-subsistent entities, but – like subjective incenses and flavors – are illusory objects, epiphenomena of the underlying imperceptible 19 «common» substrate, is clearly stated in fr. 43L / B 67. The parable of the death of Homer and the gullible mortals deceived by the appearances (τὰ φανερά, see our commentary on fr. 20L/B56) compares "the grasping of opposites" in the study of the physical world with «grasping» the lice on one's own body: the more one «grasps», the less one has. [p.112] After one has comprehended and «grasped» all pairs of opposites that constitute the whole of the phenomenal world, they lose their imaginary individuality and become «one»; in a different metaphorical code they disappear like syllables integrated into a single Word. In his doctrine of the phenomenal world Heraclitus, like the Eleatics, comes close to the subjective idealism or the “theory of hieroglyphs” in epistemology. In other words, according to Heraclitus opposites are not separate substances, but aspects of the same «One», and processes of the single substrate, phases of cosmic cycles, produced by the same substrate. The interpretation of the unity of opposites as a “connectedness” is based on the fragments about harmony (29-30 L/B 51,54), since ἁρμονία in Greek can mean “conjunction”, “joint”, for example, of two pieces of wood in carpentry. But this applies to the “apparent harmony” (ἁρμονία φανερή) only, the illusory harmony of similars, whereas the “invisible harmony” (ἁρμονία ἀφανής), which is superior and «stronger than apparent», according to our interpretation of fr. 29L/B54, speaks of an inseparable and indistinguishable identity of opposites using the Apollonian symbolism of the bow and the lyre: war and peace, discord and concord, merge into a single graphical symbol of A (acrophonetic for «Apollo»), which in the «right» position looks like a bow, hanging on a wall (symbol of war), and in the «turned upside down» (palintropos) position looks like a lyre (symbol of peace). The relativity of good and evil and other values in Heraclitus' ethics can also serve as an example of the subjective nature of opposites (fr. 82–95 of our collection). In a number of fragments, primarily related to the cosmic war or the agon of opposite forces, Heraclitus puts a third element above the two, a Moderator or Umpire (βραβεύς, ἐπιστάτης). We call this conceptual scheme a «triadic structure». The Moderator establishes the rules of the competition and regulates it by set “limits” (ὅροι, τέρματα), thus saving the adversaries from a mutual annihilation. The Moderator takes on different guises expressed in a series of parallel metaphors (we call this «metaphorical synonymity»): he is the Sun – Umpire (βραβεύς) ensuring the regularity of the change of seasons, the reciprocal increase and decrease of the duration of day and night (fr. 55 L /B120 DK seriously misinterpreted by Kirk and Marcovich), he is Polemos (War) reversing the roles of gods and men, free and slaves (fr. 32 L /B 53), he is Aion (Time), 20 playing with the fates of gods and men in a cosmic pesseia (33 L /B 52), he is the Shepherd who drives all living creatures to pasture by scourge or Thunder-strike of Zeus (Keraunos) that governs the Universe (62L / Β11). The triadic structure can be also discovered in the most important metaphysical fragments of Heraclitus about Logos and harmony. [p.113] In the grammatical analogy, "syllables", according to Heraclitus, combine opposite letters, vowels and consonants, high and low pitch, fr. 106L/B10. Consequently, the Logos is a metaphorical synonym of harmonia, and it is a great integral in which all opposites are united. In the fragment on harmony (29 L / 51 DK), the active “third” element appears to be Apollo himself, who “holds together,” in one hand two attributes, a bow and a lyre, the symbols of war and peace (29 L / 51 DK). Finally, in all the fragments from the “Political Logos” about the “works” (erga) of men in the sphere of arts and crafts (τέχναι) it is the tekhne itself that assumes the role of the active “third element” in the triadic structure, the power of art that harmoniously unites the opposites (fr.106– 115 L). Heraclitus’s thesis “art imitates nature” means that in their technological practices humans unconsciously “imitate” the universal divine law of the identity of opposites: grammar unites vocals and consonant letters (106–107 L), music unites high and low sounds (ibidem), painting unites different colors (ibidem), medicine unites good and evil (recovery by pain) (108 L), the craft of fullers unites the straight and the curved (109), the art of carpenters unites pushing and pulling in sowing, etc. The fundamental and central concept in Heraclitus metaphysics and political philosophy, the concept of «common» or universal (τὸ ξυνόν), cannot be reduced to a simple sum of the elements or to their “connection”. The universal is ontologically and axiologically superior to the particular and individual. Inside the human polis it is the law (nomos), one and the same for all, that assumes the role of the «third element» or Moderator and unites individual citizens into polis; remember that in Greek political life these citizens were commonly divided into rival parties, i.e. opposites. Inside the «city of Zeus», i.e. the Universe, it is the «divine law» (theios nomos), i.e. the same law of the harmony of opposites, that unites and transforms the opposition of mortals and immortals into harmonious «arrangement» of «this cosmos», one and the same for all. Only in the light of the triadic structure (and not in the light of bare polarity or even identity of binary opposites) the political subtext and the political message of Heraclitus' metaphysics and philosophy of nature becomes transparent: the arrangement of the polis, the ideal form of government that exactly corresponds to nature (is κατὰ φύσιν) is that in which the supreme 21 political power belongs not to the one of the opposites (rival or warring political parties), but to a “third man above the fray”, an impartial Moderator like an Umpire in a stadium (βραβεύς, ἐπιστάτης fr.57L/cf.B100) who acts in the interests of the whole, not of a part, who monitors the compliance with the rules of the game and severely punishes violators. At the referential level both an ideal ruler, i.e. an enlightened monarch (εἷς ἄριστος), and a wise legislator can be meant. Apart from political connotations the triadic structure also has a theological dimension. The figures of the Shepherd (fr. 62L/B11), of Zeus' Keraunos (fr.40L/B64), of the divine child-king Aion (33L/B52) etc. apparently point to a supreme god. [p.114] Formally, Heraclitus' triadic structure can be compared with the Pythagorean Table of opposites, in which One is correlated with the good, and Many (i.e. duality) with the evil, as well as with the One and Indefinite Dyas, the first principles in Plato's «Unwritten doctrines» that have Pythagorean roots. In both cases, the active One (the source of good and order) is placed above the Duality, the source of evil and disorder. 3. Cosmos and fire: the philosophy of nature. The section of the treatise of Heraclitus, devoted to the philosophy of nature, the doctrine of the cosmos and fire, apparently adjoined to the metaphysical and epistemological introduction on the universal logos. Both of them constituted the first "Discourse on the Universe" (Λόγος περὶ τοῦ παντός) in the opus tripartitum described by Diogenes Laertius. The fragment about “this cosmos”, echoing the introductory fragments on «this logos» (Fr. 1–2), most probably was the opening of this second section of the first «discourse»: fr. 37L/B 30 κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. “This cosmos, one and the same for all, no god and no man has ever made, but it has ever been, it is and it will be an everlasting fire, kindling regularly and regularly going out.” The physical cosmos is common to the gods and the men, two classes of being of which it is composed. This definition of the cosmos ("a compound consisting of gods and men") was subsequently adopted by the Stoics from Heraclitus.12 The gods here mean not the anthropomorphic gods of poets, but the elements and luminaries. However, the fact that “all” 12 Chrysipp. fr. 527: τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα. fr. 528 τὸ οἰκητήριον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ibid. ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων. 22 (πάντων) is here masculine (from πάντες) and therefor refers to animate beings, rather than to “all things” (τὰ πάντα), gives to the Heraclitus' concept of cosmos («order» or «arrangement») an animistic character: it is a cosmos consisting not of inanimate physical objects, but of living wills, and only from them. Only some of them are mortal, and others are immortal. The common home of mortals and immortals is a kind of natural "community" (πόλις), living by natural law. [p.115] This is the first attested instance of the use of the term “cosmos” in the new philosophical sense, as applied to the Universe. Tradition ascribes this semantic neologism to Pythagoras (Placita 2.1). Perhaps the addition of the deictic pronoun «this» (τόνδε) indicates that in Heraclitus the word has not yet completely lost its metaphorical character. The assertion that “this arrangement” or “order” has not been created by any god or any man, somehow suggests that some other «orders» or «arrangements» are human artefacts (χειρόκμητα). Such are, for example, the temples of gods, created by men or some political «orders»: the term cosmos was used in the social sphere, both political and military, for example, the leaders of the Achaeans under Troy were called cosmetores of troops (Il. 1.16 κοσμήτορε λαῶν).; and officials in Crete, analogous to the Spartan ephors, were called cosmoi. We believe that just as the concept of “this logos” is introduced by Heraclitus within the framework of the grammatical analogy or the metaphorical model “the world as text” (Liber Naturae), so the concept of “this cosmos” is introduced within the framework of another metaphorical model: the cosmos as a “Temple of Nature” (Templum Naturae). We will call this code a sacral metaphorical code. Two facts support this interpretation. 