He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai
The Evolution of
Contemporary Maori Protest
Poata-Smítb
Evan S, Te
Introduction
Historically, the intensity and momentum of Maori political activism has
never been consistent. Upturns in protest activity are followed by downturns
in struggle and vice versa. The 1970s were witness to a dramatic upsurge in
Maori activism which had a profound effect on New Zealand society. The
politicalturbulence created in the wake of the 197 5
land march on Parliament,
Bastion Point, Raglan and the regular protests at Waitangi once again
revealed the exploitative and oppressive foundations on which capitalism
had been established in Aotearoa. The decline of working-class movements
internationally and the rise of the New Right coupled with the logic of
identity politics lured many Maori away from political activity throughout
the 1980s. However, the recent upsurge in flaxroots Maori activism in
opposition to the fiscal envelope and the Sealord deal is the most significant
since the series of land occupations and marches of the 1970s.
Maori political activism has traditionally been an extremely heterogeneous social force, encompassing a considerable variety of political
strategies, campaigns and participants. Indeed, it is only a 'movement' in
the most tenuous sense (Greenland, 1984: 87). Walker has claimed that
both 'radical' and 'conservative' elements of the Maori nationalist movement
pursued the same objectives although the methods they used differed
97
98
Nga Patal
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest
(Walker, 1990: 243). However, agreement on what constitutes tino
rangatiratanga is far from unanimous. It can simultaneously be identified
with Maori capitalism, Maori electoral power, cultural nationalism or
revolutionary activity. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Maori activists
commonly asserted, in sometimes il-conceived or confused ways, that
reformism was not an effective strategy and that only through a fundamental
transformation of the system could Maori achieve liberation. More than
two decades later, the situation is completely different. While many stil
look to constitutional change and electoral politics to reform the worst
excesses of the system, a number of powerful tribal executives and corporate
wariors have argued, like the New Right ideologues in Treasury and the
the welfare system has held Maori back and that
Business Roundtable, that
real self-determination and liberation for Maori can only be achieved
under unrestrained, freemarket capitalism (see Kukutai, 1995). In this way,
the objective of tino rangatiratanga as espoused by various groups is
unclear and at times contradictory. This is symptomatic of the fact that
despite the occasional separatist rhetoric, Maori movements are not
autonomous of the underlying social structures, political forces and
ideologies of capitalist society.
This chapter provides a descriptive overview of the evolution from the
progressive political activism. of the late 1960s and early 1970s to the
cultural nationalist framework that dominated much Maori political strategy
from the 1980s. It then critically examines the ideological assumptions of
cultural nationalism. The chapter finally explores the effectiveness of cultural
nationalism and identity politics as a strategy for Maori liberation.!
The Seeds of Contemporary Maori Activism 1967-1975
The collapse of
the post-war boom saw an international resurgence in class
conflct and industrial miltancy on an unprecedented scale from 1968 to the
mid-1970s (Roper, 1993: 2; Haran, 1988).
The global upturn in class struggle from the late 1960s was closely
related to the emergence of the New Left internationally. The dramatic
growth in student political activism, the anti-war movement in the west,
Black liberation in the United States and the national
liberation strggle
against United States imperialism were important features in the politics of
the period. It was also characterised by the growth in new social movements,
which included the women's liberation movement, the anti-racist movement,
the environmental movement and the gay and lesbian rights movements.
99
The emergence of the New Left in Aotearoa closely paralleled developactivism
and the development of social movements such as the women's liberation
movement, the anti-racist movement, the environmental movement, gay and
ments internationally. The late 1960s saw the growth of student
lesbian rights movements and so forth (see Dann, 1985; Roper, 1990). The
period was also characterised by a dramatic ùpturn in class politics and a
sea-change in popular culture, which in part reflected the growing influence
of radical intellectual traditions, in particular Marxism and feminism. All
this had a profound influence on the organisation and strategies of Maori
protest groups that emerged during that period.
Initially, Maori protest groups formed part of the
progressive social
movements of the time and they actively sought to broaden, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, the struggle against racism and Maori
inequality. Indeed, although some were explicitly nationalist in their
orientation, these movements were consciously part of the Left.
The Anti-Racist Movement
A close working relationship was forged between Pakeha anti-racist groups
and what eventually evolved into the Maori protest movements of the late
1960s. Initially, this relationship crystallsed around the opposition that
emerged to the New Zealand Rugby Football Union's decision to exclude
Maori rugby players from the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa. This
generated intense opposition, and the 'No Maori, no tour' protests extended
the focus from the question of the exclusion of non-whites in the Springbok
team itself, to the moral justification of contact with a nation which practised apartheid.
