An inconsistent theory

I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
inconsistent.

Here are the axioms of the formal theory T.

(1) For each moral agent M, if M believes that a set of individuals S
has a moral right against a set of moral
agents T that the agents in T not act in a certain way, and if M can
avoid being financially complicit in the
set of agents T acting in that way, or in any other comparable moral
wrong, while accepting a burden no greater
than that incurred by a typical citizen of an affluent nation by
becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
electricity, and M is knowingly financially complicit in the set of
agents T acting in that way, then M is a moral
bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite.

(2) Jonathan Ball believes that the citizens of Iraq have a moral
right that the officials of the United
States government not order the troops of the United States army to
remain in Iraq and contribute to an unstable
situation in Iraq which has caused the death of at least one million
Iraqi citizens.

(3) Jonathan Ball can avoid being financially complicit in the
officials of the United States government ordering
the troops of the United States army to remain in Iraq and contribute
to an unstable situation in Iraq which has
caused the death of at least one million Iraqi citizens, or in any
other comparable moral wrong, by moving to
some other country, buying a plot of land, and becoming fully self-
sufficient in food and electricity.

(4) For all sets of moral agents T and for all ways of acting W, if
Jonathan Ball can avoid being financially
complicit in T acting in the way W, or in any other comparable moral
wrong, by moving to some other country,
buying a plot of land, and becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
electricity, then Jonathan Ball can avoid
being financially complicit in T acting in the way W while accepting a
burden no greater than that incurred by a
typical citizen of an affluent nation by becoming fully self-
sufficient in food and electricity.

(5) Jonathan Ball is knowingly and avoidably paying taxes in the
United States.

(6) For all ways of acting W, if the officials of the United States
government are acting in way W, and Jonathan
Ball is knowingly and avoidably paying taxes in the United States,
then Jonathan Ball is knowingly financially
complicit in the officials of the United States government acting in
way W.

(7) The officials of the United States government are ordering the
troops of the United States army to remain in
Iraq and contribute to an unstable situation in Iraq which has caused
the death of at least one million Iraqi
citizens.

(8) It is not the case that Jonathan Ball is a moral bankrupt and a
filthy shitstained hypocrite.

I can fully formalize these axioms in a first-order language and
derive a contradiction from them using the classical first-order
predicate calculus. In fact I can even do it using the intuitionistic
first-order predicate calculus, which is weaker than the classical
first-order predicate calculus. There would be no difficulty in
verifying this fact by computer.

Consequently, not ( (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) and (5) and (6) and
(7) and (8) ) is a theorem of intuitionistic first-order logic, and
(not (1) or not (2) or not (3) or not (4) or not (5) or not (6) or not
(7) or not (8)) is a theorem of classical first-order logic.

This would suggest that we must conclude that at least one of the
above propositions is false.

Got any idea which one it is, Ball?

Translation: I didn't understand any of it.........but I think he used some
words that are not real words.

Comparing war with farming is an attempt to cloud the issue. The rights
people normally hold *are* subverted in a wartime situation. By all the
usually acceptable codes of conduct war violates the rights of everybody
involved.

Stick to the subject of rights as it applies to the acquisition of food.
If vegans really believe that animals have rights to the extent that
those rights are violated by farming them for food, then why are those
rights not violated by farming that kills animals collaterally, both
deliberately and incidentally? The latter group is unquestionably much
greater in number. Simply put, why is it a violation of the rights of
the steer to raise and kill him for food, but it is not a violation of
the rights of the mouse or the bird to be chopped up or poisoned in the
process of farming wheat or carrots?

The theory that vegans believe that animals have rights is proven to be
inconsistent.

Be specific. Which premise is wrong? It is possible for rights to be
violated during wartime, is it not, and it is possible for Ball to
avoid being financially complicit in the rights violations that are
going on at the moment, is it not? The bottom line is it is a valid
argument in first-order logic and if Ball is going to dispute the
conclusion he has an intellectual obligation to say on request which
premise he has doubts about.

If Ball is going to talk about assfelching and my obligation to leave
my girlfriend and go back to Australia then I'll talk about any topic
I damn well please.

With regard to your other comments, yes, your question is a perfectly
reasonable one and someone who identifies as an animal rights advocate
has an obligation to say something about it, and I plan to work on
that when I get the time. However, I'm not sure you couldn't raise
similar problems regarding every possible position about how we should
treat nonhuman animals, with the possible exception of the two
extremes, a position saying there are no constraints whatsoever on
what we may do to nonhuman animals, and a position saying, yes,
actually, all nonhuman animals with nervous systems have an absolute
right to life and liberty, and we've got an obligation to respect it
come what may, we must reform plant-based agriculture, electricity
production, and pest control, and if civilisation is no longer
sustainable then so be it. Those are the two extremes and they perhaps
both have a consistency about them, but I'm not sure that anyone has
constructed a position anywhere in between that doesn't have some
consistency problems. If you think that you or someone else has, I'm
happy to listen to you expound it if you have an inclination to do
so.

Since I don't see any reason why discrimination on the basis of
species is justifiable, I have a problem. I don't see why accepting
discrimination on the basis of species for pragmatic reasons is a good
way to solve a consistency problem. I am unclear about the advantages
which your position enjoys over mine.

Just what I said, the theory that vegans believe that animals have rights.
They don't, it's impossible.

I'm not interested in becoming a 3rd party in any disputes, which is why I
snipped that part of your original post.

Fine.

There's only a "consistency problem" if you claim to believe in some
overarching principle that you don't and/or can't follow through on.

