lupi

cow of tailed snake (gay)

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you can say "chimoora" instead of "cow of tailed snake" if you want. its a good pun.​


i ramble about aerospace sometimes
I take rocket photos and you can see them @aWildLupi


I have a terminal case of bovine pungiform encephalopathy, the bovine puns are cowmpulsory


they/them/moo where "moo" stands in for "you" or where it's funny, like "how are moo today, Lupi?" or "dancing with mooself"



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lupi
@lupi

anyway here, their opsec at boca chica is so bad that this picture of the vehicle breakup from an onboard camera has leaked like five different times


lupi
@lupi

i suppose we should start with figuring out what things here were successful and what were not. a lot of spaceflight fanatics will say "they gathered data, and that's all that matter" and like. sure. maybe. but in a general sense, let's think about this. what did they prove here?

if you're seeing this without anythin' below it, i just spent like two hours writing out a longwinded historical explanation of why things panned out this way for starship as a reply to this. Do check it out, it's far more interesting if far less compact.

Things that were a success:

  • it flew. it turns out when you put enough rocket engines and fuel behind something, it will move. who knew.
  • it got most of the way through first stage flight. that's kinda nifty considering that stage design had never flown before.

Things that were not a success: (i was trying to get the read more thing to work but couldn't)

  • within moments of lifting off, several engines had been knocked out by the shockwave of the rocket's exhaust reverberating off the flat ground below. more would fail for assorted and less obvious reasons throughout the flight, but the ones that failed before tower clear have a fairly apparent cause.
  • it started tumbling at the end of first stage flight
  • the two stages did not separate
  • the rocket excavated a crater beneath the launch mount due to a lack of any flame trench/flame diverter/sound suppression system (this is why several engines were knocked out)
  • as it excavated said crater, it sent chunks of concrete flying half a mile and one completely totaled a minivan that was being used to host a news outlet's cameras remotely. (Nobody was harmed, this vehicle was in the keep out zone and just being used to stage remote cameras, but still)
  • dust kicked up from the rocket excavating said crater rained down all over the protected wetlands upon which the SpaceX launch site sits, the dust falling at least as far as nearby Port Isabel and South Padre Island.
  • they may not have blown up their facilities, but they sure did manage to wreck them plenty serious nonetheless
  • as you can see from the onboard camera view in the previous post, not all of the thermal tiles that are meant to keep the thing from melting during reentry stayed on. this is generally bad
  • it blew up. this one was kinda expected at some point i don't think anyone sane expected any measure of success from the bastard battleship but even still it manages to find ways to defy our expectations and fail in strange ways.

It's worth noting that at the moment, this vehicle is the recipient of a sole-source contract to be our lunar lander. This is the basket we chose to put our eggs in, despite being fully aware of spacex's history of underbidding to get government contracts.

I hope the other contenders have been working on their bids still, because we were going to offer the option to bid on future landings to them.

i have a lot of opinions about starship and the space program as a whole that i've developed over years of following it, like... I moved to florida to be closer to it, i share my launch photography here regularly on @aWildLupi, but there's a lot I could say and I don't even know where to start here. If you ever want me to chime in on something with all I know at this point, don't be afraid to ask, i like sharing.


lupi
@lupi

i figure the rundown is good but i was about to start talking folks ears off in comments, and i've had this conversation in discord a lot today already, but like. We know elon musk is a shitstain, but SpaceX is a successful company despite him, despite being a meat grinder for aerospace graduates with an average employee retention period of like, 2 years.

How could they design a rocket that's as undeniably successful as falcon 9, one that captured the commercial launch market and has a annual flight rate rivaling that of entire countries, a success record that's seen hardly a blemish since the rocket was still young 7 years ago, and then, turn around and make... this. How do we get from there to here? It's a bit of a long road, really. It'll take us from the 1990s, to the early days of spacex, to today, with some detours to talk about shuttle. As this is a rough history blended with some amount of editorializing, I'm not going to have a lot of sources to hand, if you have any questions on something I'll try to hunt it down and edit it in over time.