Pakeha-based organisations such as CARE (which included a number of
young Maori political activists within its ranks) maintained a close
relationship with various Maori groups and individuals in various activities
(Sorrenson, Newnham and de Bres, 1974: 4). CARE, for example, aranged
numerous panel discussions on the position of the Maori in New Zealand
society and was pivotal in the launching and promotion of a national campaign
against New Zealand's involvement in apareid sport, using the contrbutions
of Maori speakers such as Syd Jackson, Matiu Rata, Koro Dewes, Whetu
Tirikatane and Hone Tuwhare for their publicity campaign against the tour
(see Jackson, 1969). This interaction between Maori groups and the antiracist movement was pivotal in the establishment of the umbrella organisation
Halt
AU Racist Tours (HART) in 1969. The name was actually suggested by
100 Nga Patal
Tama Poata, the secretary of the Maori Organisation on Human Rights
(MOOHR) (Awatere, 1982). The relationship between Maori protest groups
and the movement against apartheid was an enduring one (although not
without conflict) culminating in the opposition to the 1981 Springbok Tour.
Women s Liberation Movement
From the late 1960s, influential individuals such as Ngahuia Te Awekotuku
and Donna Awatere had consistently publicised the barriers in Maori society
that had prevented Maori women from participating in, and contributing to,
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest i01
The Trade Union Movement
The dramatic increase in strike activity and class struggle from the late
1960s had a profound influence in terms of the political education of many
Maori workers involved in the struggle for better wages and conditions.
Indeed, the influence of the trade union movement in providing an
organisational base for Maori protest groups is most clearly demonstrated
in the emergence of Te Hokioi and the Maori Organisation on Human
Rights (MOOHR). Both groups were based in Wellngton and both had
strong trade union links. Tama Poata, the secretary of
MOOHR, was also an
Maori society as they saw fit. Their critiques of the patriarchal nature of
active member of the Wellngton Drivers Union and the New Zealand
Maori women's marae speaking
the women's liberation movement, in which
a number of Maori women actively participated (see Dann, 1985). By the
mid-1970s there had emerged a larger group of Maori women within N ga
Tamatoa who adopted a 'feminist' theoretical analysis of the oppression of
Communist Party.
traditional Maori leadership and the issue of
rights reflected the influence of
Maori women. For many of the young Maori women involved in activist
movements such as Nga Tamatoa, an increasing consciousness of their role
as 'black' women emerged gradually from the mid-1970s and crystallsed
around the frustration and anger experienced by Maori women during the
Maori land rights movement.
For many women, there was an underlying tension between the politics,
culture and language of Maori society that they were struggling to preserve
and their own liberation from this oppression as Maori women. Ngahuia Te
Awekotuku noted the significance and momentum of the renaissance in
'Maori' awareness, but expressed concern that the role of Maori women in
the struggle should not be restricted: '(w)e, Maori females, can only hope
that they recognise the need and the merit of our energy in this fight ... and
Both organisations advocated an alliance between Maori and the
progressive elements of the working class. Indeed, for Te Hokioi the
fundamental contradiction in society was between labour and capital, between
the workers on the one hand and the bosses and land owners on the other.
Racism was seen to be an outcome of class inequality. In this regard, the
majority of Maori were seen as an oppressed section of the working class.
Both groups advocated a pan-racial struggle along class lines as the most
effective strategy for resolving racism and Maori inequality.
Te Hokioi and MOOHR issued numerous newsletters and pamphlets to
publicise their cause. Te Hokioi itself adopted the name of the anti-
not deny knowledge and access to half our people' (Te Awekotuku, 1991:
government newspaper of the Maori King Movement and proclaimed itself
as a 'taiaha of truth for kotahitanga within the Maori Nation'. From its
inception, MOOHR pledged to defend human rights not only of Maori but
of all 'minorities' (Walker, 1980). It urged both Maori and Pakeha to fight
against racism and discrimination and uphold the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Thus MOOHR were at pains to emphasise that it was 'rich
Pakeha' to blame for racism, not all Pakeha (MOOHR, 1970).
47). Indeed, for many Maori women it was a battle on two fronts. First, in
the struggle over land and second, in the struggle for equality within the
discrimination in housing, sport, employment and the infringement of Maori
movement (Far, 1978).
A strong network of Maori women crystallsed around the day-to-day
struggles against racism and sexual discrimination, and in this process a
number of leading Maori women began to openly examine the oppression
of women within Maori society and the bariers that limited their influence
in the movement. Their developing political ideology consisted of a mixture
of 'Black feminism' and Maori nationalism which was to prove extremely
influential as the movement unfolded in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
MOOHR played a vigorous role in publicising the racism and
political rights. Together with Te Hokioi, MOOHR embraced Treaty of
Maori land, 'race-relations' and resource
Waitangi issues, the alienation of
depletion. MOOHR put an emphasis on the Treaty ofWaitangi as a possible
cornerstone of a haronious, bicultural countr provided that past injustices
were redeemed.
The inspiration and momentum that underpinned Te Hokioi and MOOHR
subsided gradually during the early 1970s, with MOOHR finally merging
with Matakite in the land rights movement in 1975. The decline ofMOOHR
102 Nga Patal
and Te Hokioi reflected the growing influence of Black Power rhetoric.
Indeed, the impetus of the movement shifted to the 'Brown Power' of newly
emerging Auckland Maori protest groups.
