Never calm, the Middle East is perhaps approaching even stormier seas than usual. Growing discord between Israel and the US and a potential win for Hezbollah in the Lebanese elections on Sunday are just two issues that are making for some rough weather in the region. But the real tempest on the horizon remains the ever-growing possibility that Iran will achieve nuclear breakout capability in the near future.
This prospect is one which leaves Israel stuck between two extremely unpalatable choices. The first is to do nothing and look on as Iran becomes a nuclear power and regional hegemon. Instead of attempting to knock out Iran's nuclear facilities, Israel could simply get used to the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran and devise a strategic doctrine for defence taking into account this new reality.
The implications of a nuclear Iran for the Middle East are not rosy. The various Iranian proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, would be able to operate under Tehran's nuclear umbrella with something approaching impunity, making a comprehensive peace settlement even harder to achieve then it is now. This is not to mention the problem of a hostile, theocratic and possibly millenarian regime possessing nuclear weapons. However, the difficulties involved in any military operation have persuaded some analysts that Israel will just have to make the best of a bad situation.
But such a policy may not be possible in the face of Israeli public opinion which genuinely sees Iran as a dire threat to its security. A recent poll conducted by the Center for Iranian studies at Tel Aviv University found that as many as 30% of Israelis would consider emigrating from the country should Iran attain a nuclear weapon. It is harder for Israel's citizens and politicians to dismiss Iran's nuclear programme than it is for the rest of the world, when it is accompanied by the frequent apocalyptic declarations of the country's leaders about the future of the "Zionist entity".
The alternative is for Israel to attempt a unilateral surprise bombing campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities in the knowledge that its air force can, at best, merely set back Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In so doing, a regional conflagration would almost certainly break out in which Israel would come under rocket bombardment from Hezbollah in Lebanon and ballistic missile fire from Iran itself and possibly Syria too. It is also likely that Iran would launch missiles at US bases in the Gulf. In addition, the price of oil would hit unprecedented heights and deal a new blow to a weakened global economy, especially if tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz was disturbed for any significant length of time.
Not only are the consequences of an attack extremely dangerous for Israel, but the success of such a mission is by no means guaranteed. The distance of Iran's nuclear facilities from Israel put them at the extreme limit of Israeli fighter-jets, they are scattered throughout the country and defended by advanced Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles such as the TOR-M1 system. These conditions complicate any potential Israeli strike, which could leave the country embroiled in a multi-front war and the target of international anger at having imperilled the security of the Gulf states and the global economy. While dealing with those problems, it is possible that that the airstrikes would not achieve even the limited goal of delaying Tehran's march to a nuclear weapon.
An alternative scenario is one in which negotiations go nowhere and the US gives grudging approval and even support for an Israeli attack, which will make certain logistical aspects of such a mission easier for Israel. This outcome, even though unlikely, could become more realistic if the Obama administration suffers any more serious foreign policy setbacks. North Korea's recent nuclear test was a severe blow to America's strategy of engagement and President Obama will not be keen to see Iran go nuclear on his watch, for domestic political reasons if nothing else. Should Hezbollah come out on top in the Lebanese elections, then US policy in the Middle East to bolster western-oriented governments will have suffered another serious blow. It is unclear how many more such setbacks Washington is prepared to accept.
But another option exists which still has not yet been tried properly, despite seven years of negotiations in which various interlocutors have tried to persuade, coax and cajole Tehran into backing down from its unyielding stance, with very little success. It is the option of immediate, swift and firm diplomatic action, focused first on getting Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment within a short time-frame and, failing this, imposing targeted sanctions against Iranian interests.
If a more accommodating attitude is not taken by the Iranian government in the months following the presidential elections, then sanctions directed at Iran's oil and gas industry could be imposed, as proposed by analysts such as Emanuele Ottolenghi. Iran's energy sector is particularly dependent on foreign development and technology, and sanctions against it could seriously damage the regime in Tehran and elicit a more conciliatory approach.
If, however, the international community fails to address Iran's nuclear programme with the immediacy it deserves, Israel may well feel that, despite the risks, it has no choice but to attempt to forestall by military means what it perceives to be a grave threat to its existence. The result will not be pretty, but no-one should underestimate how seriously Israel takes this problem. If catastrophe in the region is to be averted then the global powers must act now. Otherwise they will see their position reduced to observers as either Iran goes nuclear or Israel takes matters into its own hands, with all the dire consequences that these eventualities would entail for the Middle East and the wider world.