Philosophy, Medicine, Science, and Boundaries DAN LUSTHAUS Harvard University he Caraka-saṃhitā is widely accepted as the earliest extant Indian medical text. Its founding ideas are attributed to an ancient preceptor named Ātreya and his disciple Agniveśa, about whom we know very little that is not deeply drenched in conlicting hagiographia. he core redaction of this text is attributed to someone named Caraka, whose historical identity is equally soaked in conlicting hagiographical details.1 In this text, however, we ind, along with a plethora of medical information about sundry physical and mental illnesses, symptoms, drugs, herbs, diagnostic theory, and principles, methods of prognosis, treatments, anatomical theory, and so on, what is usually considered to be the irst appearance of the theory of pramāṇa, the instruments or means by which knowledge is acquired. Medieval Indian philosophy – after the Nyāya-sūtra (which appears to have been inluenced by the Caraka-saṃhitā [hereafter CS] in its own treatment of the pramāṇas), and especially after the innovations in epistemology and logic developed by the Buddhist philosophers Dignāga and 139 Dharmakīrti – devoted much of its energy and attention to arguments and reinements of pramāṇa theory. For centuries, pramāṇa theory was the grounding discipline for all Indian philosophy, no matter which school or tradition one belonged to. Why did it irst appear in India in a medical text? Does that make the CS a philosophical text or a medical text with some philosophical sections? Is this a question for comparative philosophy or for comparative “history” of science? I will try in this paper to both complicate and clarify those questions. COMPARED TO WHAT? his essay will be a departure from my usual approach, which would be to focus on a careful reading of a text or limited range of texts. Instead, here, I will raise more general issues gathered from some of the thoughts I have had over the years as a practitioner of what could be called comparative philosophy, ideas raised by working on a variety of materials in a variety of religious and philosophical traditions. For the most part, what will be ofered are, not so much conclusions, but possible research directions or considerations for myself and other practitioners of this sort of philosophy, though, as I will suggest in a moment, in some very important sense, all philosophy is comparative. All thinking is comparative: X and non-X, X and Y, Q implicating R; all thinking presupposes notions of identity and diference. In what ways are X and Y the same or diferent? All relations presuppose at least two things must be diferent from each other, and at the same time united in a common relation. When we wish to test whether our students can think rather than regurgitate, we ask them to write essays that “compare and contrast” one idea, or system, or theory, etc., with another. Rubbing things together creates mental friction, which can, under the right conditions, ignite insightful and even innovative thinking – a type of creative tapas in the Ṛg Vedic sense.2 A contemporary philosopher tackling Plato, or Aquinas, or Descartes, or Hegel, or Frege, or Whitehead, or Derrida is, in efect, doing comparative philosophy, comparing the thought of another time and/or place, often in another language, with one’s own. Even when philosophizing strictly within one’s own contemporaneous idiom with one’s contemporaries, one is thinking comparatively of one idea with 140 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES another, or one theory with another, though obviously within a much more restricted horizon of comparative possibilities. Hence, there is a risk of ideational sterility unless new ideas, imported from elsewhere, can revivify the ideational pool. hat “other” source can be a foreign philosophy, a system from another time, or simply the appearance of someone with new ideas that stem from bringing some new factor or permutation into the current discourse.3 Someone wrestling with Plato or Aristotle is engaged in something very much like what someone wrestling with medieval Indian or ancient Chinese philosophy encounters, i.e., an encounter with a foreign language that ‘thinks’ and expresses itself diferently than we do today. his involves systems of thought embedded in alien cultural and conceptual horizons whose meanings and orientations must be recovered through whatever means available or devisable. At the same time, translating the ideas in these alien texts into our thinking patterns often requires negotiation with a complicated set of texts, commentaries, divergent interpretations, and hermeneutic challenges. hese in turn may be riddled with painful lacunae in terms of missing pieces, unknown opponents, and multiple contexts, often indistinct (or less distinct than we might imagine them). hese texts and their contexts all remain moving targets that are re-imagined and re-conigured by every generation that attempts to think through these text-sets afresh. All of this is wrapped in an ever-increasingly dense accrual