Let's turn the clock back to the late 1990s

History doesn't repeat, but it sure does love to rhyme. Right now, we're watching the tech industry eat itself all over again, as the boom times screech to a halt. So if the last few years felt like the dotcom bubble, you might not be surprised it's where this story starts.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, as the dotcom boom was in full swing, the US Department of Defense was seeking to replace the aging Titan IV, Atlas II, Delta II, and so forth, vehicles that had been pressed into continued service after the shuttle failed to meet the DoD's expectations for operational readiness and capability.
They put out a contract to all the major rocket builders for what they called Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, and when you're a defense contractor, when the government says jump, you say "how high/how much are you paying us." Plenty of contractors got to work, but only two contenders were selected.

  • Lockheed Martin provided their proposed Atlas V (and maybe the Atlas III? can't recall), which benefitted from a collaboration with Russian aerospace industry (arranged by the US State Department!), providing the RD-180 engine to power them. They're not important here, as much.
  • McDonnell Douglas (later Boeing, after the merger) provided their proposed Delta IV. It shared a name with Delta rockets past, but little else. It would take the cryogenic upper stage from the failed, interim Delta III (my beloved) and mate it to a fully cryogenic core stage. And, importantly, it's the focus of our history lesson here.

As you can imagine, with the tech industry on what seemed like an endless climb towards the heavens, endless investment money pouring in, and so many tech companies promising revolutionary new services for and facilitated by the burgeoning web, a lot of folks were really getting into satellites. Motorola famously took a big gamble on Iridium, one that Really Didn't Pay Off and they nearly scuttled the whole thing (there's a good book about it i've never read, Eccentric Orbits). But to Boeing and Lockheed, the EELV contract wasn't just an opportunity to position themselves for government money, it would afford them the chance to build new designs to suit this upcoming commercial satellite demand.

Boeing would build an entirely new facility in Decatur, Alabama to produce the Delta IV rocket, a titan of rocket manufacturing, capable of producing 40 rockets a year, a flight rate that even Shuttle hadn't been able to realize. They saw number going up, and they wanted to ride that train, they designed Delta IV to be a commercial powerhouse, intended for a high flight rate to keep that factory constantly ticking along.

And then that commercial market completely failed to materialize. The bottom fell out under the dotcom bubble, it burst, and suddenly Delta's greatest strength (its capacity for a high flight rate) was its greatest weakness. With all the fixed costs of their overbuilt infrastructure, the business case didn't close.
Delta IV would forever be stunted by its own potential, horrendously unprofitable but mandated to exist by the DoD for "assured access to space," a policy instituted after Challenger to make sure that there were multiple avenues for them to get things into space.
This would have ramifications of its own (ask me about Vulcan, and ULA's Decatur Problem sometime), but they don't matter here insofar as they're a demonstration of a big mistake, Boeing's hubris, confidence, eyes larger than stomach, stomach larger than portion size, et cetera.

How does Boeing's failure define SpaceX's success?

In the late 2000s, after SpaceX got Falcon 1 to succeed by the skin of their teeth, NASA awarded them and some other companies (Rocketplane Kistler, Sierra Nevada, and later Orbital Sciences) contracts under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Systems contract, partly funding the development of vehicles and systems that would be able to bring supplies to and from the Space Station as the Shuttle retired. For SpaceX, this would be their impetus to develop a new vehicle, as EELV had been for Boeing and Lockheed.

That vehicle would become the Falcon 9, and the Dragon spacecraft that rode it. And in this moment, I cannot express how much Falcon 9 is "What if we didn't fuck up Delta IV." They saw what had happened when Boeing overextended, and endeavoured to design a rocket to be as lean, cost-effective, and potent as possible for a specific market sector.

  • Both stages of the falcon 9 use the same tooling to produce their propellant tanks.
  • Both stages even use the same engine, with the second stage's engine just being vacuum optimized with nozzle extensions and some other minor tweaks.