1) The expression “ever-living fire” and the corresponding practice come from the cult sphere: in the Greek temples an “eternal flame” was maintained;13 the eternal flame in the temple of Apollo in Delphi was especially revered, but also of Apollo the Lycian in Argos and Apollo of Carneios in Cyrene.14 2) In the second part of the fr.43L/B67, the relation between the imperceptible essence of the world and sensible phenomena is compared with the relation between fire and incenses. This comparison recalls a scene of an altar in front of the temple, into which various incenses are thrown. As we see, not only Heraclitus' metaphysics and ethics, but also his philosophy of nature is also connected with the theme of the "wisdom of Apollo" whom Heraclitus regards the supreme and only authority in philosophy. The metaphor of 13 Cornutus. De natura deorum. P. 53, 1: τὸ δ' ἀείζωον πῦρ ἀποδέδοται τῇ Ἑστίᾳ διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι [ὄν], τάχα δ' ἐπεὶ τὰ πυρὰ ἐν κόσμῳ πάντα ἐντεῦθεν τρέφεται. 14 W. Burkert. Greek Religion (1985) 61. 23 the “temple of nature” (Templum Naturae) is not just rhetoric, it is philosophically meaningful and inextricably linked to Heraclitus' philosophical theology, his pantheism and monotheism. [p.116] Unlike many man-made temples in which the fools (axynetoi) perform meaningless rituals and pray to stone sculptures, «as if they were talking with a wall»15, in the temple of nature dwells the only alive and real cosmic god, who in vain speaks to the axynetoi thorough his logos, «this logos» of nature, but they do not listen to him. Epithets like “ever-living” and “the one who was, is and will be” in Greek perception even linguistically are equivalent to «immortal» and «divine». The threefold repetition of the verb “to be” (εἶναι) has no analogs in the remaining fragments and sounds like a religious hymn to a new god. The subject of endless disputes were two inextricably related questions: what is the nature of the “measures” to which the lighting up and the extinction of divine fire are subject, and how reliable is the interpretation going back to antiquity, according to which kindling and extinctions are related to the doctrine of ecpyrosis and diacosmesis, that is, to the cyclic cosmogony, in which the periods of the universal “conflagration” of the world alternate with the phases of the world formation as a result of the extinction of the cosmogonic fire. Almost all ancient interpreters and writers who cite this fragment or paraphrase it, understood it precisely as a cosmogonic one, and the term “by measures” (μέτρα) as a reference to «measured periods» of time, i.e. regular cycles. John Burnet in his "Early Greek Philosophy" (1930: 158-163, first edition 1892) put forward an alternative quantitative (non-temporal) understanding of "measures" as "portions" of fire, and replaced the traditional cosmogonic interpretation with a "meteorological" one: ostensibly the fragment refers to the ordinary events of everyday life, like alternation of day and night, or the change of seasons. The cosmogonic interpretation was declared a Stoic invention: according to Burnet, Kirk, Markovich and others, the fragment describes only “partial” changes inside “this cosmos” that affect separate things, but not the cosmos as a whole. According to Burnet, the words “was, is and will be” allegedly prove that Heraclitus recognized the eternity of the world. Therefore, his supporters, like Marcovich in his edition, put a colon after ... καὶ ἔσται ... ‘and it will be’, intending to separate the words “kindling and going out” from “this cosmos” as a subject. But this is grammatically impossible: Heraclitus does not say that this cosmos "was, is and will be" he clearly says that this cosmos "was, is, and will be ever-living fire, kindling regularly and 15 Fr. 145L / B 5. The section with a critique of popular religion in our edition: fragments 142-149 Leb. 24 regularly going out ". [p.117] Of the researchers who correctly objected to the Burnet's interpretation, Charles Kahn should be singled out: see his important appendix “On the cosmic cycle” in Kahn, ATH, 147 sq. But in our opinion, in the heat of controversy, Kahn goes too far when he says that "such (temporal and cyclical) concept of measure is the only one that is clearly described in the texts" of Heraclitus. The law of preservation of matter is well known to Heraclitus from Anaximander (fr.B1) and he repeatedly uses it in cosmological fragments, but precisely because this law is formulated in both Anaximander and Heraclitus in the terms of lend-and-borrow metaphorical code – generation as a «loan» and destruction as «repaying the debt» with exactly the same amount – the quantitative concept of a measure, i.e. the amount taken as loan and a then returned, does not exclude the cyclical regularity, because the lend-and-borrow model includes the temporal notion of the fixed «term» of repayment, and this notion of prothesmia, of fixed time, is very important in Heraclitus' doctrine of fate and predestination. The "kindling and going out" of ever-living fire in fr.37L/B30 describes the complex hierarchy of cosmic cycles, which Heraclitus himself lists in the first part of fr.43L/B67, starting with the smallest and ending with the biggest: "day - night", "winter - summer" and ending with the periods of the Great year, metaphorically called "abundance and poverty" and "war and peace" (on the restoration of the original text of this fragment see details in our commentary to fr.43L). This interpretation is supported by the text of the most important anthropological fragment of Heraclitus (fr.75L/B26) as reconstructed in our edition: in exact parallelism with the macrocosm, man “kindles in the morning after going out in evening”; this daily cycle of alternation of awakening and sleeping is, in turn, strictly paralleled by the cyclical alternation of life and death. Burnet's anti-cosmogonic «everyday» interpretation of «kindling and going out» of cosmic fire in fr. 37L/B30 is based on a questionable assumption that the word μέτρα is an “internal accusative” with the participles ἁπτόμενον / ἀποσβεννύμενον and that its meaning is “measures” in the sense of “portions” of fire: ostensibly, it is not the cosmos as whole that is kindled and is going out, but only some “portions” of it. This interpretation, accepted by Diels, Kirk, Marcovich and then by most of those who deny a cosmogony in Heraclitus, is both syntactically and semantically incorrect and should be rejected. Even if μέτρα is formally an “internal accusative”, it should be understood adverbially and with reference to time, as it was understood by Galen (μετρίως) and a consensus of ancient readers who paraphrase this word as κατὰ περιόδους 25 “periodically”.16 That Burnet's interpretation is wrong, and that the ancient interpretation (followed by Aristotle, many Stoics, the source of Diogenes, the Placita tradition, Galen, Simplicius and many others) is correct, has been proved beyond any doubt by the publication of a text unknown to Burnet, the Derveni papyrus. In support of his «quantitative» (and not temporal) interpretation of metra in fr.37L/B30 Burnet cited the fragment 56(c)L/B94 in the version of Plutarchean De exilio ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα “the sun will not transgress its metra”; in Plutarch’s De Iside we have a varia lectio οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται προσήκοντας ὅρους “the sun will not transgress appropriate limits”. The 5th century verbatim text of Heraclitus quoted in the col. IV of the Derveni papyrus supports the authenticity of the reading ὅρους «limits», and not of μέτρα “measures”. This makes Burnet’s alleged supporting evidence invalid. But what is really fatal for the “quanta” or “portions” interpretation of metra by Burnet and all his followers, it is the words μηνὶ τακτῶι «at prefixed month» that we read in line 13 of column IV of the Derveni papyrus in the context of quotation from Heraclitus. This proves beyond any doubt that the “limits” or “terms” (οὔρους) of the Sun in Heraclitus quotation have nothing to do with “portions” of fire or the size of the Sun, but refer to the solstices (τροπαί) that occur regularly “at prefixed month” every year. The word ὅρος (Ionian οὖρος) is even more often than μέτρον used in temporal sense referring to fixed terms. In Heraclitus’ poetic cosmology similar and synonymous words are τέρματα ‘turning posts» of day and night (of the solstices, fr. 55L/B120) and τροπαί ‘reversals’ of the opposite elements in the cycle of «Great Year» (fr. 44L/B31). We may conclude once again that Heraclitus' world-order (κόσμος) is a dynamic concept, inextricably linked with the idea of time, measured periods (metra), recurrent cycles and fate. For Aristotle and the Peripatetics the "fire" of Heraclitus was a material cause or element (ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον), "from which" all things come into being and consist. But the semantics of fire in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus is much more complex and multifaceted. The choice of fire in Heraclitus was influenced by traditional valeurs and functions of fire in Greek culture: 16 In doxography and ancient paraphrases of this famous fragment μέτρα of Heraclitus is correctly interpreted as «measured periods of time», περίοδοι, so Theophrastus in the context of. 38L/B144. In the Placita (cf. fr. 51A L) the words πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα are paraphrased as τὸ περιοδικὸν πῦρ ἀΐδιον, cf. also περιόδους in fr. 51(c); Plutarch in the context of frt.57L/B100 κίνησις ἐν τάξει μέτρον ἐχούσῃ καὶ πέρατα καὶ περιόδους and in fr. Probabilia,12 Leb.; in the doxography of Diogenes Laertius, 9.8 ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατά τινας περιόδους. LSJ, s.v.μέτρον, 2 consideres such instances as μέτρα ἐνιαυτῶν, νυκτός (Arat. 464. 731) late («later of Time, duration»), but Heraclitus in 37 L / B 30 provides exactly an early instance. 