Brown Power
The emergence of Nga Tamatoa in the early 1970s saw the articulation of
the idea that racism was the basic social cleavage in society. This was most
clearly amplified in their rhetoric of 'Brown Power' which represented a
fundamental rejection of the racist in~titutions and values of New Zealand
society. Like the Black Power philosophies of Stokely Carmichael and
Charles V. Hamilton, Brown Power was based on the fundamental premise
that'... group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively
from a bargaining position of strength' (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1970:
146), Thus, advocates of Brown Power urged Maori to unite, to recognise
their common history and to build a sense of solidarity and community.
They emphasised the goal of Maori self-determination, or the capacity for
Maori to define their own goals and to develop their own separate
organisations and institutions.
In its early stages, members of Tamatoa were influenced by the
revolutionary wing of the Black Power movement in the United States, but
as Nga Tamatoa developed, different interests and objectives began to be
articulated. Indeed, there was a division in the movement between the
conservative, university-educated students such as Syd and Hana Jackson,
Peter Rikys and Donna Awatere and the more militant exponents of Black
Power such as John Ohia, Paul Kotara and Ted Nia (Walker, 1990: 210). At
first, it was this more radical faction with their talk of Brown Power and
Maori liberation that attracted the sensational media headlines. However, it
was the more conservative element of Tamatoa that took control of the
movement. Their strategies differed from the miltants in that they tended to
look to 'liberal' elements in the ruling class for change. They did this
because their political outlook was based on a belief that provided the
appropriate legal measures were put in place, Maori could prosper. Hence
their emphasis on self-help programmes for Maori development. Nga
Tamatoa also employed the protest techniques and tactics popularised during
the late 1960s such as the use of petitions, demonstrations and pickets. They
initiated the tradition of the annual protests at Waitangi Day celebrations.
There was a fundamental belief that New Zealand capitalism coupled
with the parliamentary political system could be cleansed of racism. In
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 103
essence, this view reflected the interests of middle-class university-educated
Maori based on a strategy of advancement within the system. As a result, the
Brown Power slogan was unclear. It could be identified with Maori capitalism
or revolutionary acti vity.
The Auckland gang problem encouraged co-operation between Nga
Tamatoa and an emerging group, the Polynesian Panthers. The Polynesian
Panther Movement, founded in June 1971, had a largely Pacific Islands
membership and was explicitly based on the Black Panther Party in the
U.S.A. (Polynesian Panther Party, 1975: 225). They were particularly
influenced by Huey Newton's policy of black unity and repeated his
distinction between revolutionary and cultural nationalism in their arguments
with the conservative members ofNga Tamatoa.2 The Panthers located the
causes of Maori and Pacific Islanders' oppression within the exploitative
social relations of the capitalist system of production. Consequently, the
Polynesian Panthers promoted a strategy ofliberation based on the complete
overthrow of the capitalist system and the social relations necessary for its
development.
The revolution we openly rap about is one of total change. The
revolution is one to liberate us from racism, oppression and
capitalism, We see that many of our problems of oppression and
racism are tools of this society's outlook based on capitalism; hence
for total change one must change society altogether.
(Polynesian Panther Party, 1975: 226)
In practice, this meant that the Panthers stood in solidarity with other
liberation struggles, oppressed groups and activists, working toward a global
sed the everyday struggles of Maori and Pacific
Islanders, from land claims to the discrimination and violence of the police
revolution. They publici
(Polynesian Panther Party, 1976). In particular, the Panthers sought apan-
ethnic grouping of both Maori and Pacific Islanders and their views competed
with those of Nga Tamatoa who favoured Maori unity first (Polynesian
Panther Party, 1975: 225-226).
Maori Land Rights Movement 1975-1984: 'Not One More Acre!'
As the struggle against Maori oppression and ràcism intensified, the early
movement started to polarise. At the root of this was whether the whole
system had to be overthrown and a new society built in its place, or whether
104 Nga Patal
real change for Maori could come through the existing political structures.
Support for the conservative strategies pursued by groups such as Nga
Tamatoa rested on the expectation that the state would make significant
concessions. However, as the struggle intensified, the failure to stem the
tide ofland alienation through offcial channels led to a widespread pessimism
about the abilty of the third Labour government (1972-1975) to secure
Maori rights. This led many frustrated militants to look at more direct
strategies.
From 1975 to 1978, the Maori land rights movement brought together a
wide range of activists. Indeed, such diversity in a common cause was
actively promoted by Te Roopu 0 te Matakite, the organising committee of
the 1975 Land March on Parliament. In paricular, Matakite sought to
consolidate links with workers, both Pakeha and Maori, who were perceived
as natural alles in the struggle:
We see no difference between the aspirations of Maori people and
the desire of workers in their struggles. We seek the support of
workers and organisations, as the only viable bodies which have
sympathy and understanding of the Maori people and their desires.
The p~ople who are oppressing the workers are the same who are
exploiting the Maori today.
(Te Roopu 0 te Matakite, 1975)
Despite the divergent political and strategic philosophies, there was no
room to mistake the object of protest and the enemy of Maori as anything
other than a stiite which was seen as being both racist and capitalist.