Falcon 9 trades efficiency for convenience with both of these, as an upper stage fueled by RP-1 (highly refined kerosene) loses a whole lot of efficiency over the hydrolox upper stages used by the EELVs, but it greatly simplifies a whole lot for them to have common propellants.

  • Additionally, they sought manufacturing efficiency by only developing one size of payload fairing, sized to fit the majority of commercial satellites, a move that prevented them from accepting a great many defense contracts.
  • Lastly, SpaceX's Hawthorne facility was modest, they didn't overbuild, they didn't put the cart before the horse, they made sure it was lean. Hell, even when it came to their launchpads, they were lean, claiming equipment and structures from scrapyard and govdeals to build things up. They even got the old Beal Aerospace proving ground for a steal, it's now their McGregor testing facility. (Beal aerospace is another hilarious story from 90s spaceflight, my favorite era)

All of this meant that even before they started strapping legs to it and trying to hit barges in the ocean, they had a potent, cost-effective vehicle primed to meet the ISS resupply contract, eat Roscosmos and Arianespace's lunch by undercutting them in the commercial market, and even bid on the handful of defense contracts it was qualified for to get little a DoD money as a treat. Falcon 9 succeeds because it was designed by a competent team with a clear vision and a demonstrable awareness of past failure to avoid.

They've managed to stretch the design from its stocky, square-bottomed beginnings to a genuinely remarkable powerhouse of a lifter, and a reusable one at that. It's only blown up a couple times, once from an issue with a supplier (which isn't even something they alone have dealt with, rip Taurus II), and once while it was still pushing the envelope, getting stretched and experimenting with performance increases.

And that's even before mentioning the teams that made it happen. They had so many industry experts, they had people from TRW who worked on an engine for the Space Launch Initiative program, its engine technology finding its way into Merlin, for example. They were no slouches, SpaceX attracted all sorts of talent with decades upon decades of industry experience in the early days, and it really shows in what they were able to accomplish back then.

If they had such smart people at the wheel, how the hell did they fuck up this hard?

Simple. When Elon Musk built his team out in the wetlands of south texas, at a site that had originally only been slated to be a ground tracking station, then a potential falcon 9 launchsite at most, he brought almost nobody with him that worked on Falcon 9, or really, rockets or launchpads in general. This decision baffles me, but then, I'm not the kind of "more money than sense" sort that Mr. Twitter is.

Starship as we know it has a long history of bold promises, from the original unveil of the Interplanetary Transport System/Big "Falcon" Rocket (no, it didn't really stand for falcon, of course it didn't, this is elon musk we're talking about) at the 2016 International Astronautical Conference in Guadalajara, through to the spectacular conflagration we saw today.

Frankly, a lot of that doesn't matter, because up until they broke ground in boca chica, the most real the thing had ever been was that time they purchased a shitload of expensive carbon fiber tooling and entered into a lease with the port of long beach to use an old WWII shipyard for manufacturing, and then backed out of the lease and scrapped the tooling. I think they made one or two test tanks out of carbon fiber and blew them up (on purpose)? Doesn't matter.
The vehicle design changed at least annually, with Musk's initial promises and claims that "it won't be a space shuttle, it won't have wings, or tiles," left by the wayside, as they tried designs that were flat bottomed lifting bodies, designs with fins, and ultimately designs with tiles like we see now.

It was only when they started fabricating the thing (after contracting a water tower construction company to manufacture a singular prototype vehicle, called Starhopper by fans) that a real design for it began to emerge, out of an impetus that can only be seen when you actually start to have skin in the game and have to sell a product, not just an idea of one. And now, that design process was taking place with a team of people who had very little experience with launch vehicles, or launch pads, leading to decisions like:

  • "let's catch the landing vehicle out of the air with giant arms on the launch tower for immediate reuse"
  • "we don't need a flame trench, we're not gonna have one on mars" (though that decision may be equally rooted in not wanting to deal with the paperwork required to do any amount of earthwork in the protected wetlands around their launchsite)
  • "we're gonna make the thing use these weird flappy things driven by tesla motors to control itself on reentry, so it can reenter on its belly and land on its tail"
  • "what if the vehicle WAS the fairing and it opened like an alligator"

Baffling technical decisions aside, we've got more to unpack here. Like the question of, well, what is starship... for?

