Saturday, June 13, 2009

The 'theft' of the Iranian election


The big news of the moment is the aftermath of the elections in Iran, with the issue being the legitimacy of the incumbent, Ahmedinajad, being declared the victor (with 63% of the vote compared to runner-up Moussavi at 34% (both numbers rounded). Many have claimed that the election must have been rigged - ranging from those who believed that Ahmedinajad was going to win but only after going to a second round of voting, to those who believe that Moussavi won and the election result was reversed.

Reading the various accounts, articles, opinion pieces, etc., the level of superficiality in most is truly amazing. Here this Twitterer thought that with the Obama administration we were now beyond the days of dumbed down, one-dimensional analyses. Guess we need President/Professor Obama to give a speech to explain the subtleties....

OK, this Twitterer is not an Ahmedinajad fan and does not take the position that the Iranian elections were either free or fair. The very fact that the Guardian Council decided which candidates would be allowed to run was a way of 'fixing' the election. And subsequently, there were numerous irregularities and ways in which the thumb was put on the scales (ranging from official television and media coverage, to interference with various modes of communication e.g. SMS, to support from the Supreme Leader - both when chose to say something, and also when he chose not to react or take a position (e.g. see (here and here). However, thus far, what he objects to is that the majority of what is out there is profoundly unserious...

Let's look at some of what is advanced in favor of the proposition that the elections were massively fraudulent:
  • Many articles just assume the fraud, or content themselves to anecdotal stories e.g. quoting an Iranian as saying that he/she didn't vote for Ahmedinajad and didn't know anyone in town that would have voted for him either (yes, there are a number of articles like these with puerile thinking!). A variant of this quotes a journalist who walked around town asking voters who they planned on voting for and found no one who would reply 'Ahmedinajad'.
  • Very many articles just assumed that Moussavi was going to win, so that any other outcome would be prima facie proof of electoral fraud. Why would they make this assumption? This Twitterer is not sure, but generally articles of this type gushed in wonder at some or all of the following: Moussavi spoke to very large crowds (the fact that Ahmedinajad did as well apparently was inconsequential); the crowds were very enthusiastic, there was a lot of green (hmm, wasn't aware that green translated to certain electoral victory); there were lots of women and Moussavi's wife was especially prominently featured, (again, unsure why the fact that there were very many women at Ahmedinajad's rallies did not register, because they were more likely to be in chadors perhaps this somehow meant they didn't count); Moussavi's supporters were very youthful; they used Twitter, SMS, and texting a lot more than the incumbent's campaign; etc., etc. These articles seemed to view events through the lens of the recent U.S. elections (variations of the word 'Obamaesque' often appeared in these articles), and assume that what is good for us surely is good for the Iranians!
OK, having dutifully discarded these weighty articles, let us consider those that at least have a modicum of thought put into them:
  • One piece of evidence cited is the lopsided nature of the result - Ahmedinajad 63% to Moussavi 34%. an almost 2:1 margin. While many public opinion surveys were taken they varied wildly e.g. see this list on Wikipedia. However consider an opinion poll conducted by an American organization, the Terror Free Tomorrow Center for Public Opinion. Its survey prior to the election showed that among voters who expressed a preference, Ahmedinajad led Moussavi by a margin of 2.4:1. Granted, it showed a large number undecided, but this throws some cold water on the theory that a 2:1 margin must obviously have been "cooked."
  • Another set of arguments considers the geographical spread of voting patterns across the country. One criticism is that the official numbers show Ahmedinajad beating Moussavi (an Azeri) in Azeri regions, surely an issue. However, the same poll referenced above also showed a 2:1 edge in favor of Ahmedinajad among Azeri voters.
  • Put forward as evidence are also the claims of Moussavi and some of his supporters (e.g. Moussavi won; officials admitted as much to the Moussavi campaign before reversing course, etc. etc.). Even if one ignores the fact that these claims are tinged with self-interest, there are some realities that undermine their credibility. Among these is that the Moussavi campaign claimed victory even before the closure of the polls... Also that they claim a win with 65%, when prior to the election the hope was to hold Ahmedinajad to a second round. Their claim was also rather unspecific - they apparently "knew" based on their poll watchers (while simultaneously complaining that these folks were often not allowed in).
  • Other "evidence" cited comes from other parties with an interest (a.k.a axe to grind). Sometimes they let loose a whopper big enough to show that they have little to no credibility, and thus should be ignored... An example here might be National Council of Resistance of Iran leader Maryam Rajavi , who announced: "More than 85 percent of the 51.2 million eligible voters boycotted the mullahs' sham presidential election"., and claimed, laughably, that the real voter turnout was only 7.5 million!
  • Some of the narrative developed also does not seem to be consistent. For example, according to Juan Cole: "Here is how I would reconstruct the crime. As the real numbers started coming into the Interior Ministry late on Friday, it became clear that Mousavi was winning. Mousavi's spokesman abroad, filmmaker Mohsen Makhbalbaf, alleges that the ministry even contacted Mousavi's camp and said it would begin preparing the population for this victory. The ministry must have informed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has had a feud with Mousavi for over 30 years, who found this outcome unsupportable. And, apparently, he and other top leaders had been so confident of an Ahmadinejad win that they had made no contingency plans for what to do if he looked as though he would lose. They therefore sent blanket instructions to the Electoral Commission to falsify the vote counts." Others make much of the bad blood between Moussavi and the Supreme Leader, and between Rafsanjani (supporting Moussavi) and the Supreme Leader. All of this seems overstated. Let us remember that the four candidates were vetted and approved to run by the Guardian Council (while hundreds of other potential candidates were eliminated). This fact, along with the fact that all four are stalwarts of the revolution (even though they have been classified in the press as "moderates" and "hard-liners", and their differences exaggerated) make these narratives unlikely. How likely is that the Supreme Leader would be so worried about the victory of a screened and 'approved' candidate, that sensing that the candidate might win he pulls a crude stunt that loses him all credibility? The more so, because even if Moussavi had won he could still have been easily 'neutered' just as "reformer" Khatami had been previously? (Side note, in his Salon article Cole is a little more circumspect - his blog's 'Stealing the Iranian election' becomes 'Ahmedinajad reelected under a cloud of fraud.')
  • Much has also been made re Rafsanjani's support of Moussavi. This actually may not have been a plus for Moussavi - Rafsanjani (though extremely well plugged in) is not very popular, and, if memory serves, Ahmedinajad crushed him the first time he was elected...
  • An observation regarding the announced counts was made that seemed credible to this Twitterer - that as the counts were announced "... a perfect linear relation between the votes received by the President and Mir Hossein Mousavi has been maintained..." and that apparently this was very suspicious. Alas, all this proved was that this Twitterer needs to brush up on his statistics, as this theory was debunked by Nate Silver...
So, bottom line, the semi-automatic acceptance of claims of electoral fraud by many is unsupported, and even those attempting to understand what has transpired (including this Twitterer) are ill-served by the pap that most of the media is serving up!