The occupation of
Bastion Point and the subsequent eviction intensified
the experience of direct conflct with the state. The occupation again brought
together the diverse Pakeha left and mobilised wide public support (Walker,
1990: 218). The Auckland Trades Council placed a 'green ban' on the area,
declaring that no work would begin on the planned sub-division. A North
Shore contractor even donated six trucks, including two bitumen tankers, to
help with a planned blockade (Auckland Star, 1977).
The occupation at Bastion Point was followed by the arrest of 17
protesters in February 1978 at the Raglan Golf Course. The arests occurred
on land taken from Tainui Awhiro under the Emergency War Act for a
military aerodrome during World War II and never returned. Among those
arrested were representatives of Nga Tamatoa, Te Matakite 0 Aotearoa,
Orakei Marae Committee and Tainui Awhiro. .
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 105
the 1970s had a significant impact upon
Maori political activism in the 1980s. In particular, the high
level of political intensity that had characterised the struggle provided the
The Land Rights Movement of
the evolution of
conditions from which a young, more militant leadership emerged. Most
notably, the Maori land rights movement and the struggle against racism
radicalised a group of Maori women, the core of whom had been involved
in Nga Tamatoa. These women were to form the basis of
the Black Women's
Movement.
The land rights movement and the occupation and eviction of members
ofNgati Whatua from Bastion Point and the arests at Raglan also prompted
certain activists, based primarily in Auckland, to adopt a more direct strategy
to undermine racism. This was exemplified in 1979 when He Taua confronted
and assaulted members of an engineering student group who had traditionally
celebrated the University of Auckland's capping wt1ek by making, among
other things, obscene imitations of Maori haka.
The Waitangi Action Committee (WAC), Maori People's Liberation
Movement of Aotearoa and Black Women were at the forefront of Maori
political activism in the early 1980s. These groups were primarily based in
Auckland and possessed a considerable overlap in membership (Walker,
1984). From 1979, WAC continued the earlier focus ofNga Tamatoa with
annual protests at the Waitangi Day celebrations, arguing that ratification of
the Treaty ofWaitangi was a futile objective because the cost of reparations
would effectively bankrupt the state. WAC called for a boycott of the
Waitangi Day celebrations with the objective of escalating opposition to the
celebrations until they were stopped. At this time, Maori activists proclaimed
the treaty as a 'fraud' and denounced it as the 'cheaty of Waitangi' . WAC
used marches to spread their message to various marae on route to Waitangi
and were most successful in bringing together the Kingitanga and the
Kotahitanga movements for the purpose of a hikoi, a peaceful walk to
Waitangi in February 1984.
Initially activists in groups like WAC acted in liaison with certain Pakeha
anti-racist groups. However, following the rifts between the anti-racist
movement and some Maori groups during the anti-Springbok Tour protests
of 1981, the association between Maori and Pakeha activists weakened.
There was a widespread perception amongst Maori that too many Pakeha
ignored the connection between apartheid in South Africa and colonialism
and racism in Aotearoa (see Awatere, 1981). Groups such as People Opposed
to Waitangi (POW), were widely seen as a way of accommodating Pakeha
106 Nga Patal
support for Maori protest so that Maori could maintain autonomy in the
movement (Jesson, 1983).
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 107
system. However, the movement ended up far from these traditions and
not
The New Right and Cultural Nationalism from 1984
The prolonged economic crisis in New Zealand throughout the 1970s and
1980s was brought on by the inherent tendency in capitalist systems for the
general rate of profit to fall, inhibiting investment and undermining capital
accumulation (see Roper, 1993: 11-21; Shaikh, 1989; 1991: 185-186). For
the state, capitalism's chronic tendency to produce crises reverberates and
results in a legitimation crisis for the whole system. Thus governments from
the 1970s have had to respond to a dual crisis of political legitimation and
economic management, the product of steadily worsening conditions of
economic decline and fiscal instability coupled with a growth in .unemployment, the politicisation of ethnic and gender inequalities and other
signs of social unrest. In particular, the political turbulence created by the
events of the early i 980s encouraged the widespread perception that New
Zealand was at the turning point with regard to harmonious race relations.
The sense of urgency and concern about the state of New Zealand society
manifested itself in the official report Race Against Time from the Race
Relations Office. It was widely perceived that New Zealand was on the edge
of a prolonged and irredeemable racialconflct (Race Relations Conciliator,
1982).
The upsurge in Maori protest and discontent forced governments to
respond to the evidence which showed overwhelmingly that the majority
of Maori occupied a peripheral place in New Zealand society. Numerous
studies confirmed that Maori disproportionately experienced poor educational outcomes; high levels of unemployment; low income levels; ilhealth and hence lower life expectancy; higher rates of imprisonment; low
rates of home ownership; and high rates of state dependency.
While those Maori activists involved in movements such as MOOHR,
Te Hokioi, the Polynesian Panthers and land rights at least attempted to find
strategies which could successfulIy chalIenge the system which produced
such dramatic inequalities, others ended up pursuing struggles which
represented little or no threat at aii to the state. This helped to obscure the
fact that capitalism's tendency towards economic and social crisis was a
result of its internal contradictions.