26 first of all, the role of fire in the cult and ritual, as well as in the household and crafts. In the heroic epic, fire is a power hostile to the body and corporeality, the funeral fire incinerates bodies. Of all the elements the fire is closest to the type of element that Aristotle characterized as “most incorporeal” (ἀσωματώτατον), a physical body so thin (λεπτομερέστατον) that it borders on the incorporeal. The sacral and religious associations of fire relevant to Heraclitus’ cosmological imagery have been already discussed above. Of all the elements fire is also the most energetic and resembling more a process or a power than a stable body; much more fortunate than the quantitative interpretation of «measures of fire» in Heraclitus was Burnet's subtle analysis of the image of flame as a symbol of incessant cosmic change. For his dynamic and dramatic model of the cosmos Heraclitus needed a «first element» or rather a divine essence (physis) that would antithetically combine in itself the opposite powers of generation and destruction, of creation and annihilation. Fire was exactly such essence and cosmic power that possessed this paradoxical property. Fire can destroy and annihilate, but at the same time in crafts and skills it can display a “creative” power, primarily in blacksmithing, metallurgy, pottery, bread baking, cooking, surgery, etc., in all those “arts” (tekhnai) which Heraclitus analyzed in his "Political logos" (see fragments 111, 115, 116, 116A, 117, 75A in our edition, most of them not in DK, Marcovich or other editions). Thus, the Stoics did not invent the concept of the creationist “artistic fire” (πῦρ τεχνικόν), but borrowed it from Heraclitus. [p.119] The choice of Heraclitus could have been partly influenced also by the Zeitgeist: his book was written at a tragic time when the fire of war literally burned around, temples and whole cities were annihilated by fire. In fr. 135L/B43 Heraclitus compares civil war with fire. The debate between the supporters and opponents of the cyclical cosmogony in Heraclitus (ecpyrosis and diacosmesis in later terminology) that continues since the 19th century should be ended by the recognition of the validity of the ancient tradition and relegated to the archives of scholarship. The reconstruction of the lend-and-borrow economic metaphorical code in the cosmological fragments of Heraclitus (the predestinated interchange of opposites as a “repayment of debt” at a fixed term, prothesmia), leaves no doubt that the cyclical cosmogony is directly attested by Heraclitus' ipsissima verba in fr. 42/B90: just as a loan (money, χρυσός) and a pledge (property, χρήματα) cannot be in the same hands at the same time, in other words they cannot coexist, in the same way fire (πῦρ, referential equivalent of “gold”) and all things, i.e. the actual world-formation (πάντα, referential equivalent of “property”) can only alternate in time within two different phases of a cosmic cycle, the phase of «abundance» or «wealth» (κόρος) and the phase of 27 “need” or “poverty” (χρησμοσύνη). The simile of this fragment is based on a subjective perspective, like some other fragments of Heraclitus, i.e. the exchange of gold (money) for property (pledge) should be seen by the eyes of a participant of transaction, and not by the eyes of external observer. In the economic metaphorical code «property» is a metaphor of being, therefore «to have» or «to be available» at the iconic level means «to exist» at the referential level of meaning. Phase one: «Now I have gold» = «Fire exists». Phase two: «I give my gold as loan, and I exchange it (ἀνταμείβομαι) for the pledge” = “Fire disappears, the world comes into being”. Phase 3: “At the prefixed time my gold is returned and I return the pledge” = «The world disappears, Fire exists». By this analogy Heraclitus anticipated the Aristotelian distinction between possibility (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια) and provided a basis for the cyclical cosmogony of the Stoics. Let us now turn to the theory of elements in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus. Theophrastus, who, unlike us, had in his hands the complete text of Heraclitus, could not construct a coherent exposition of his “physics”: according to his testimony, there were contradictions in the physics of Heraclitus, while some parts remained unfinished (Theophrastus ap. D.L. 9.6). For those who consider the book of Heraclitus as an ethical-political and theological treatise with paradigmatic analogies from the natural world, and not as a version of the standard Ionian Περὶ φύσεως, there is nothing surprising in this statement of Theophrastus. In different chapters or passages of his book Heraclitus used physical theories taken from various sources. The existence of contradictions in the «physics» of Heraclitus should be accepted as established fact. Already Aristotle hesitated whether the material principle of Heraclitus should be identified with fire (so he thinks in Metaphysics and Physics) or with the “exhalation” (ἀναθυμίασις, so he thinks in De anima). Aenesidemus, who carefully studied the text of Heraclitus, believed that the original substance in Heraclitus' physics was «air», and not fire (air is identical with the «exhalation» from water). In the authentic fragments of Heraclitus we indeed find texts that support both views: fragments 42L (B90), 42A unequivocally identify the cosmogonic principle as "fire". [p.120] On the contrary, in fr.69L/B36 the cycle of interconversion of three elements begins with air (the cosmic psyche), whereas the fire is not even mentioned. Moreover, in fr.69L/B36 on the one hand, and in the complex fr.44–45L/B31 on the other, we find two different systems of elements: in the first case, a system of three elements (breath=air, water and earth), in the second a system of four: fire, whirlwind (= air), sea and earth. The theories of change that underly these two systems are also different: the first is taken from Anaximenes (the transformation of a single substrate), there are no pairs of opposites in it. The second implies a cyclical interconversion of opposites. 28 The four elements fall into two pairs of opposites: a hot fire paired with cold air and a dry earth paired with wet water. Although Heraclitus held the doctrine of the periodic "conflagration" of the polymorphic world of the four world-masses, the complex of fragments 44–45L/B31 is not a cosmogony in the usual sense. What we have here, is not a scientific description of material change or of cosmic evolution, but a metaphysically and politically loaded parable about the “war” of the four world masses, demonstrating how the “law of pendulum” (or the «way up and down») of the cosmic justice, the inevitable exchange of damage and retribution between the opposite powers, works at the macrocosmic level. The fragments 44–45L/B31 contain a “calendar of the Great Year (Megas Eniautos)”, describing the change of the four epochs as successive domination and defeat of each of the four elements. The key-term τροπαί denotes in this text the temporal “turning-points” and not “transformations”, (a mistaken interpretation that goes back to the Stoic source of Clement and is commonly uncritically accepted in modern literature, Charles Kahn being a notable exception). This is a complex metaphor that simultaneously contains an allusion to the “turning-points” of the year, i.e. solstices and equinoxes, and also, within the framework of the metaphorical model “the world as a battlefield”, to the “reversals”, that is, the «retreats» of the defeated adversaries in the cosmic battle. At the same time, the fragment 44L/B31 is an Apollonian conundrum (γρῖφος): “The turnings of Fire are first the Sea, and the turnings of the Sea are half Earth, and half Whirlwind.” One can understand the meaning of these enigmatic words only having in mind a diagram representing five «turnings» of a four spoke chariot wheel, the popular sacred symbol of Apollo in archaic times. Both in Heraclitus and Empedocles the revolving («turning around») four spoke wheel is a symbol of time. This Apollonian symbol of time is mentioned in Heraclitus fr.65L/B103 and in Marsilio Ficino's paraphrase of Heraclitus fr.68L/cf. B91. Fire dominates on June 22nd (the Great Year is isomorphic to the astronomical year) in the epoch of Great Summer, then it suffers a first defeat (τροπή, ῾reversal”, i.e. turns back and retreats) in Great Fall, when the Sea dominates on September 22nd (the epoch of rains begins); in the Great Winter at Winter Tropai on December 22nd dominates the enemy of Fire, the cold storm-wind Prester (gales are typical for the winter months in Greece); and finally in the Great Spring, on March 22nd after the defeat of Prester dominates Mother Earth, when plants start growing and flowering begins. [p.121] At the moment of domination, each element is in the phase of “abundance” or “excess” (κόρος), and its opposite is in the phase of “scarcity” or “need” (χρησμοσύνη), then they switch their roles. In the temple of Apollo Didymeus near Miletus, the local Pythia (“prophetess”), while foretelling 29 the future, sat not on a tripod, as in Delphi, but “on the axis” (Iambl. De myst. 3.11ἐπὶ ἄξονος καθημένη προλέγει τὸ μέλλον), that is, on a chariot four spoke wheel, lifted up on the axis.17 Since this practice is not an “imitation of Delphi”, which is typical for the period of the renewal of the Didymaean oracle in the Hellenistic era, it can be assumed that this is an ancient tradition dating back to the 6th century. On the image of a rotating wheel, as a symbol of change, which to some extent is parallel to the symbol of the river, but at the same time is a symbol of cyclical change (a connotation missing from the river image), see further our commentary to fr. 65 and 68 with a unique quotation in Ficino from unknown source (rotae currentis…). Since Heraclitus allegorically identified Apollo with the sun18, and the sun, according to Heraclitus, controls the cycles of day and night, as well as the change of the seasons (fr.57L, the text of B100 in DK is incomplete), it will not be too bold to assume that the cycle of the Great Year (Megas Eniautos), isomorphic to the astronomical year, was also modelled in Heraclitus by the same Apollonian symbol of revolving four spoke wheel, in which the four spikes correspond to the four elements and the rotation of which corresponds to the change both of year Horai and of the Great Epochs. The striking similarity of the cosmic cycle of Heraclitus with the cosmogony of Empedocles makes us to think about two possible scenarios: either Empedocles is the debtor of Heraclitus, or both depend on a common (probably Pythagorean) source. The Pythagorean Oath by Tetraktys contains a possible allusion to the 4 "roots" of Empedocles, but it may be older than Empedocles.19 Note that we do not ascribe to Heraclitus the Empedoclean theory of immutable elements and his mechanistic theory of «mixture» and separation, we ascribe to Heraclitus the theory of 4 world-masses (maxima membra mundi in Lucretius' phrase) which, unlike Empedocles' «roots» constantly change into each other. The theory of 4 maxima membra mundi may have existed even before Heraclitus in Anaximander, and it is directly attested in fr.44-45L. For more details on the cosmic cycle see our commentary to fr. 44–45L (cf. B31) and especially the diagram on page 343 of the published version. [Our commentary on these fragments is summarized in the pdf file «Heraclitus' Cosmic Cycle Explained» uploaded in our personal page on this site; it also contains the diagram which illustrates the calendar of the Great year in Heraclitus]. 