




Bikash Koley For Google Technical Infrastructure

CNSM 2016





A Global Cloud Network



Google Backbone(s)

Internet facing Backbone, B2: 70+ locations in 33 countries





Global Software Defined Inter-DC Backbone: B4






- **30,000+** circuits in operation
- Many tens of network element roles
- Dozen+ vendors
- 4M lines of configuration files
- ~30K configuration changes per month
- > 8M OIDs collected every 5 minutes



At scale stuff breaks!



The Nines and the Outage Budgets

... for **four 9s** availability? 99.99% uptime 4 minutes per month ... for **five 9s** availability?




24 seconds per month


Why is high network availability a challenge?



Google's Network Hardware Evolves Constantly




As does the Network Software







... driven by ever-evolving products



Network Operation is a tradeoff





Lessons learned from a decade of high-availability network design



We analyzed over 100 Post-mortem reports written over a 2 year period

What is a Post-mortem?

Carefully curated description of a *previously unseen* failure that had *significant* availability impact






Learn from failures

Postmortem:
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Summary


- Start date / time of incident:
- Total duration of incident:
- Postmortem Tracking bug: b/24732745
 - Postmortem Owner:
 - Contributors:
- User impact:



Summary Timeline (in MTV Time [PST/PDT])








Appendix - Other relevant tidbits

\$75,000 p. 16 PDT - The sold solds assent to have a power solide modest \$76,000.




Where do failures happen?



No one network or plane dominates

How long do the failures last?




Shorter failures on B2


Durations much longer than outage budgets



What role does **network evolution** play?



70% of failures happen when a management operation is in progress



{reliability, efficiency, scale} are NOT tradeoffs .. if network operation is fully intent driven **Evolution is inevitable: Design for it!**


- All network operations are automated, requiring no operator steps beyond the instantiation of intent
- Changes applied to individual network elements are fully declarative, vendor-neutral, and derived by the network infrastructure from the high-level network-wide intent
- Any network changes are automatically halted and rolled-back if the network displays unintended behavior
- The infrastructure does not allow operations which violate network policies

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
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ZTN Architecture




Workflow Engine




- The workflow engine executes a goal-seeking workflow graph
- Workflows are expressed in a meta-language
- All interesting metrics of execution logged
- Workflows have the same test coverage as any software system


Network intent



- The workflow engine interacts with the intent-based network management infrastructure over transactional APIs
- Workflow intents are expressed at the network-level, as changes to
 - Topology
 - Config
 - Functional calls


Network Models





- OpenConfig (<u>www.openconfig.net</u>) for vendor-neutral configuration model
 - > YANG for data modeling, gRPC as transport
 - Both configuration and op-state models
 - BGP, MPLS, ISIS, L2, Optical-transport, ACL, policy...
- "Unified Network Model" for topology
 - Protocol Buffer based Google internal schema
 - Describes all layer-0/1/2/3 al


Network Management Services



- Compose full config (vendor-neutral and vendor-specific) from topology/config intent update
- Provides secure transport of full config to network elements
 (OpenConfig+gRPC)
- Enforce Operational Policies
 - Rate limiting
 - Blast radius containment
 - Minimum survivable topology

Streaming Telemetry

network state changes observed by analyzing comprehensive time-series data stream



- Common schema for operational state data in OpenConfig
 - stream data continuously -with incremental updates
 - Efficient, secure transport protocol, gRPC

Workflow Safety

- Ability to automatically check the safety of operations
- Ability to repeatedly validate the network state against the stated intent
- Ability to recognize "bad" network behavior
- Ability to roll back to the original state



Lessons learned from a decade of high-availability network design



 \downarrow

Make it safe to evolve the network **daily**

Make it safe to evolve the network daily

Scale just-in-time, scale often

Make it safe to evolve the network daily

Scale just-in-time, scale often

Evolve into a **Zero Touch Network**

References

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- Evolve or Die High-Availability Design Principles Drawn from Google's Network
 Infrastructure [sigcomm 2016]
- Andromeda: Google's cloud networking stack
- OpenConfig : http://www.openconfig.net
- gRPC: http://www.grpc.io