Initially, the politics of Maori cultural nationalism found expression in
the struggle to win Maori studies and language programmes in the education
Maori in history,
just as victims but as fighters, was something to be welcomed. However,
aspirations. The emphasis on the rediscovery of the role of
for large sections of the movement, the emphasis on the rediscovery of
culture came to be the objective of the movement itself and a substitute for
practical struggle. For the most part, cultural nationalism placed little or no
importance on building a political movement, or on strategies for farreaching social change.
Particularly in intellectual circles, Maori cultural nationalism became
less a critique of right-wing racist politics than an attack on left social
movements. This was best encapsulated in Donna Awatere's polemic, Maori
Sovereignty which was explicitly directed at Pakeha feminists, trade unionists,
socialists and the Pakeha anti-racist movement. Awatere was to argue that
Pakeha activists were committed to a status quo characterised by white
supremacy and Maori subordination. In spite of the alleged differences
between white women and white men, homosexual and heterosexual, the
working class and the capitalist class, Awatere was to argue aii cleavages
occurred within a common cultural framework. All whites shared the benefits
of the alienation of Maori land and culture and the imposition of European
cultural values (Awatere, 1984).
Pakeha society was said to reflect inherent characteristics: it was
competitive, exploitative, valued material success and it eroded or dominated
traditional or radically egalitarian Maori values. Maori possessed an inherent
integrity that had been progressively eroded since contact. However, this
status could be redeemed by the immersion in Maori identity or 'Maoritanga'.
Because the inherent traits of Pakeha were the basiC causes of an oppressive
and unequal society, the virtues of Maori were critical for their resolution
(see Greenland, 1984: 89).
This became an extremely persuasive ideology throughout the 1980s,
but rather than channelling Maori into greater political involvement, the
introverted emphasis on Maori consciousness alone tended to lead Maori
away from political activism. This was because the implication was that
'Maori culture' and identity by itself would automatically bring about
political and economic freedom. With its emphasis on lifestyle changes,
cultural rediscovery represented almost no threat at aii to the state which
easily accommodated the rhetoric of cultural nationalism into the language
of state policy-making during the 1980s. In this way, it could accommodate
the idea that the low level of participation and achievement of Maori in
education and employment structures of New Zealand society was the result
108 Nga Patal
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 109
of social alienation caused by the loss of cultural identity. Such an explanation
regressive tax reform; the disassembly of the state sector through
for Maori disadvantage did not represent a threat to the underlying social
relations of capitalist society.
privatisation, commercialisation and corporatisation; and the dismantling
of the welfare state (see Roper, 1991; 1993; Holland and Boston 1990;
Following its election in July 1984, the fourth Labour government
Boston, 1991). However, a series of claims before the Waitangi Tribunal
Maori protest by enhancing the status
of Maori culture, attracting the commitment of Maori to state institutions
and satisfying Maori demands for self-determination in their own affairs.
Labour did this in two major ways. First, it extended the jurisdiction of the
became an obstacle to the sale of many key state-owned enterprises, a
crucial component in Labour's restructuring programme. At a time of
growing economic and social dislocation, the political costs for Labour
were exacerbated by the widespread perception that Maori were getting
'special treatment'. Indeed, the pressures were so great by 1989, that the
Labour government attempted to play down the significance of its Treaty
attempted to appease the rising tide of
Waitangi Tribunal giving it the power to examine Maori grievances
retrospective to 1840. Second, the official policy of 'biculturalism' adopted
by the fourth Labour government after 1984 involved the incorporation of
Maori personnel, Maori models of organisation and Maori social practices
policy.
and cultural symbolism within the institutions of the state (see Barber,
Maori Élite
1989). The partial adoption of ethnic rhetoric by the state and the co-option
of élites into state institutions gave the ilusion of a 'partnership' as espoused
under the Treaty ofWaitangi, while marginalising the more radical demands
In addition to its Treaty policy, Labour also undertook a process of co-
(Kelsey, 1993: 234).
Waitangi Tribunal
The Labour government had assumed that by the introduction of the Treaty
ofWaitangi Amendment Act in 1985, the state could somehow take control
of the direction of Treaty issues and shape the nature of Maori demands.
From 1985, iwi and hapu diverted time, energy and meagre resources into
researching and presenting claims to the Waitangi Tribunal and the judicial
system. However, it quickly became apparent that the Tribunal was a body
without 'teeth', restricted to making recommendations on particular claims
upon which governments were under no obligation to act.
As Maori demands for political and economic self-determination became
more strident, a contradiction quickly emerged between the economic
programme of market liberalisation and the treaty settlement policy (see
Kelsey, 1990; 1993). The fourth Labour government's Maori policy was
motivated by an overriding objective of reducing government expenditure
at a time of economic and fiscal crisis. Labour embarked on an economic
restructuring programme designed to restore levels of profitabilty in the
New Zealand economy. This was characterised by a monetarist,
disinflationary strategy coupled with a programme of market liberalisation,
which included: the deregulation of the financial sector; liberalisation of
foreign trade; the elimination of so-called 'rigidities' in the labour market;
opting key individuals in the Maori protest movement. The involvement of
a Maori élite within the structures of the state forced many Maori leaders to
straddle the uneasy gulf between pushing the Maori struggle forward and
maintaining the existing state of affairs. The prestige and wealth that went
with such privileged positions in the settlement process meant that Maori
leaders became increasingly removed from the concerns and vitality of the
flax roots Maori struggle.