17 Jamblichus. De mysteriis 3.11: ἡ ἐν Βραγχίδαις γυνὴ χρησμωιδός... ἐπὶ ἄξονος καθημένη προλέγει τὸ μέλλον. (Parke 1986: 124; Herda 2008: 58, n. 343; 60, n. 355–356). 18 In the cult of the Milesian Apollo Didymeus this is attested quite early, see Herda (2008) 33, n. 54; 38. 19 [Plut.] De placitis philosophorum 877A οὐ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεος ῥίζωμά τ’ ἔχουσαν.’ 30 4. Man and soul: anthropology and psychology The key text of Heraclitus on human nature 75 L (B 26 DK) has undergone significant distortions in the medieval manuscript transmission. In the form in which it is printed in the editions of Clement's Stromata, this text is grammatically impossible and philosophically meaningless. [p.122] We propose the following reconstruction of the Greek text and interpretation (for the justification of the emended text see the critical apparatus and our commentary): ἄνθρωπος εὐφρόνη φάος · ἅπτεται ἑῶιος ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὀψίας. ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται, τεθνεῶτος, εὖτε {ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις} ἐγρηγορὼς ἅπτεται, εὕδοντος. «Man is night and light: he kindles in the morning after going out in the evening. And he kindles alive after he has died, just as he kindles awakened after sleep». A parallelism between fr.75L/B26 and the fragment about the «kindling and going out» of the cosmos in fr.37L/B 30 is obvious and is a clear evidence of the fact that the archaic idea of parallelism of the microcosm and the macrocosm played an important role in the anthropology of Heraclitus. Man, like cosmos, is subject to a regular rhythm of kindling and extinction. The alternation of day and night in the cosmos corresponds to the cycle of wakefulness and sleep in humans. On the ground of this parallelism Heraclitus per analogiam makes a bold conclusion that life and death are also cyclical: death is followed by a new life just as sleep is followed by awakening. If our emendation is correct, Heraclitus' theory on the nature of man reveals a striking resemblance to the theory of Parmenides, according to which man consists of two elements: active spiritual (light) and passive carnal (night). The opposition of light and darkness also appears in the Pythagorean Table of opposites: in this Table light (φῶς) corresponds to good (ἀγαθόν) and limit (πέρας), while darkness (σκότος) corresponds to evil (κακόν) and unlimited (ἄπειρον) (Parmenid. B 16, cf. B 8, 56 sq. Pythag. 58 B 5 DK). Heraclitus, unlike the Pythagoreans, was not a metaphysical dualist, and therefore could not accept a radical dualism of the spiritual (mental) and physical. The night in Heraclitus was most probably understood as the absence of light (fire) or "extinction." But it is quite possible that general theoretical monism did not prevent him (as it did not prevent the Stoics) from recognizing a relative (axiological) dualism of God and matter, body and soul, regarding the corporeal as “extinguished fire”. Within the ethical sphere, such an 31 antithetical conception of a person will “work” in the same way as the “strict” dualism of the Pythagorean type, since the soul receives a privileged status, and it is the concern for the soul, not for the body, and for moral rather than material values that becomes a priority. The words of Heraclitus “The ethos of man is his daimon” (i.e. his fate and source of his genuine well-being) anticipates the Socratic ethics (see commentary on fr.96L/B 119). [p.123] This dualistic anthropology explains the noticed by many similarity between some views of Heraclitus on the soul with the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines. The tradition of Heraclitus’ vegetarianism and his ascetic life in the mountains, his contempt for luxury and pleasures, also receives some explanation. If the soul is a spiritual light, enclosed in the darkness of sensual flesh, moral life should become a katharsis, a purification of the soul from bodily filth. It is conceivable that Heraclitus played on the homonymy of the words φῶς ‘light’ and φώς “man”.20 In his authentic psychological fragments Heraclitus contrasts the "dry" and the "wet souls": a dry soul is "the wisest and best" (which corresponds to the intellectual and moral virtues of Aristotle), while the "wet" soul of a drunk is deprived of reason and turns humans into cattle (fr.73–74L/B117-118). It stands for reason that the story of the "drunk", who forgets the road to his home, is a parable about all non-philosophical humanity that lives in the pursuit of pleasures, without «listening with understanding» to the nature and the divine logos. Aristotle and the doxography describe the physical substrate of the soul in Heraclitus as "exhalation from the blood." This is confirmed by two fragments quoted by Arius Didymus together with the river fragment; the first we attribute to Heraclitus, emending the MSS. νοεραί «intelligent» to Ionian and poetic νοτεραί «wet», its authenticity is guaranteed by the syntactical ambiguity; the second may be a later paraphrase of the first. 67(a)L ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοτεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται «the souls, being evaporated [scil. from the blood] always become moistened». and fr.67(c)L/cf.B12 αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται «souls are evaporated from liquids" This conception of the soul is also based on the parallelism of the micro and macrocosm: the evaporation from the blood in the human body is analogous to the “evaporation” from the sea in the «great body» of the cosmic god, which «feeds» the sun and the stars. The Hippocratic author of the treatise On Diet, book I in his imitation of Heraclitus understands the soul as a 20 This word pun may be also alluded to in Parmenides 28 B 1, 3: the man of knowlege, i.e. a philosopher, εἰδὼς φώς travels from the realm of darkness and ignorance to the realm of light and wisdom. 32 “mixture of fire and water,” an active light and a passive dark elements, from which both the cosmos and human body are composed. All cosmic cycles, like those of day and night, the change of seasons, are conceived as alternating “advance and retreat” (military metaphors) of fire and water, oscillating between a prefixed maximum (μήκιστον) and minimum (ἐλάχιστον). The influence of Heraclitus’ battle of elements and his concept of fixed «turning points» (tropai, termata) is obvious. Fire and water are powers rather than bodies, it seems that they are associated with the Sun and the Moon respectively, the male and female dynameis (De diaeta 1.7). The attempt of Kirk, Marcovich and some others to interpret anathymiasis “evaporation” in Heraclitus as “fire” should be rejected. The anathymiasis both in Aristotle and Heraclitus is not “fire”, but a steam or vapor, an intermediate phase in the transition from wet to hot, from the sea to the aither, something close to air. The interpretation of the Hippocratic doctor is closer to Heraclitus' conception since the steam is indeed, from the Greek point of view, “a mixture of water and fire”, a suspension of hot particles of water, but not a pure fire. [p.124] So, the structure of the soul according to Heraclitus (like everything else in the world) is antithetical: as in the Orphic anthropogony, the divine “fiery” part of the human soul is “mixed” with a dark element. In the Orphic myth it is called Titanic, in Heraclitus it is described as a «wet soul». However, «wet» in Heraclitus is more than a physical quality or a dynamis of the Ionian physics, it is also a psychological and ethical concept: it is a sensual, emotional, sexual, intoxicating, Bacchic and feminine element that may cause madness of crowds resulting in anthropomorphic polytheism, the rule of hoi polloi and the pursuit of egoistic pleasure. Its eternal adversary both in nature and in human soul is the «dry» and fiery Apollonian element responsible for sophia and sophrosyne of the wise, political homonoia under the rule of the best, and the heroism of fallen in battle. Behind this symbolic axiological system lurks a system of systoikhiai that resembles the Aristoxenian, more archaic than the one quoted by Aristotle, version of the Pythagorean Table of opposites (Aristoxenus Fr. 13 Wehrli). 5. Ethos: moral philosophy. Heraclitus is the first Greek philosopher, in whose texts of we find not only an interest in moral issues (the history of Greek ethical thought in such extended sense one should start from Homer), but also virtually all the fundamental concepts of classical philosophical ethics. He is the first to speak about the moral character of a person (ἦθος), about virtue (ἀρετή), about practical 33 intelligence (φρόνησις) and about wisdom (σοφία), about happiness (using the more archaic concept of δαίμων rather than εὐδαιμονία), about the nature of good and evil, about pleasure as a false human value (τέρψις – Ionian equivalent of attic and general ἡδονή). Heraclitus can also be considered the father of moral psychology: for the first time in his fragments the term psyche becomes a carrier of intellectual (wisdom) and moral (virtue) qualities, i.e. is identified as a moral agent and a moral personality. Moreover, it is in Heraclitus that the term “nature” (φύσις) for the first time is transformed from a scientific physical concept into ethical and theological one. Just as later in Stoics, “nature” (physis) in Heraclitus signifies the objective order of things (as opposed to the subjective dokeonta of the axynetoi and the poets), and exactly as in Stoics it contains the divine «universal logos» proclaimed as the new moral standard as well as a paradigm for the «correct» political and religious legislation. [However, as we have already noticed, the meaning of logos in Heraclitus differs from the Stoic usage in one respect: although logos may be «spoken out» by the cosmic god through the visible «works» of nature, it is not directly identified with the divine mind, because it is a metaphor and not a mental term for “reason”. Heraclitus has different words that refer to the divine cosmic Mind: Γνώμη, τὸ Σοφόν, φρόνιμον τὸ πῦρ]. Some 100 years before Plato and some 150 years before Aristotle Heraclitus for the first time addressed the fundamental in Greek philosophical ethics problem of the relation between reason and emotions (passions), as well as the problem of the internal conflict between rational mind and irrational desires that recalls the problem of akrasia. It stands for reason that he formulated all this not in the standard 4th century terminology (like τὸ λογικόν and τὰ πάθη), but in archaic Ionian prose and relying on