It wasn`t too long ago that intelligence experts were saying that the dance of spy and counterspy had become passe. Modern espionage, they suggested, had become principally a matter of electronic and other
technological measures and countermeasures.
In a narrow sense, they were right. The role of machines in intelligence gathering has steadily become more important. But the breach of security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which is potentially so severe that President Reagan has ordered a sweeping damage assessment, is the latest reminder that all the technological wonders can easily become prey to the human factor.
By all accounts, the compromise at the embassy resulted from the most human of impulses. Some Marine guards allegedly fell prey to the charms of a lovely Soviet woman. This might have given Soviet agents entree to key communications and intelligence rooms within the embassy, an inner sanctum of national security if ever there was one.
After the capture of a spy in U.S. naval intelligence who turned over secrets to Israel, the defection of a CIA man trained to work in Moscow and the discovery of a Navy spy ring, this most recent episode ought to convince everyone that in addition to minding the machines, the intelligence community had better devote more attention to minding the men.
It isn`t an easy task. The number of people with access to classified information is immense, the temptations are as various as the human vices and the suspicion created by security consciousness is itself corrosive. There will surely be some who will look for a mechanical means of counteracting human weakness. This administration has been notoriously quick to invoke lie detector tests. Unfortunately, no such device is fool-proof. And its routine use easily can produce a false sense that security has been restored.
Dealing adequately with the human factor requires a lot of steps that do not offer the deceptive certainty of a lie detector but may provide more real protection. These include more thorough screening of people granted security clearances, especially those charged with protecting secure areas of embassies and other facilities; continuous monitoring of personal behavior by superiors; and concern for financial, family and other personal problems that can make an individual vulnerable to recruitment.
More often than not the serious breaches of U.S. security have not come from people with ideological motivations. They have been examples not so much of divided loyalties as of divided souls.