Like the fourth Labour government, the subsequent National government
also set out to restore levels of profitable investment in the New Zealand
economy. The National government was concerned that the backlog of
Treaty claims created a climate of uncertainty for investors because the
ownership of a number of key resources was in doubt. Treasury officials
were concerned about the fiscal implications of some of the major Treaty
claims declaring it an 'unquantifiable fiscal risk' (Southland Times, 1994:
14). National attempted to end this uncertainty by negotiating a full and
final settlement of all Treaty of Waitangi claims at minimal cost. Like
Labour, the National government embarked on a series of secret negotiations
with a selected number of corporate warriors and tribal executives which
sought a full and final settlement of fishery claims under the Treaty of
Waitangi in the form of the Sealord deaL.
The lack of accountability and democracy in such negotiations generated
intense anger and resentment which manifested itself in the bitter internal
divisions that have characterised the recent upsurge in Maori protest over
the signing of the Sealord deaL. These divisions were strained further at the
110 Nga Patal
time of the negotiations surrounding the government's $l bilion Fiscal
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 111
For the majority of
Maori, cultural nationalism has failed so dramatically
Envelope, an attempt at a full and final settlement of all remaining Treaty of
Waitangi claims.
in this respect because as a strategy, it has evaded the significance of the
relative location of the majority of Maori in the working class within New
The attempted chainsawing of the pine tree on One Tree Hil on 28
Zealand's class structure and also the existence of class differentiation
October 1994 (the anniversary of the 1835 Declaration of Independence),
the beheading of the statue of John Ballance at Moutoa. Gardens and the
within both Maori and Pakeha populations. Second, such an approach has
prevented, through its rhetoric and posturing, the possibility of building a
stronger movement by combining with other progressive social movements
in order to achieve specific political objectives. Third, cultural nationalism
has in effect provided a way out of engaging in struggle by encouraging
individual lifestyle changes rather than a strategy for fundamental social
change or the transformation of society. Finally, the internal logic of the
underlying philosophies of cultural nationalism have been counterproductive,
explosion of anger at the 1995 Waitangi celebrations heralded the most
significant upsurge in Maori protest since the 1970s. The occupation of
Wanganui's Moutoa Gardens by Whanganui Maori has been a powerful
symbol of the resurgence in the struggle for mana whenua. The 79-day
occupation at Pakaitore marae has invigorated other struggles around the
country, in particular the occupation by Te Roopu aTe Pohutu of Rotowhio
marae at Whakarewarewa in Rotoi:ua and the occupation ,of the former
Tamaki Girls' College in Auckland. The upsurge in Maori struggle has also
fostering confusion, demoralisation and internal fights over authenticity.
expressed itself in the occupations of the Takahue school near Kaitaia and
of the courthouse at Patea, Other struggles include the Tuhoe embassy in
Taneatua, the occupations of the Taumaranui police station site and Kaitaia
airport. These occupations have been a long time in the making and reflect
the growing anger, frustration and desperation at the lack of real options
available to Maori for the resolutions of their grievances.
While much of the recent protest has represented a continuation of the
traditions of the land rights movement of the 1970s, some more notable
Fragmentation
This emphasis on cultural identity as the determining factor in Maori
oppression encouraged the perception that the struggle against Maori
inequality and racism could be reduced to a clash of cultures; a conflct
between 'races'. Indeed, New Zealand history had been characterised by an
irredeemable clash of cultural values. Against the inherent hostility of
Pakeha, Maori sovereignty was the only hope for justice.
struggles, such as the occupations of Coalcorp land at Huntly by the
One tendency of movements which emphasise the identity of their
Whaawhaakia hapu, of the Waikato University marae by Te Toitutanga and
members as the determining factor in their oppression is to 'personalise'
the other protests in opposition to the $170 milion Raupatu settlement
the conflct for liberation. If you personalise power, you tend to personalise
between the government and the Tainui Trust Board, represent a challenge
to the mandate of decision-making bodies within iwi to make such settlement
agreements.
the enemy. Hence the struggle for equality becomes reduced to a fight
individuals and attitudes, not against the system that perpetuates that
Maori Liberation and the Politics of Identity
oppression. In this way, one of the most notable features of Maori protest
from the late 1970s is the increasing personalisation of the Maori struggle
biculturalism has resulted in a dramatic expansion
of opportunities for middle-class professional Maori in the state apparatus,
While the offcial policy of
education system, health and the media, the emphasis on identity alone as
the crucial determining factor in Maori oppression has been an unmitigated
disaster for the vast majority of working-class Maori whanau who have
borne the brunt of the fourth Labour government and the National
government's 'economic restructuring' (Ministry of Maori Development,
1992).
against prejudice, a fight against the institutions and practices against
for liberation, whereby the object of Maori oppression is Pakeha and
Pakeha culture. This leaves the struggle against Maori oppression to be
fought out at the level of individual relationships between Maori and
Pakeha while the system in which this relationship occurs remains
untouched.