his symbolical psychophysical concepts of the «wet» (sensual, irrational) and «dry» (intellectual and spiritual) elements in human psyche. Heraclitus' word for the emotional part of the soul and passions is thymos (θυμός fr.89L/B85) in its archaic and poetic sense of «heart» (not in the fourth century sense of anger), the seat of passionate desires (ὁκόσα θέλουσι, fr.87L/B110). The rational faculty of the soul is represented primarily by “intelligence” or “sound mind” φρόνησις, φρονεῖν, as well as by intellect (νόος, γνώμη). Despite the lexical differences, Heraclitus' moral psychology grosso modo agrees with the central demand of the classical virtue ethics, the demand of the strict control of emotions and subordination of desires to the dictates of the «ruling» reason. In this demand he goes even further than Plato and certainly further than Aristotle; his position comes closer to the ascetic anti-hedonism of the Pythagoreans, Antisthenes and (no wonder) to the Stoics. His ideal is a kind of apatheia, i.e. a radical extermination of all passions of the heart (thymos), rather than their education and control as in Plato and Aristotle. As in Plato, so in Heraclitus' philosophy ethics is inextricably linked with his politics, and both ethics 34 and politics rely on his metaphysics and philosophical theology. Both in his metaphysics and in his ethics, Heraclitus points to Apollo as his teacher and the source of wisdom, the god of measure and harmony of opposites. Long before Socrates, Heraclitus responded to the imperative of the Delphic god “Know thyself” by saying “I have searched myself” (fr.97L / B 101). The seeming subjectivism and relativism, that might be found in the fragments about the relativity of human values, supported by tekmeria (empirical instances) from animal behavior (fr. 90–95L, ), should not be misleading: in these fragments Heraclitus criticizes the false values of hoi polloi in the context of his radical polemics against hedonism and the pursuit of pleasure. The relativity of false values is contrasted with the eternal and absolute genuine value or human good (ἀγαθόν) based on the "divine knowledge", that is on the surpassing human subjectivity cosmic point of view conforming with nature (fr.82L/B78). [p.125] Like Plato, Heraclitus must be classed with the representatives of moral realism in ethics, he is convinced of the objectivity and eternity of moral and legal standards, as they have superhuman, and therefore, extra-subjective, justification. The chances are that Heraclitus already knew the classical ethical topos about the “three ways of life” (βίοι), corresponding to three different conceptions of happiness. Here is the contrast between the hedonism of hoi polloi and the heroic elite choosing immaterial values. 102L/B 29 αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέο ἀέναον θνητῶν · οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα. «The best (or “the noblest”) of men choose one thing only instead of all /other goods/, the eternal glory among the mortals21, whereas the crowd indulges in gluttony like cattle». In the aristocratic lexicon of the Greeks οἱ πολλοί is not just a “majority” in a quantitative sense, but also democratic party. And aristoi in the sphere of politics are not just the “best”, but primarily the aristocrats who have the sense of superiority and possession of excellence (ἀρετή) that distinguishes them from the crowd. But did Heraclitus really intend by this contrast the traditional conflict of two parties, the demotic and the aristocratic? This can be questioned. In the language of Greek philosophers and especially moralists, elitism seldom, if ever, has an explicit class character: the hoi polloi contrasted in their discourse with sophoi, agathoi, kharientes, spudaioi etc., are not aristocrats by the social status, but aristoi according to meritocracy, the intellectual 21 A possible another instance of intentional syntactical ambiguity: θνητῶν can mean both «mortal men» and «mortal things». In the latter case one should translate «one thing to all other: the immortal glory to what is transitory”. 35 and moral elite of the philosophers, whose «excellence» is accorded to them by education rather than descent. Heraclitus does not seem to provide an exception to this rule: fragment 99L/B116 explicitly proclaims that the acquisition of the «greatest excellence» in Heraclitus's ethics, sophrosyne, is open to all men. While condemning the “gluttony” and the bestial hedonism of the Ephesians, Heraclitus hardly targets simple peasants and craftsmen: his lively interest in the world of crafts (τέχναι) and the «works» of all kinds of non-aristocratic professions does not square with a supposed aristocratic snobbery.22 [p.126] Rather, the target of his passionate invective is the Ephesian «bourgeoisie», the new rich middle class of merchants and manufacturers, whose wealth has long surpassed the wealth of the old land-owning aristocracy. Heraclitus condemns their “demonstrative consumption” at the time of need and scarcity or resources (χρησμοσύνη), presumably at the time of the Ionian revolt or soon after it. These people apparently did not want to fight the Persians, fearing for their lives and wealth. That is why Heraclitus appeals to the “old noblesse”, to the traditional military-aristocratic ethics of heroism and self-sacrifice with its cult of the “immortal glory” and the apotheosis of the fallen. The ideal of this knightly ethics was the Homeric Achilles, who “chose” a heroic death in battle when he was young instead of the innumerable joys of a non-heroic long life in peace. The fragment is also interesting as an illustrative example of how Heraclitus applies in ethics his central metaphysical opposition of «one and many» with a clear assertion of the axiological primacy of the one over the many. Just as in physics one thing (fire) costs as much as the whole cosmos (πάντα, fr.42L/B90), just as in politics “one the best” costs more than “myriad” (fr.128L/B49), and one divine law surpasses all human laws taken together (fr.131L/B114), just as in theology the divine cosmic mind (Gnome) that alone governs the whole Universe, deserves to be worshipped by the Greeks more than all the gods of the poets (fr.140L/B41), so in his ethics one immaterial value (the immortal glory) costs more than all the goods of the world combined. Given that the immortal glory (kleos) is an award for arete, and that arete in Heraclitus' ethics has already become something that belongs to one's inner self or psyche (as later in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics), we may conclude that Heraclitus anticipated the central principle of the Socratic and Stoic ethics ὅτι τὸ μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν “(Remember) that the only good is 22 In this Heraclitus seems to be a more “democrtatic” character than Plato. It is hard to imagine Plato visiting smitheries, washeries (fuller’s shops), potters etc., studying with attention their “works” (ἔργα) and trying to discover in what they are doing a mimesis of the heavenly theios nomos of the harmony of opposites. 36 what is noble” where by the “noble” is meant the excellence (arete) of the soul, the immaterial agathon. If this analysis is sound, we may also conclude that Heraclitus can be regarded as the earliest attested representative of the tradition of moral philosophy known as «virtue ethics». The verb κορέννυμι “to engorge, to full oneself”, used by Heraclitus in his invective, is cognate with the word κόρος which is used in two main senses, gastronomical and economical: 1) ‘satiety’(opp. λιμός hunger), in contexts relating to food and eating and 2) “excess, abundance, wealth” (opp.χρησμοσύνη in archaic Ionian, and πενία in Attic and koine, “poverty” ) in context relating to property, wealth. It is virtually certain that in his description of the cosmic processes and in the calendar of the Great year Heraclitus uses, it as economic metaphor for “wealth and poverty” or “excess and deficiency”, to denote the peaks of the opposite processes of growth (koros) and diminution (chresmosyne). In Greek moralists, poets and philosophers, koros is a pejorative word, that may include both connotations, and also refer to all kind of moral vice associated with insolence (hybris) punished by the gods. The proverbial locus classicus comes from the mouth of another unhappy aristocrat of the same epoch of civil discord and revolutions, Theognis of Megara (Theogn.153): Tίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῶ ὄλβος ἕπηται / ἀνθρώπωι καὶ ὅτωι μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι. “Glut breeds insolence when wealth falls in the hands of an evil man who is deprived of a sound mind.” Heraclitus would have applauded these words, especially since Theognis, a victim of civil war, probably suffered in Megara from the same nouveau riches as those whom Heraclitus denounced in Ephesus. Hybris “insolence”, cursed by Heraclitus as the greatest evil for the polis, results in the transgression of due measure (μέτρα) and leads to tyranny (fr.135L/B43). The best prevention of these diseases of the soul and of the polis Heraclitus seeks in the propagation of the virtue of moderation, restraint, curbing of desires and chastity (fr.99-100L/B116.112), the sophrosyne. Here are the ethical fragments of Heraclitus preserved by Stobaeus that are of primary importance for his theory of virtues. (For the defence of their authenticity contra Kirk and Marcovich, and for the justification of our text and the separation of the DK fragment into two quotations joined by the καί of the anthologist, see our commentary): [p.127] Heraclitus fr.100L / B 112 DK = Stobaeus, Anthol. III, 1, 178 “σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη” καὶ “σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας” (a) “Moderation is the greatest excellence” and (b) “Wisdom is to speak out the truth and to act in agreement with nature, understanding her” 37 [scil. understanding the voice of nature, the universal logos]. The promotion of the moderation to the highest position in the hierarchy of virtues indicates the aristocratic, conservative and ascetic (anti-hedonistic) character of Heraclitus' ethics. Plato, Heraclitus' intellectual twin, in the fourth book of Politeia recognizes justice (δικαιοσύνη) the main excellence of the soul, yet temperance or self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) is also accorded an important place. Σωφροσύνη both in popular Greek morality and in philosophical ethics is used in two main senses: a more restricted one relating to interpersonal relations and family