Karim Sadjadpour called it correctly in Foreign Policy when he wrote: "... Given the depth of polarization in Iran, the final results will likely be hotly contested by the losing side..." It is to be hoped that the violence will abate and that this will be ultimately resolved somehow...

Articles pre- & post-election:
Landslide or Fraud? The Debate Online Over Iran’s Election Results NYT's The Lede
Faulty Election Data & Statistical Evidence Does Not Prove That Iranian Election Was Rigged
Iran's Pres. Candidates Recognize the Web as a Go-To to Win
Reformists a Force in Looming Presidential Election
Another Coup for the Hardliners
The Supreme Leader's One Vote
Iranians vote in droves, Mousavi ally claims lead
Iran elections disputed
Rivals in Iran vote issue competing victory claims
Wishful thinking from Tehran
‘It’s a Coup d’Etat’
Reverberations as Door Slams on Hopes of Change
Iran:Riot in Tehran streets after election day"Death to the dictator!"
Ahmadinejad reelected under cloud of fraud & Stealing the Iranian Election
Iran elections: revolt as crowds protest at Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 'rigged' victory

Links to pictures:
Autnews
Flickr: mousavi1388's photostream

Pre-election backgrounders:
A Primer on Iran’s Presidential Election System
The List: Iran's Presidential Wannabes
Why Iran '09 Could Be Like Florida '00
Iranian Presidential Elections: Ghost at the Election Banquet
Iranian Presidents Have a Critical Role in Policymaking

No comments:

Post a Comment