  • launching huge batches of starlink satellites
  • launching every satellite we can fit in it super cheap because reusability means cheap right
  • point to point suborbital passenger flight
  • point to point suborbital logistics for the department of defense
  • orbital tourism
  • lunar lander for the Artemis program
  • mars colonial transporter
  • honestly, the list goes on.

and so we begin to see a problem. Does anyone else remember a space vehicle design with lofty promises, including the concept of being a Vehicle To Do Anything And Everything, do it cheaply, reusably, and innovatively? A vehicle that would make spaceflight routine, a vehicle that would make it accessible to everyone, a vehicle that would

hi i'm talking about the space shuttle can you tell i'm talking about the space shuttle? I love the space shuttle a whole lot, but love isn't blind, and even the best spacecraft ever designed isn't without its faults.
Even when its worst moments were the result of human factors choosing to operate it outside of safe limits, bad safety culture allowing egregious risks to be tolerated in the name of meeting deadlines, et cetera, even with that defense, it was still a shadow of what it was promised to be, suffocated under the weight of having to be designed to do everything, and not designed to be good at any one thing.

The team working at Boca Chica are either unaware of the mistakes they're making (and repeating) through lack of experience, or in Musk's case actively ignoring the fact that he's driving those mistakes, because SpaceX's past success has made him feel like they're invincible, and "rip to the Shuttle but I'm Different. Better Actually."

What can we learn from this? What conclusions can we draw?

I dunno really. SpaceX now is where Boeing was in 1998, thinking they're invincible and making huge mistakes in the name of ambition, maybe. The market conditions sure line up for that, as the space industry is undergoing another mini-collapse.

We're seeing a bloodbath as small launch companies fail, leading venture capital investors to back out as spaceflight seems like a riskier investment, on top of VC being super gunshy in general as crypto and everything falters, jumping all over the place trying to find the next big pump and dump, like AI or generative art or NFTs or the metaverse, just trying to find a lifeline to keep their precarious little empires of dirt from getting washed away.

Spaceflight is risky business, the only dependable source of revenue comes from governments, due to the absolute fickle state of the commercial market. The actual sturdy customers, telecoms, only need a couple sats every ten years, they're not enough to anchor you.
SpaceX is attempting to induce their own demand by vomiting thousands of starlink satellites into the sky to try and be the first to bring a profitable (rip Iridium) satellite internet constellation to market.
Rocketlab is branching out by offering end to end services designing, building, and flying payloads for academia and small industry on their Electron+Photon platforms, while also attempting to scale up to a medium lift vehicle with Neutron, and also as of this week, selling Electron as a hypersonic research testbed.
We're seeing bloodshed as even companies we thought were sure shots like Branson-backed Virgin Orbit fold as funding dries up. Those who have survived are trying to make every pivot they can to weather the oncoming storm.

And starship did about as good of a job separating today as Elon Musk does in general, what a messy divorce.

late edit with one final thought, also shameless plug stuff

starship failing this test was expected, and in talking about the failed test i'm not offering this indictment of the program based on something that was a foregone conclusion. I wasn't expecting it to succeed. Nobody should have. it was never going to succeed. I'm not looking at this test in a vacuum and being like "starship blew up, it's a failure because it blew up." No. Starship was a failure long before it blew up.

it failed to make orbit in this flight, it didn't meet its objectives, and that's not because "space is hard," but because they made decisions at every step in the design, build, and layup of starship and its infrastructure that hamstrung it and made it worse and made this failure not just probable, but absolutely inevitable

christ did i really spend like two hours drafting this oh my god i'm a dork

if you liked this i'm goin' through some rough times right now, and if you like space you can support me by purchasing rocket launch photos off my gallery site, but also if you have questions about almost anything mentioned here (i had to defer to some expert friends to fill in some of my blanks) I'm happy to talk even more about this lmao


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in reply to @lupi's post:

yeah, that's what i was referring to, I just didn't have a quick link to cite. I mean, between the crater, the concrete sent flying all across their facility, and all the tanks being caved and venting.