The conclusion that Pakeha are the enemy of Maori gives cause for
pessimism, to say the least. Moreover, since cultural nationalists explain the
division between Maori and Pakeha as biologically rooted, the rupture must
be permanent. From this it follows that any strategy aimed at the liberation
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 113
112 Nga Patal
of Maori necessitates an apocalyptic struggle because the very existence of
Pakeha is the basis of Maori oppression.
Given that identities are blurred, multiple and historically contingent,
the idea that the main division in society is between Maori and Pakeha also
risks fragmentation of the movement itself because it inevitably leads to
confusion and fights over authenticity (di Leonardo, 1994: 168). If the
reasoning of identity politics is taken to its logical conclusion, then Pakeha
are not the only oppressors: men are oppressors, heterosexuals are oppressors
the women's liberation
and so forth. The fragmentation and demoralisation of
movement according to sexuality, class and 'race' demonstrates this precisely
(Smith, 1994: 4-5).
Class Divisions
While it is certainly true that for some left-wing groups the belief in the
centrality of working-class struggle disguised a fundamental resistance or,
in some cases, hostility to the struggles of Maori activists, it is also a
notorious fact that Maori movements since the 1980s have tended to fight
for the political changes of greatest benefit to those Maori who are already
middle class or wealthy. In this regard, cultural nationalism and the politics
of Maori identity have been the perfect social theory for the upwardly
mobile Maori middle class because it presents the interests of Maori in
contemporary capitalist society as essentially unitary. Thus affuent rightwing individuals such as Donna Awatere (Maori affairs spokesperson for
the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT)) right through to those
of the Maori unemployed, homeless and hungry of South Auckland's
'ghettoes' can be presented as philosophically and culturally the same. This
ignores the critical importance of differential access to economic and political
power within and across Maori society.
Indeed, Maori are all too frequently discussed by cultural nationalists as
if forming one homogeneous entity, its members possessing exactly the
same experiences of oppression and exactly the same political aspirations.
However, this ignores the fact that there exists a dynamic range of aspirations
and political strategies within so-called 'Maoridom'. Moreover, these
aspirations often conflct with one another and are not divorced from the
influence of the wider social and economic environment.
The emphasis on Maori solidarity conceals the historical reality of
social class stratification within both 'traditional' and contemporary Maori
society. It is imperative that we recognise the fundamental antagonism in
capitalist social relations between capital and labour. It is also important to
recognise the inequalities that exist between men
and women.
Cultural nationalist approaches also ignore the fact that Pakeha are not a
homogeneous group that confront Maori in a unified and hostile manner.
The fact is that like Maori, Pakeha in capitalist society are also stratified
according to class and gender, Thus references to 'Pakeha society', 'majority
culture' and so forth, may be useful rhetorical devices to focus blame and
motivate action but they are not useful concepts for explaining social reality
nor are they useful as the basis of a strategy for Maori liberation (Loomis,
1990: 4).
The idea that Pakeha are innately materialistic, exploitative and aggressive
is fundamentally problematic. It assumes that the underlying values and
behaviour of Pakeha as exhibited in capitalist society are primordial and
static. This ignores the fact that the construction of identity at any point in
time is socially constructed and historically contingent. Thus, what it means
to identify as Maori or as Pakeha changes radically throughout history,
reflecting the dynamic relationship between changing material conditions
and the way in which those societies are organised.
Lifestyle Changes
The idea that 'Maori culture' and identity by itself wil automatically bring
about political and economic freedom provides a way out of engaging in
struggle. What is conspicuously absent in cultural nationalist accounts is
talk of transformation and change. Indeed, these approaches have tended to
lifestyle and
encourage strategies based primarily on changes in individual
which are detached from any emphasis on a collective Maori struggle to
construct and change aspects of the world we inhabit. In recent decades,
there has been a progressive decline of the active base of the movement and
the rise of strategies based upon 'direct action' tactics: '... attention-grabbing
actions caried out by the enlightened few, the aim being to shock and
disturb the ignorant masses' (Smith, 1994: 20).
The emphasis on the rediscovery of traditional culture as the solution to
the basic causes of Maori oppression has involved a celebration of the
Maori spirituality and a Maori attachment to nature. The
frequent references to the special nature of Maori society and the separate
and enhancing 'world of the Maori' are testament to this. However, it is
important to note that such appeals to a special 'nature' as a guide to human
action provide few secure reference points (Seg~l, 1987: 7).
superior virtues of
114 Nga Patal
Autonomy in Struggle
The assumption that only those who actually experience a particular form of
oppression can either define it or fight against it has gained a following on
the left commensurate with the decline of the level of class struggle in the
main advanced capitalist societies from the mid-1970s (Smith, 1994: 5).
For movements organised on the basis of the identity of their participants,
the enemy tends to include 'everyone else' perceived as an amorphous,
backward blob which makes up the rest of society (Smith, 1994). It is
assumed that society at large benefits from a particular form of oppression
and has an interest in maintaining it. From this conclusion, it follows that
each oppressed group should have its own distinct and separate movement.