of baggage and assumptions requiring discriminative weeding. he encounter can engender a massive oedipal confrontation, or a minor re-arrangement of trivial details, or a refashioning to suit current tastes and needs. Of these last three alternatives, the irst is likely to produce philosophy; the second, some form of scholasticism or doxography; and the last, revisionism or fundamentalism.4 Yet we tend to think of Greek, or Christian, or German philosophy, and so on, as part of our “tradition,” our history, while Caraka-saṃhitā, Dignāga’s Pramāṇa-samuccaya,5 Cheng weishilun 成唯識論 (Treatise Establishing Vijñapti-mātra),6 and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Jinsi lu 近思錄 (Relections on hings at Hand7) are not. Some Western philosophers still insist that non-Western philosophy is not philosophy at all, but even if generously granted the label of “philosophy,” they don’t practice our philosophy, i.e., what we consider to be philosophy proper. In a more ambiguous status are works by Islamic and Jewish philosophers such as Ibn Dan Lusthaus 141 Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides, Gersonides8 and Crescas.9 heir ambiguity is due to the fact that, while they are rarely part of the curriculum of Western philosophy, it is recognized that important igures in Western philosophy, such as Aquinas and Spinoza, were aware of and were inluenced by them. Buber and Levinas have impacted the academy, but Rosenzweig and Hermann Cohen still remain primarily “tribal” reading. One obvious goal of comparative philosophy would be to expand the horizons of our sense of “our” tradition. Laozi and Zhuangzi now are part of our tradition. One could even argue, without too much inaccuracy or perversity, that making the Upaniṣads a metonymy for Indian thought was an invention of our tradition more than a fair appraisal of the actual history of Indian philosophy, one with which certain factions in India became complicit. Nonetheless, the status of such divisions between “our” and “their” tradition has become increasingly ambiguous over the last century, as texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā, the Daodejing, and the Zhuangzi have become staples of humanities programs (and even popular reading), while, in Asia, Western fare has taken irm root in standard curriculums. he East-West divide is more imaginary than real these days – more a question of identity politics than a characterization of styles of thinking. We are situated in a very privileged place. Rarely has such a large segment of the world had such access to so much of the world’s philosophical literature. It is an historical truism that philosophies are at their innovative best when located at the intersection of competing systems. Philosophical xenophobia leads to stagnation, as the results of the largely successful eforts by Anglo-American philosophers to expel even the philosophy of their European contemporaries from the curriculum of philosophy departments sadly illustrates. Rorty sneaking Heidegger in through the backdoor has proven insuicient to revitalize the analytic project. He failed partly because so much of what made the German and French philosophies of the twentieth century vital was lost or distorted in reductionistic translation.10 Philosophy is not just any thought on something novel but a disciplined form of thought, at once tradition- and rule-bound, and yet seeking new discoveries or insights. Diferent philosophical traditions assume different rules and rhetorical styles. Some prize exhaustively detailed prose exposition in formalized univocal syntax – e.g., a syllogism – while others prefer evocative, poetic multivocality designed to say more with fewer 142 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES words. Some seek to express their syllogisms and rigorous method in the pithiest of verses. Whatever its style, philosophy seeks to reason, i.e., to apply reason methodically to a topic or agenda. My interest at the moment, however, is not to argue for some sense of the universality of comparison. (As soon as universals become suiciently restricted to allow comparison with other universals or particulars, they lose some of their presumed universality.) Neither is it to essentialize some notion of philosophy, but rather to think about what ‘reasoning’ means in diferent philosophies, and what sorts of typical gestures and characteristics reasoning exhibits in various philosophies. I am not proposing a deinition of “reason” beforehand in order to remain open to possible suggestions ofered by the diferent traditions. QUESTIONING PARAMETERS To advance more quickly, let me throw out some questions. Is there something that makes Chinese philosophy – if there is any such unitive discipline as opposed to multiple, divergent philosophical and religious traditions that we lump together on the basis of a common historical and geographical proximity – distinctively a Chinese philosophy? And so on for Indian, Islamic, Jewish, etc., philosophies. Deciding this is important if we wish to know what is being compared