NASA's not gonna let them use the identical launch mount they spent last year building next to pad 39a lmao

oh I assumed you were referring just to OLM but yeah it's not great anywhere down in boca chica rn

also, on one of the facility cams there looked to be a big fire in the tank farm for about 15 minutes right after the flight, but I have no idea what that was

also also, lmao I didn't know that they'd assumed that this was just gonna work and decided to build one down at KSC too, fuckin idiots

it's been confirmed to be the latter; the telemetry on the live feed showed that it was descending through 35km after an apogee at about 39km -- supposedly the planned stage 1 apogee was nearly 80km so if anything it's a surprise that they didn't declare the trajectory off-nominal and blow it up earlier

i've heard both ways, but then i'd heard the FAA confirmed it was detonated.

but yeah, this whole thing was just. why did they allow this to happen, what did you learn? you learned taht if you put enough engines under anything and give them enough fuel, it will go up.

Also that they are horrendously behind on meeting objectives for the NASA HLS contract, which hinges on this thing actually working, which hinges on it not being a fundamentally flawed design from the ground up, designed by a team that did not include anyone from spacex who had actually worked on rockets or launchpads.

Like i'm not even bullshitting you (despite being a bull), when Musk spun up boca chica for this, he brought almost nobody with any history or expertise from Hawthorne or the Cape to help design the rocket or infrastructure.

That, and a hatred of regulation, are why it didn't have a goddamn flame trench, because like. They didn't understand why it would need one, "it won't have a flame trench on mars 🤓"

hjksdfkjhsdkjhfjsgdfhgg holy shit I can't believe the reason they decided not to use 60-year-old engineering best practices is because they didn't want to have to go to the trouble of getting environmental permits to dredge up protected wetlands

THEY COULD'VE BUILT A HILL!

THATS WHAT WE DID AT KSC! ALL OF OUR LAUNCHPADS ARE ON FILL! The SLS pad is literally a hill of concrete!

before the comments get too deep i'm starting to draft a more long form post about How They Messed This Up So Fucking Bad and it's gonna be fun lmao

they had spare cones from scrapped Starship prototypes they probably could've just jammed on the front, that's what relativity did anyway, but they also decided to skip wet dress rehearsals and full stack static firings that would have exposed how inadequate the pad was for this so

[elon fanboy voice] ah well you see they collected much data here as you may or may not know. next time they will simply not do the exploding failure things, and will instead do the NYOOM success things,,

in reply to @lupi's post:

Of course! For as much as I go on about space, I really don't get to dive into my opinions and knowledge about history and policy, and I really ought to do that more. One of these days, i'll make that thread about why the 90s were absolutely bananas in spaceflight and why that my favorite spaceflight time period. It's one of few times in history the US government has tried to stabilize a regime instead of the opposite, when the state department went panic mode after the USSR collapsed. It's great.

I appreciate it! I may be an outsider without any actual work experience in the industry, but i chat with enough people that I've started to come into knowing some things. Even so, I ran the draft of this by like two people I know who are whole bodies of research into the industry in and of themselves before i posted it.

The historical lens here i think brings a whole lot to the table that I don't know if Space Twitter is ready to hear, but it really does cast an interesting light on things to compare Falcon to Delta IV and Starship to Shuttle in that historical way.

The first time I have myself on record saying this in any form was in spring 2021 while I was just filling air during a Kerbal stream. The fact that it's proven itself true (especially the "we're headed into a market collapse" bit) really blows my mind, I managed to surprise myself because I never wholly trust my opinions and beliefs to be correct.