Yes, I know, you have painted yourself into a corner. But it's not a problem
for you, you gain more from it than you lose. By being in this corner you
see yourself as a warrior in this lofty existential moral conundrum. That
suits you.

I accept that we are all just animals, and that "rights" are nothing more
than a way of perceiving a set of social conventions which evolved through
human history. "Discrimination" is one of most misunderstood and misused
words in the english language. Discrimination is good. Specifically,
failure to discriminate on the basis of species is a form of mental
aberration. People who do this seem to have transcended physical reality and
have taken to living in the realm of pure concepts.

We're talking about the argument that Jonathan Ball is a moral
bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite. There was no premise that
nonhuman animals have rights. And if you tell me that's off-topic for
this newsgroup, I'll just roll around on the ground laughing. When was
the last time this newsgroup was on-topic? If Jonathan Ball spends
years hurling abuse at others for failing to live up to certain
standards of ethical integrity it's reasonable to investigate whether
he himself adheres to those standards.

The statement "nonhuman animals have rights" simply means that there
are some constraints on what we may do to them, which just about
everyone believes. Ethical vegans take an extreme stance on how strong
their rights are. You can raise questions about its consistency, yes,
but you've really given no reason why your position has any particular
advantage over theirs.

No probs.

Which I don't, but Jonathan Ball does...

It's everyone's problem, not just my own. Simply saying
"discrimination on the basis of species is justified" as a way of
getting on with life is not a solution. If I have a problem because my
position lacks a coherent foundation, you have that problem just as
much. If it counts as a problem, then it's everyone's problem.

And with regard to this idea of yours that it "suits me" to see myself
as a warrior in a lofty existential moral conundrum, you're an idiot
and you really should stick to just talking about ethics. It's called
living a reflective ethical life. Any reasonably reflective person
will acknowledge that there are some difficult moral questions, some
of us decide to actually spend some time thinking them through, and if
that's not your thing, then what are you doing on this newsgroup?

You really do not have the insight into my psyche that you think you
do, you know.

That's an utterly ridiculous statement, totally unargued. You've given
up trying to make serious contributions to the debate. You should just
stick to trying to persuade Ronny Hamilton to find something else to
do with his time.

That's incorrect, if you mean by "nonhuman animals have rights" simply
that there are some constraints on what we may do to them then your
position would be a completely normal animal welfare one. So you're
missing something.

Who are "they"? Animals? All of them?

I thought it was obvious. I'm not extrapolating the principle of human
rights to animals, I'm not claiming that discrimination on the basis os
species is wrong, then doing it all over the place.

Yes you do. By claiming to believe that discrimination based on species
is unsupportable you are taking such a position.

, but Jonathan Ball does...

I told you, your obsession with Jonathan Ball is your cross to bear,
please keep it out of our conversations.

There is no problem, you create an imaginary one when you take that
position.

Who said I haven't thought about them? I have, and I have to these
conclusions. Perhaps you think that the only way to argue is to
construct absurdly confused, convoluted pseudo-logical propositions.

Maybe, maybe not. One thing I know, people usually do things for a
reason, a payoff.

The problem is I believe it's something you either see one way or the
other. There's no argument that I know of that could change your mind.
I've tried, if you remember. I even submitted a lengthy academic
argument called Moralstat99. If I said that we should extend rights to
plants you might see that as nonsense. The same thing applies to
non-human animals.

There is no real debate. The proposition that we should not discriminate
on the basis of species is a notion that attempts to transcend nature
itself. Anyone who "believes" it lives inside a part of their conceptual
mind, not in the real world. It makes about as much sense as most
science fiction.

You might have a point, it's about as useful.

It's correct. But you're right that not every position which adheres
to this proposition would be called an animal rights one. But as the
arguments on this newsgroup show it isn't really clear-cut what counts
as an animal rights position. Unless you want to say that no-one
really holds an animal rights position.

It depends on the vegan, as you well know. I will let you know the
next time I wish to put forward a position for consideration.

When I say "I think we should avoid discrimination on the basis of
species" and then am unable to put forward a coherent ethical theory
which meets this requirement, that is a weakness, yes. But just
arbitrarily stipulating that discrimination on the basis of species is
acceptable because it seems to be a convenient way of producing an
ethical theory we can all live with is just as weak.

If we just focus on the things I say we should and shouldn't do to
animals, and the things you say we should and shouldn't do to animals,
I don't see that you've given me any reason to think that the place
where you draw the line is better. (That's a two-way street, of
course). It's an impasse. So more work needs to be done.

Very well, then, how about I move to "If we are going to discriminate
on the basis of species then we have an intellectual obligation to
give a satisfactory explanation of why it is justifiable?"

This thread is about Jonathan Ball, and you wanted to comment on the
original post. You could always have started your own thread. I am
happy to avoid talking about him with you if that is what you would
prefer.

There is the problem of trying to determine how we should treat
nonhuman animals. Different people draw the line in different places
and we need a rational way of deciding which place is best.

You've thought about them, I've thought about them, the conclusions I
have come to at the moment are somewhat different to yours. For some
reason you don't wish to give me the credit of being just another
reasonably intelligent person who's made a good faith effort to think
these things through, you wish to portray me as someone with some kind
of mental illness who's got some kind of "moral hero" complex, who
argues in "absurdly confused, convoluted pseudo-logical propositions".
Well, it lacks credibility I'm afraid.

Yes, I had a look, the so-called "rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases" is really quite weak, I'm afraid. I tried to explain
why.

I do plan to write something on this topic and I will be looking at
the various answers that have been given to the argument from marginal
cases.

Well, why not try to say something about how we should treat nonhuman
animals, why draw the line in the particular place you recommend
drawing it?