life, and a wider sense relating to social and political behavior. Sophrosyne in the first more specific sense is the ability to curb the desires (especially in sexual sphere), to withstand the temptations, it comes close to chastity; in popular morality it is commonly regarded as a distinctive virtue of a woman, of a faithful wife (but not only). Sophrosyne in the second sense signifies self-control not only in the private, but also in the civil sphere and it comes close to mindfulness and sound mind of a man who observes the limits imposed by law and custom, as well as by his social status. The vice opposed to the sophrosyne in private life is licentiousness (ἀκολασία); the vice opposite to the moderation in the second civil sense is the lack of sound mind and folly (ἀφροσύνη), and from this there are only few steps to insanity (μαίνεσθαι) and the peak of insolence (hybris), characterized by a total disrespect and humiliation of others (e.g. in tyranny), as well as by arrogant behavior that insults the gods and provokes their nemesis. Heraclitus' concept of moderation (sophrosyne) combines both these senses, both the cathartic chastity, the taming of one's desires, the victory over one's violent thymos, on the one hand, and the civil self-control, mindfulness combined with observance of law, on the other. The civil sophrosyne in Heraclitus, in turn, is also twofold: on the one hand, it is a respect for custom and law in one’s own polis; on the other hand, it is a respect for the divine cosmic Justice (Dike) in the Republic of Zeus, of which the philosopher is also a citizen. It may seem that the emphasis on two most important virtues, moderation (moral) and wisdom (intellectual), anticipates Aristotle's distinction of moral and intellectual virtues. But this is not exactly the case: in Heraclitus wisdom (sophia) is both theoretical («to speak», i.e. to pronounce a logos) and practical («to act») virtue. It is worth noticing that before Plato and Aristotle the term arete was primarily associated with active, practical life (the traces of this traditional conception are still visible in Aristotle's discussion of three bioi in EN I.5), often with military and athletic excellence, and therefore arete could be counterposed to sophia (intellectual excellence). According to the author of the Dissoi logoi (circa 400 B.C.), sophists and philosophers of his time teach «virtue and wisdom» (ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν), i.e. both practical skills and theoretical 38 knowledge. That is why Heraclitus does not call wisdom arete. [p.128] It seems that the two most important excellences in Heraclitus, sophrosyne and sophia, correspond to the two parts or faculties of the soul: the emotional faculty (thymos) and the rational faculty (γνώμη, φρονεῖν, νόος). We should not tacitly assume that the Platonic concept of “parts of the soul” (τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς) was known to and shared by Heraclitus; he may well have conceived them as “powers” or dynameis of the soul. And we should not ascribe to Heraclitus the division of the rational part or faculty of the soul into theoretical and practical reason with two distinct virtues of sophia and phronesis. This was a revolutionary innovation of Aristotle’s moral psychology in EN book 6; in Heraclitus, as in Plato, σοφία and φρόνησις must have been closely related, not contrasted, terms. The conceptual pair “to act and to speak” (ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν) in fr.100L/B112 exactly corresponds to the programmatic distinction of “words and deeds” (ἔπη καὶ ἔργα) in fr. 2L/B1. In the proem Heraclitus specifies the main subject of his work as a comparative enquiry into «words and deeds» in the human and divine world, i.e. in the cosmos. This is an anticipation in archaic phraseology of the future Stoic division of philosophy into logic (ἔπη «words», cf. λόγον τόνδε ibidem), physics (ἔργα, the “deeds” of the cosmos, i.e.cosmic processes) and ethics (the «deeds» of men). Now it becomes clear why «wisdom» consists in «speaking out the truth» (logic and physics) and «acting according to nature» (ethics). Both speech and action should be grounded in «agreement with nature», i.e. with the objective order of things directed by divine mind and omnipotent fate, and such following and agreement is possible only through «listening to» and «understanding» (ἐπαΐοντας) the voice of nature, the eternal logos. On this text of Heraclitus is directly based the fundamental principle of Stoic ethics “to live in agreement with nature”, ὁμολογουμένως τῆι φύσει ζῆν.23 One should stop speaking about “the distorting lens” of the Stoic reception of Heraclitus. Instead one should admire the Stoics as the best interpreters of Heraclitus of all ancient commentators. Yes, they have rephrased the main doctrines of Heraclitus, originally expressed in archaic Ionian prose and metaphorical language, in a plain Hellenistic koine of their time using the conceptual and terminological apparatus of their own school, but what is wrong with this? Isn’t any modern historian of ancient philosophy doing the same? One should rather speak about the distorting and deforming lens of the 19th century hypercritical “projectionism” which produced the ill-founded and philosophically dull materialist falsification of Heraclitus’ utterly ingenious and 23 On this principle, the τέλος formula, see e.g. Schofield, Stoic ethics, in: Inwood (2003) 239 ff. 39 profound ethical-political-theological thought, a falsification that still mars many expositions of his philosophy. 6. Polis and Cosmopolis: the practices of men. State and laws. We find a similar contrast between the ideals of the unenlightened crowd and those who “listen to” the logos in the political philosophy of Heraclitus. As in his ethics, so in his political philosophy Heraclitus asserts the axiological primacy of the “one” (common) over the “many” (individual): fr. 130L/B104 τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι ἕπονται καὶ νόμοισι χρέονται (scil. δήμων), <οὐκ> εἰδότες ὅτι ‘οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὄλἰγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί᾽. ‘What kind of mind do they have? What kind of reason? They follow the singers of the crowd (demos) and they rely on the laws (of the crowd) ignoring that most are bad, few are good.” [p.129] [Preliminary note on the Greek text, for details see our commentary to this fragment, Lebedev, Logos Geraklita, pp. 435-437. It is hard to understand why most editors of Heraclitus (Marcovich, Kahn and Conche among them) follow Diels-Kranz and Bywater and prefer the inferior and heavily corrupted version of Proclus to the superior version of Clement. The corrupted version of Proclus omits the word νόμοισι “laws” which is of primary importance not only for the interpretation of this fragment, but also for the reconstruction of Heraclitus’ political philosophy in general. Clement is generally an incomparably superior source of Heraclitus quotations than Proclus both with regard of quantity and quality of quotations. And besides, Clement’s quotation is in Ionian dialect (νόμοισι χρέονται!), whereas Proclus’ quotation in a colorless late Greek, with the exception of one word νόος. Note that the Ionian dialect in Proclus is otherwise «restored» by Diels, not attested in MSS.!]. By “they” Heraclitus means the unphilosophical and ignorant hoi polloi, those «lacking understanding» (axynetoi) who do not heed the universal logos, but indulge in gluttony, sex, intoxication and ecstatic «madness» of the Bacchic cult. The culprits, the teachers of this hedonistic way of life, according to Heraclitus, are the poets whose «words» (ἔπη) they heed: Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus. What is the link between the poets and the "laws of the crowd"? The link becomes transparent once we clarify the conventional translation of the term νόμοι as "laws". This word in classical Greek has a broader meaning than our «laws»: it covers not only political laws, but also customs, religious cults and rituals. We say «to believe in gods», the Greek used to say θεοὺς νομίζειν, literally “to recognize 40 the gods by custom or law”. Homer and Hesiod, according to Heraclitus, taught the Greeks the false religion of many anthropomorphic and immoral gods, which is harmful both for the human soul and for the state, as polytheism promotes the "private" and individual (ἴδιον) to the detriment of the "public" and common (ξυνόν), the separatism and disunity of communities (poleis), and their inability to withstand the might of the Persian Empire. Religion and politics for Heraclitus, as well as for the entire archaic period of Greek history, are inextricably linked, in a sense they are the same, the collective bonds, that transform a mass of people into single body of a polis, animated by a collective will of government. To create a unified state, you need a unifying god. The aristoi in the ethical fr.102L/B29 choose “one instead of all”. In fr.130L/B104 Heraclitus calls upon Ephesians to make the same choice in the sphere of nomoi, i.e in the sphere of both religion and politics. Like Plato in the 10th book of the Politeia (in which Heraclitus’ invective against Homer’ pacifism is quoted), Heraclitus believed that the philosophers should succeed poets as the teachers of the Greeks (according to our interpretation of fr. 133L/B35; cf. Heraclit. Probabilia fr.1(a) and (b) Leb. = Plato, Resp.607b). Central to the understanding of Heraclitus’ political theory and philosophy of law is the programmatic fragment quoted verbatim by Stobaeus: Fr. 131L/B 114: ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου · κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. ‘Those who wish to speak [properly, “speak out their logos”] with mind, should strongly rely on the common for all /logos/, as a community [= many citizens] relies on [one and the same] nomos, and even much stronger. For all human nomoi [= customs and laws] are fed [= supported like nurselings by their Breadwinner, i.e. Father], by only one nomos, the divine. His power extends as far as he wills, he is sufficient for all and he even overpowers them all.’ As regards the text, the phrase ξυνῶι πάντων “common for all” is either elliptical for ξυνῶι πάντων λόγωι «common for all logos», or (as we are inclined to think) the word λόγωι after ξυνῶι has been lost in medieval transmission. This is more than just a conjecture: 1) λόγωι is supplied and then for some reason deleted in one of the two best MSS. of Stobaeus, the codex Napolitanus (N); 2) the chances are that Heraclitus’ fr.7L/B2, that contains the phrase ξυνὸς λόγος “common logos” in Ionian dialect, derives from the context of fr.131L/B114 or even is partly based on it, as has been suggested by West and Marcovich. This fragment cannot be adequately interpreted before we answer the preliminary question: who are the “speakers” that in their «speaking» (i.e. in their individual logoi) should rely on the 41 “common logos”? The following reference to the polis and laws makes it clear that Heraclitus does not mean in this particular passage all men and the ordinary language they speak, although he may have said something like this in the first chapter in his theory of names. In this fragment Heraclitus apparently refers to «speakers» who speak or deliver their «speeches» (logoi) in an assembly, i.e. to political orators, or to those who «speak out» or write political or religious laws, nomoi (or nomoi hieroi «sacred laws»), i.e. legislators. [p.130] In Greek linguistic consciousness nomos (νόμος) «law or custom» is a kind of logos.24 The fragment is a constructive supplement and a direct continuation of the preceding critical fragment 130L/B104. The bad nomoi criticized in the latter fragment were invented by aoidoi, i.e. by poets like Homer. Therefore the reference should be to religious nomoi (or at least should include religious nomoi), i.e. to anthropomorphic polytheism invented by poets who drank too much and were deprived of «sound mind». The fragment 131L/B114 says how one should establish good laws: legislators who wish to «speak out» laws «with sound mind» (ξὺν νόωι) should rely on the divine law, the law of the harmony opposites by which the polis of Zeus, i.e. the cosmos, is administered. This law permeates the whole Universe and governs all human practices, like art and crafts. But men do not «notice» this because of their stupidity and lack of understanding. As «workers» (ἐργάται in fr.107L/B75, probably authentic word preserved by Marcus Aurelius), they work correctly, “according to nature”. They «work» correctly, without realizing this. It is only in the sphere of religion and politics that they err and act «contrary to nature». For Heraclitus polytheism and democracy (called isonomia in his time in Ionia) are inextricably linked as they are related forms of the same unnatural «rule of the many». Bad laws, both political and religious, are established by ignorant oi polloi who follow the insane poets; good laws, of which fr.131L/B114 speaks, should be established by the philosophers, exactly as in Plato’s Politeia. Human laws are laws set by men. The Divine law (theios nomos) of the fr. 131L/B114 is not established by anyone; like the cosmos, it is eternal and omnipotent, it is the foundation of the cosmic justice in the Cosmopolis, the universal community of gods and men. If we translate this doctrine from the archaic and figurative language of Heraclitus into familiar modern terms, we have here a theory of natural law. The verb τρέφονται is not a biological, but a social metaphor. 24 In the Nicomachean Etics, speaking about the educational role of the laws, Aristotle says: EN 1180a 21ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ “the law has a compulsive force, being a rule (or principle) that derives from certain practical wisdom and mind.” Cf. Politics1287а 32 διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν «Therefore the law is a mind without appetite». 42 Human laws do not “feed on the divine,” but are its «nurselings», that is, depend on it. A breadwinner is a metaphorical synonym for “Father,” therefore the “divine law” is no different from “the father of and king of all” Polemos, as well as from the «reverse harmonia» of war and peace, the identity of opposites and the law of cyclical retribution. The translation of the term νόμοι as “laws” is conventional: in this case, Heraclitus means all the customs and practices of men, including crafts and arts (τέχναι). In fr. 106–124 Heraclitus shows that all technological practices of men mirror or «imitate» the “divine law” of the harmony of opposites. The principal argument of Heraclitus’ critical political theory can be reconstructed as follows: 1) human arts and crafts imitate nature and the divine law, 2) human political institutions and religious laws contradict it, 3) therefore, they must be reformed and brought into line with nature and natural law. According to Heraclitus, we do not see in the physical Universe many arrangements (cosmoi) or autonomous self-governed states (poleis), contrary to Anaximander’s blasphemous theory of innumerable worlds. What we see in «this arrangement» (κόσμον τόνδε), i.e.in the visible Universe, is the united empire of Zeus governed by the single providential divine Mind (Gnome) of the Wise Being (To Sophon). [p.131] This is the model (paradeigma according to Diodotus) of the correct form of government (politeia) that «conforms to nature» (is κατὰ φύσιν) and that will save the Greeks from slavery. In fragment 131L/B114 In 131 Heraclitus proposes a revolutionary for his time transformation of the polis pluralism and separatism into federal monism, the creation of a common Greek (probably Pan-Ionian at the initial stage) unified federal state, with a single government, united army and a unifying common religious cult of Apollo the Sun (consubstantial with his Father, Zeus the Cosmos). This state should be governed not by the ignorant polloi, but by the wise, most probably by an enlightened monarch who will model its laws on the heavenly prototype (paradeigma), i.e. the Cosmopolis. We have reconstructed this project from the fragments of Heraclitus, but there is an external supporting evidence that proves that the idea of federal state was known in 6th century Ionia and was considered by some as a practical plan of political and religious reforms intended to counterbalance the military might of the Persian empire and to save the Ionian Greeks from slavery. According to Herodotus, Thales of Miletus proposed to the poleis of the Ionian Dodecapolis (the Twelve cities that were already affiliated in a loose confederation, the Ionian league, while remaining autonomous states) to form a single bouleuterion (councel-chamber) in Teos, the centre of Ionia, and to transform the poleis into demes, i.e. administrative units, without 43 resettlement of residents. 25 The connection between the political theory of Heraclitus and his metaphysics and the philosophy of nature becomes apparent through the reconstruction of the triadic structure (see p. 111 above). The principle of the unity of opposites as such is rather abstract, it is of little value in political theory and of no use in political praxis. But once a third element is added to the binary scheme, that of a Moderator placed “above the fray”, who sets the rules of competition of two conflicting parties and in this way prevents them from destruction, the abstract metaphysical scheme acquires obvious political meaning and relevance; it becomes a practical recipe of eunomia (stability provided by “good laws”) and homonoia (civil concord). The reconstruction of the triadic structure in Heraclitus’ metaphysics and political theory once again provides a confirmation of the invaluable evidence of the commentator of Heraclitus Diodotus that the subject of Heraclitus’ book was “not about nature”, but “about the form of government” (περὶ πολιτείας), while the purpose of his discussion of cosmic processes was a kind of theory of natural law rather than scientific physics: nature as a political standard (paradeigma). In political philosophy Heraclitus continues the tradition of "centrism" or impartial moderation “above the fray” that was a guiding principle in the legislation and reflections of Solon.26 It is significant that even Solon’s metaphorical language resembles that of Heraclitus: Solon compared himself to a “boundary stone” (ὅρος) between the rich and the poor. The concept of ὅρος (οὖρος in Ionian dialect), boundary point or limit, plays significant role in Heraclitus theory of the cosmic justice (fr.55L/B120; 56L). Solon complained that his enemies “barked” at him (and eo ipso at good laws) like dogs and that he felt himself like a hunted wolf (Solon, Fr. 31.9; 30, 26–27 Gentili – Prato). Heraclitus quotes a Greek proverb about a dog that barks at her master, probably in political context (fr. 126L/B97). [p.132] 25 Herod. 1.169 Χρηστὴ δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ διαφθαρῆναι Ἰωνίην Θαλέω ἀνδρὸς Μιλησίου ἐγένετο, …ὃς ἐκέλευε ἓν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Τέῳ (Τέων γὰρ μέσον εἶναι Ἰωνίης), τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλις οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατά περ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν. «Thales of Miletus even before the desolation of Ionia gave a useful advice to the Ionians to establish one common councel-chamber (bouleuterion) in Teos, since Teos is in the middle of Ionia; the other poleis would remain inhabited as they were, but would be considered like demes.» 26 Aristotle on the reforms of Solon, see Dovatour (1965) 197 ff. (1989) 15 ff. On the reforms and politeia of Solon see Raaflaub, Ober, Wallace (edd.) 2007: 22–82. The connection between the political philosophy of Heraclitus and Solon was justly pointed out by Ch. Kahn, even without taking into account the triadic structure, Kahn (1979)180. See also Rowe, Schofield (edd.) 2008: 50. 