Ngl, at first I thought you were kinda overreacting based on an explosion on an explicit test flight, but you make some good points. Especially if they can’t get this thing flying properly by mid-next year, which sounds like a real possibility with this many flaws. And of course the comparisons to the shuttle are much more damning, because that’s how a spacecraft really fails even if it did fly reliably.

I hope they figure this shit out. At least Elon is busy with Twitter lol, the engineering team might have a chance to get some common sense decisions made while he’s distracted.

yeah, I realized it would read that way but these are absolutely thoughts that I've had since well before today's test (spring 2021, at least), having seen the way the program shook out. I's why I added that whole penultimate "late edit" section.

Like, we all knew it was going to explode, or fail spectacularly. That thing was not making it to its perfect Hawaiian retirement. The argument I'm trying to make is that it failed before it ever left the ground, and the test was only symptomatic of that.

As to "figuring shit out", as of last year, Hawthorne management has assumed control of the site and is trying to pick up the mess Musk's cowboy team left them with, but i don't know if there's anything to be saved. They might've just invested too much in a design that really has no saving grace.

wait, is that why they were reporting that the launch staff all supposedly cheered when the damn thing blew up? (q.v. stories like this one from CBS: https://archive.is/cQ4mG) I saw that little detail and I was astonished--like, sure, even a failed launch can provide useful information, but a catastrophic and expensive failure is still a failure so...what was with the party atmosphere?

knowing that this is some special skonks-works team of Elon Musk loyalists makes things so much clearer.

~Chara

I mean i get it, they were all stunned the thing flew at all, and I can't fault anyone for being excited at the spectacle. But we all knew it was gonna blow up. Like, maybe we didn't all know, maybe some folks believed it would truly succeed. But there's a reason Emerald Mines did his best to tamp down expectations and say what he did ahead of time.

Not everyone who works on it are loyalists, not anymore, last year SpaceX and NASA audited the site and discovered how bad it was, and Hawthorne management completely took over. I didn't include that detail because all the mistakes that would lead to this failure had already been made before it, but it is at least a detail I do feel i might be worth finding room for in a subsequent edit.

the whole reaction of spacex fans online to this confuses me

like sure I understand that any data they could get from this launch is useful, but surely they would gotten much better data if they had invested in a launch system that didn't immediately cause heavy damage to both their rocket and facilities on use?

Oh it gets worse. This isn't even the worst sand-related incident SpaceX has had.

In short, when Starship SN8 blew up after pulling off the first successful landing of a Starship vehicle, the team at boca, "in an effort to accelerate testing and development," scavenged engine parts from the debris of a rocket that blew up and put them to use on the next starship, SN9.

So Boca Chica is on the beach, right? Beaches have sand. When your rocket parts get scattered across the beach after it blows up, the rocket parts get sand in them.
You're not cleaning that shit out of 'em either, look at what Nauka had to go through when its far simpler engines and propellant lines/tanks were found to have foreign object debris in them.

As Starship SN9 came in to land, the engines didn't all start, they puked their guts out and the thing slammed into the ground because the engine parts had sand in them, and the last thing you want in an environment like "complicated rocket engine plumbing" is fucking sand.

"Oh, but they got data!" Yeah. And how useful is that data when their testing methodology was flawed from the start and their results were tainted by knowingly putting parts from a rocket that blew up into the damn thing? What did you actually learn? What did you actually prove?

phewwwww. i hadn't been following Starship that closely besides the high-profile stuff, my general opinion of it was "i have Opinions (mostly about lack of crew escape) but more SHLVs is good" - this program is a complete mess, huh?

yep! did you see my previous comment to someone else talking about their famous sand incident? I think that says a whole lot about how the program has always been fucked.

and as a cherry on top, the fact that we know about that Sand Event, and the fact that within an hour we had leaked stills from onboard cameras during the tumble, the fact that their operational security is. nonexistent. that's a good sign too

apropos of nothing but why do we always launch from sea level? wouldn't we save measurable amounts of effort by launching from, say Denver, skipping a full mile of the strongest gravity and thickest atmosphere? is it just because Florida and Texas are the only places on earth where you can drop flaming debris on people with no consequences?