Hence, the so-called 'new social movements' that have arisen during the
1970s and 1980s tend to be organised on the basis of 'autonomy' or
independence from each other.
While no Maori organisations have been built specifically on the basis
of identity politics, many of the key assumptions have gained widespread
acceptance amongst anti-racists, both Maori and Pakeha alike. In this regard,
Maori political
one of the most significant developments in the evolution of
activism since the early 1980s has been the extent to which Maori movements
have adopted the language of these identity politics.
One of the central tenets of cultural nationalism has been the idea that
Pakeha have a fundamental interest in maintaining racism in Aotearoa and
that their contribution to the movement for Maori liberation is more likely
to be divisive than constructive. It has followed from this that the most
effective way of fighting racism and discrimination was for Maori to organise
and struggle separately. This emphasis on autonomous struggle has resulted
theoretically at least, in the exclusion of Pakeha, whatever their social class
and gender, from playing a key role in fighting for Maori libèration. However,
this stance is fundamentally problematic in two major respects: first, because
there is no necessary or immediate unity between oppressed groups in
Aotearoa. Most lack the required resources to fight back when they are
isolated from each other. Unfortunately, the perception that the strggle for
tino rangatiratanga is primarily a Maori versus Pakeha strggle forces
Maori to strggle against the entire Pakeha population. In essence, this
isolates the Maori struggle, forcing it to rely entirely on its own resources.
Given the fact that these resources are meagre, the struggle is very un~qual
to say the least. Second, movements consisting of Maori alone have no real
social power to fundamentally transform their oppression. Historical evidence
The Evolutlon of Contemporary Maorl Protest 115
shows that political movements based solely on the 'identity' of the
participant tend to lurch from the left to the right of the political spectrum
means to achieve their political aims.
precisely because they have no real
It is also important to remember that it is not necessarily true that
autonomous movements, in and of themselves, are successful in identifying
and addressing the issues of the oppressed because even these movements
are not autonomous of the underlying social structures, political forces and
ideologies of capitalist society. There is no guarantee that self-organisation
of the oppressed wil produce the best political strategies for liberation. All
too often, for example, the interests of middle-class elements have become
dominant within the'se so-called 'autonomous' movements, as the history of
the women's movement and Black nationalism have demonstrated (see
Shawki, 1990: 92-99; Segal, 1987).
Conclusion
It is only through a critical assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and
effectiveness of the various strategies for Maori liberation and the groups
that wage them, can we hope to build the strongest possible movement. One
of the most significant developments in the evolution of Maori political
activism since the late 1960s has been the increasing use of culture and
identity as a strategy for dealing with Maori disadvantage and powerlessness.
This has been the dominant ideology in the Maori nationalist movement
since the early 1980s. However, cultural nationalism is not a primordial
phenomenon that constitutes the only authentic strategy for dealing with
Maori disadvantage. Rather, Maori cultural nationalism is a relatively recent
phase in Maori political development, which has embraced a considerable
variety of political strategies, campaigns and paricipants.
The recent upsurge in Maori political activism following the Sealord
deal and the fiscal envelope proposal has exposed the failure of cultural
nationalist strategies to provide a real solution to Treaty of Waitangi
grievances and Maori disadvantage in wider society. Indeed, while the
cultural nationalist emphasis on the rediscovery of Maori identity was
something to be welcomed, the rediscovery of culture as an end in itself and
a substitute for far-reaching social change has been a disaster.
Cultural nationalist strategies have done nothing to change the material
reality for the vast majority of Maori. While a few corporate warriors, tribal
executives and middle-class Maori professionals have bènefited from the
narow economic agenda of the New Right, the Employment Contracts Act,
116 Nga Patal
the benefit cuts, user-pays education and health have all impacted severely
on working-class Maori whanau. By failng to challenge the underlying
power structures in Aotearoa, cultural nationalism cannot provide a solution
to the problems that face most Maori.
While culture and identity remain absolutely essential to Maori social
wellbeing, it does not automatically follow that cultural identity alone
should provide the organisational basis for the fight against racism and
Maori disadvantage. Because identities are blurred and multiple, any fight
against Maori oppression must be based upon building the strongest possible
liberation movement by uniting different oppressed groups into a common
struggle. This is essential because true liberation for Maori wil not occur
without a fundamental transformation of capitalist society and the creation
of a society in which there is effective women's liberation, gay and lesbian
liberation and freedom from racism. It is not necessary to actually experience
a particular form of oppression in order to fight against it, any more than it
is necessary to be destitute in order to fight poverty (Smith, 1994: 4). All
those struggling for a better society can learn to recognise and identify with
those facing particular oppressions and can be enlisted as common alles in
the struggle.
Notes
I, Limitations of space mean that this discussion is necessarily synoptic, This paper
2,
is a considerably condensed version of the research that forms the basis of my
doctoral dissertation. Thanks to Brian Roper and Laurel Hepburn for comments
and suggestions on the first draft.
960s, only a small number
During the Black Nationalist movement of the I
argued that 'Black' culture should be the centrepiece of
political activity. Huey P.
Newton was to strongly criticise cultural nationalists as being reactionary (see
Allen, 1970: 167).