44 7. Theology: criticism of the popular religion and a manifesto of monotheism. The third logos (discourse or chapter) of Heraclitus’ work was theological, “On the gods”. It started with reflections on the obscurity and difficulty of subject (fr.136-139L=B86, 47, 28a, 108 DK) that were followed by a criticism of all commonly recognized Greek authorities in the sphere of the divine, religion and mythology. Although we, following an established tradition, have included the invective against Hesiod, Xenophanes, Hecataeus, and Pythagoras in the first chapter on the Logos (fr. 21L/B40), this fragment may well derive from the introduction to the third chapter on the gods, since the only common feature shared by these four “polymaths” is their interest in religion, theology and myth: three of them have written about the gods, and the fourth Pythagoras, was considered, among other things, an expert on various religious traditions and an authority on questions of the afterlife. The conclusion reached by Heraclitus after an overview of the achievements of his predecessors in the field of theology is that of dissatisfaction and rejection of all existing views: “even the most authoritative person decides to observe what is /just/ his opinions” (fr.138L/B28a). Heraclitus explains the incapacity of hoi polloi and of the theologians, both poets and philosophers, to cognize the true god by their failing to understand that the Wise Being is absolutely “distinct from all other creatures” (fr.139L/B108). It is so distinct from human nature, that most people cannot believe in it (apistia) and find it easier to believe in the familiar anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod that are similar to themselves. The third chapter consisted of two main sections: 1) the criticism of the popular anthropomorphic polytheism, both in cult and in mythology (negative theology); 2) constructive philosophical (pantheistic) theology that contained a manifesto of monotheism and practical advice on the reform of cult and dogma, dromena and legomena, ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. Probably, no other Greek philosopher before the Christian apologists has rejected the Greek religion as a false faith with such categorical force and passion as Heraclitus. This explains why some Christian apologists, like Justine Martyr, sympathized him and recognized him a “Christian before Christ”. In the surviving fragments Heraclitus with loathing rejects the Apollonian cleansing rites (Fr. 144), the worship of the statues of the gods, and compares prayer to "talking to the wall." Like Pythagoreans (and influenced by Pythagoras?), Heraclitus rejected not only meat in the diet, but also bloody sacrifices in ritual: the gods should not be fed with “carrion”: νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι (fr.143L/B96). Following the suggestion of Plutarch who quotes this saying in Quaestiones convivales 668F-669A, we interpret it not as a bizarre and inconceivable for any Greek demand to throw out human bodies instead of burial, but as a prohibition to eat “carrion” i.e. animal food, κρέας δὲ πᾶν νεκρόν ἐστι 45 καὶ νεκροῦ μέρος “all meat is dead body and a part of dead”(Plut. loc.cit.). This is further supported by the biographical tradition that pictures Heraclitus as a vegetarian: πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας “he fed on herbs and plants” (Diog.Laert.9.3). In Heraclitus’ poetic cosmology traditional gods are reinterpreted allegorically as stars and elements. The Sun and the stars “feed” themselves on the “exhalation” (anathymiasis) from the sea, so the gods actually do not need animal food and wine offered to them by humans. We do not know for certain what kind of ritual (if any) he proposed as an alternative to the traditional thysia of animals, but if in the metaphorical model Templum naturae (fr.43L/B67 θυώματα; 37L/B30, ἀείζωον πῦρ was the “ever-living fire” kept unextinguished in temples, e.g. in the temple of Apollo in Delphi) the cosmic exhalation was conceived as kind of “natural sacrifice” and self-feeding of Apollo the Sun, a conjecture lies at hand, that he proposed as a “natural alternative” to thysia the bloodless burning of incenses (θυώματα) at the altar fire mentioned in fr. 43L/B67DK. [p.133] Heraclitus promised to the adherents of the mystery cults of the Bacchic type, as well as to Persian magi and other “liars” and “witnesses of lies” punishment by fire at the time of koros/ekpyrosis (fr.146-147L / B14). However, it should be noted that the analysis of the Dionysian ritual in fr.148L / B15 does not contain an unequivocal condemnation of it. On the contrary, Heraclitus seems to admit that the behavior of bacchants would be impious if they did not venerate the phallos; consequently, once they do venerate it, their behavior is pious, although they do not realize why. In the name of the sacred symbol αἰδοῖον, the organ of the generation of a new life, Heraclitus discovers the name of the death god Aides (cf. aid-oion “penis”); the ritual, like all human tekhnai is built on the “conjunction” of opposites and it is its antithetical character, conforming to nature and the theios nomos, that makes it pious. This analysis of the ritual, which reveals the harmony of opposites in its basis unnoticed by men, in the third chapter “On gods” resembles the analysis of technological practices in the chapter two on polis (fr.106 – 124A Leb.). This part of the book of Heraclitus, unfortunately, is very incompletely represented in the preserved fragments and paraphrases. It can be assumed that Heraclitus undertook in the lost parts of the third chapter a systematic etymological analysis and allegorical explanation of the traditional divine names of Greek religion. Plato’s Cratylus may conceal a lot of unidentified Heraclitean material from this chapter. This hypothesis is supported by the use of the Heraclitean analogy between Logos and the cosmos in the Platonic etymology of the name of Pan in Cratylus 408c2, a passage that we include as an anonymous quotation from Heraclitus in our collection of fragments fr. Probabilia, Nr. 3L.: [οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὸ πᾶν; “Do you know that the 46 logos means “Universe?”, asks Socrates. Hermogenes confirms that he knows. The word “do you know” are elliptical for “Do you know the theory that…?” There was only one Greek philosopher who used the word logos metaphorically for the “Universe”, Heraclitus of Ephesus (fr.1-2L/B1, B50 DK). The etymology of Pan that follows, may or may not be Heraclitean (to establish this we would need additional evidence), but the division of the logos/cosmos into true (divine, celestial) and false (sublunary, human, the object of poetic lies) is 100% Heraclitean. The ambiguity of the expression τραγικὸς βίος «tragic life» (intending both poetic lies and “goatish life”, i.e. hedonistic life of hoi polloi) may be also Platonic, but it is a good summary of Heraclitus’ anti-hedonistic ethics]. We draw attention to the fact that, in his positive philosophical theology, Heraclitus avoids the word θεός ‘god’, perhaps because of its association with the anthropomorphic gods of poets. Heraclitus calls the new philosophical god "The Wise Being" (τὸ Σοφόν) in three fragments 139– 141L, B108, B41, B32 (with a plausible allusion also in fr.1/B50). In fr.140 "The Wise Being" is identified with the cosmic "Mind" (Γνώμη) that alone steers "the whole Universe". The divine governing principle of the cosmos also appears under the metaphorical names or images of Polemos (War), Aion (Time), Keraunos (Thunder Strike), Shepherd, Breadwinner etc. The question arises, why did Heraclitus argue with such pathos on theological issues with Pythagoras and Xenophanes? There is a remarkable convergence in the philosophical theology of three Western Greek thinkers, all of them Pythagoreans or with Pythagorean background. Parmenides (ἀνήρ Πυθαγόρειος, according to Strabo), Xenophanes and Empedocles, all of them held a monotheistic doctrine, all of them identified this new philosophical god with “mind” (νόος, φρήν), and all of them conceived this god as a “sphere” (Sphairos). [p.134] There are only two differences. The Pythagoreans recognized the immateriality, the incorporeality both of the soul (conceived as immortal daimon) and of god, whereas in Heraclitus “fire” formally is not incorporeal: it is the thinnest body, that is, a physical substance that fills the cosmos. However, as we have argued above in the section of Heraclitus’ concept of fire, the celestial fire is divine and this saves the opposition of the body and the soul in Heraclitus. The second, philosophically and theologically more important difference is this: both the Eleatics and Xenophanes, apparently following Pythagoras, emphasize the "immobility" and immutability of the incorporeal god-mind. Heraclitus, on the contrary, considered rest as a “property of the dead” (εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν, fr.49 b L.). Just as Heraclitean ethics is not an ethics of meditative quietism (despite the principle all-acceptance and of contentedness), but ethics of struggle and 47 participation in the common agon and “works” (ἔργα) of the cosmos and polis, so in his eschatology his notion of paradise is not a nirvana, but a flight at a cosmic speed with Apollo the Sun across the Universe, and intellectual pleasures reserved for the commensals of the gods at the heavenly symposia (fr.159, 159A L).The theological chapter “On gods” most probably ended with questions of the eschatology and the afterlife of souls. Despite some vagueness and inconsistency of the tradition, we can conclude that Heraclitus recognized a kind of naturalized version of the Pythagorean astral immortality for the elect, that is, for those wise and heroes who have purified their souls by philosophical bios and vegetarian diet and achieved the "dry" god-like state of the soul (fr.156/B63, 157L/B18). For those who, like beasts, have lived a hedonistic life of terpsis, i.e. for hoi polloi immersed in the “filth” of bodily pleasures, like gluttony, wine and sex, Heraclitus had bad news: the dissolution of a “wet soul” together with the body at the moment of death (fr.158L cf. A17 DK). Presumably, in the concluding lines of his book Heraclitus touched on the theme of the apotheosis of the philosophers (fr.159L, cf. B13 DK) using the image of the “commensals of gods”. According to our conjecture, the very last fragment was the parable about Sibyl and Apollo (fr.160L / B92) intended as a kind of “exegi monumentum”. Heraclitus, like Sibyl, was a prophet of Apollo (“listening not to my logos…” fr. 1L / B50). Consequently, all that has been said in his logos (in the sense of his book, teaching), is the divine word of Apollo, who “speaks by his mouth”. And just as the voice of Sibyl is still heard 1000 after her death, so the words of Heraclitus, written in this book, will be “heard” and read by the future generations. As the unflagging interest in his philosophy shows, this prophecy of Heraclitus came true: we continue to read and to interpret his words 2500 years after his death. Modern editions of Heraclitus in chronological order Paul Schuster. Heraklit von Ephesus. Acta Societatis Philol. Lipsiensis, hrsg. v. F. Ritschl. Leipzig, 1873. Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, recensuit I. Bywater, Collegii Exoniensis socius. Appendicis loco additae sunt Diogenis Laertii Vita Heracliti, Particulae Hippocratei De Diaeta Libri primi, Epistulae Heracliteae. Oxonii, 1877. Herakleitos von Ephesos. Griechisch und Deutsch von Hermann Diels. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1901 (second edition 1909). 48 Eraclito. Raccolta dei frammenti e traduzione italiana, a cura di Richard Walzer. Firenze: Sansoni, 1939. 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