you don't launch over land because then you drop stages on people

that's why launch sites are always by the ocean (except in china) because then your fallen stages don't hit people and towns (except in china) (but they're slowly spinning down their inland launch sites. even so, i don't recommend looking up videos of chinese rocket stages landing on rural villages)

if you can find a mile high cliff near the ocean go for it, but those don't exist

as far as gravity and atmosphere losses, what you actually save is minimal compared to the herculean effort it takes to establish a launch site in such conditions. A rocket is only in the lower atmosphere for a short while.

other launch sites used include:

  • wallops island, virginia
  • vandenberg, california,
  • kourou, french guiana
  • tanegashima, japan
  • mahia, new zealand
  • wenchang, china (their one coastal launch facility)

as a largely landlocked country (save the arctic circle) with no convenient coastal colonial holdings (like europe with french guiana), Russia had really no choice and was by and large lucky that most of their landholdings are barren and uninhabited for their baikonur, vostochny, and plesetsk cosmodromes

florida was chosen for many reasons, but you'll note that a lot of these are at low to moderate latitudes because the closer to the equator you are, the more efficiency you gain from the earth's rotation giving you a speed boost

One of the most cursed things I've watched was a long march launch where the rocket IMMEDIATELY turns after taking off and then flys off to do terrible things. But the scary part wasn't the terrible things, rather the extremely distorted voice talking during the launch combined with things going Obviously Wrong.

Intelsat 708 was.... There are a lot of sinophobic and warmongering (read: bullshit) reasons the united states does not interface with the chinese aerospace industry or CNSA anymore, but Intelsat 708 and the way it was handled? that was also one of them I can find entirely fair and reasonable.

I saw some of the news, which just focused on the "we got data from this"-angle. Which sure, they learned that flame trenches are kinda important. Something that every serious launch site has had since 1950s. Thanks for the write-up, really makes me wonder how long it's going to take until the contract for the lunar launch vehicles gets yanked, because I don't believe for a second that these cowboys will be able to unfuck this clusterfuck in time for the planned lunar missions.

I remember reading the old Wired article on SpaceX years and years ago that I've seen people cite as the start of the Musk mythmaking, but really the only thing I recall from that article is how Musk had originally insisted that they didn't actually need countdowns but then enough rockets exploded that he eventually conceded that point. And it feels like he has repeatedly been making the same mistakes ever since.

just commenting to commend you on writing a post that made me more interested in rockets and rocket history than any Kennedy Space Center field trip, "hey so what is it that made my work shake earlier" google search, or general 10 years of sideline-exposure to the space program by living on the space coast.

I'm glad! Like, this is such high praise that I'm struggling to figure out what to say in reply.

There are a lot of really fascinating things about it that a lot of people miss out on because they're only interested in the equipment or the promises of those who make it.

For example, if you ever catch the North Brevard History Center in downtown Titusville open, there's a whole binder of preserved newspaper clippings in the back from Titusville residents fighting NASA to keep Playalinda Beach open after NASA decided they would permanently close the access road for "safety/security" around the Shuttle. That binder absolutely fascinates me. (also, across the street is a pretty good ice cream place)

That in itself is a fraction of a whole story and a whole twitter thread I did once, and really ought to do again here with what i've learned since, and a clearer goal in mind.

I really need to get up there sometime. The binder sounds interesting and there's probably some info there about the various small towns/villages NASA wiped off the map to make KSC in the first place as well.

On a previous visit, I talked to one of the docents and it turned out she lived in one of them. She talked about the school bus ride being so long that you had your homework done before you got home, 'cause it really was out in the sticks from the mainland.

They have a large canvas print of an aerial photo from one of those towns on display as well, it hung in the bank that used to be across the street.

That story of the towns we lost fascinates me in a way as a part of the history. You can trace the old A1A through where North Atlantic splits from the modern alignment all the way through to where it resumes in Ormond Beach. But that's a whole post in and of itself.