to what when we propose to do comparative philosophy. As we will see, this also entails the question of where our centre of gravity lies: From where do we begin to compare? What sets the agenda? Is comparative philosophy done from a home base looking out at the “others”? Or do we try to locate ourselves in some privileged neutral or lofty position from which we look down at the objects being compared, as if implicated by or committed to none of them? Is there any viable standpoint upon which a comparative philosopher can take his or her stand? Might it be the case that so-called Western philosophy is also distinctively “Christian” philosophy, even when practised by non-Christians (such as Spinoza, Aristotle, Nietzsche, modern secularists, etc.), such that Hegel – despite coining the phrase “death of God” – is after all at bottom a Christian thinker? Does his Encyclopedia – consisting of the tripartite Logic, Nature, Spirit – bear only a supericial structural and conceptual parallel with the Trinity, or is there something more fundamental at play? Dan Lusthaus 143 Has Spinoza become a Buddhist when he identiies the three primary afects – the afects from which all other afects are derived by permutational combinations – as pleasure, pain, and desire? In Buddhist jargon pleasure-pain is called vedanā while desire in a primary sense is called tṛṣṇā. Vedanā and tṛṣṇā are two of the most important nidānas in the twelve-fold chain of pratītya-samutpāda (conditioned co-arising), often considered Buddhism’s premier doctrine. Pleasure, pain, and desire in Spinoza’s system of afects play a similar primary role as do vedanā and tṛṣṇā in Buddhist discourse. Or is this model Jewish, since Spinoza partly draws on Crescas’ ethical philosophy for these and other components of his own?11 What else would Spinoza have to include or exclude before we see his philosophy as Buddhistic, in the same way that Pure Land, Huayan, or Tantra are seen as, at one and the same time, deeply similar yet profoundly dissimilar to the Buddhist teachings of the early Pali canon? Might Spinoza be closer to, for instance, Pali Buddhism or Huayan Buddhism, than either is to Pure Land or Tantra? What makes these distinctive types of philosophy distinctive? What, aside from their diferent narrative histories and accidental diferences (language, socio-political factors, institutional support or suppression, changing fashions in styles and rhetoric, etc.), makes them distinctive from each other as philosophies? Are there characteristic factors that can be enumerated? How do we bracket our expectations of what is properly “philosophy” in order to inquire fairly into such a question? Even more problematically, how do we circumscribe what counts as “religion”? It is axiomatic in Indian philosophy that a deinition must be suficiently restricted so as to exclude anything that is not the case, and broad enough to include everything that is the case. Western scholars will quickly recognize that this is rarely as simple as it seems, especially when trying to ind a stable referent for a term as famously diicult to deine adequately as “religion.” Christian or so-called Western presuppositions concerning what counts as a “religion” quickly exclude many of the world’s leading religions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Mīmāṃsa, Sāṃkhya, Jainism, etc. his is because these either reject or give short shrift to deities and especially deny a central role to a Divinity with a capital “D.” hese are major religions explicitly devoid of “God.” Responding to that by enlarging the deinition of religion into something as inclusive as Tillich’s “man’s ultimate concern” fails to exclude Marxism, health 144 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES care, sports, romance, ego-gratiication, and a host of other -isms and human pursuits. Similarly, the Western notion that religion is grounded in faith and belief rather than reason and logic would be anathema to many Indian traditions (and even some pre-Renaissance Western religions). If the essence of religion requires neither God nor belief, such that these are contingent properties appropriate only for describing some religions, then what essentially marks a religion as a religion? We partially run into such problems because we start within the assumptions and “evidence” of our Western traditions and then try to explain the “other” traditions in terms of how well or adequately they mirror our own. In this way, we set the agenda and prioritize the importance of issues based on what our religions claim is important. Since other religions revolve around diferent centres of gravity, inconvenient anomalies invariably emerge. If we believe that “our” religion is paradigmatic for all religions, then its concerns must also constitute the paradigmatic underpinnings of any proper religion. Consequently, when faced with the aforementioned anomalies, if “our” concerns and deinitions render other traditions marginal or insuicient relative to what we deem the “ultimate” and most essential concerns, the fault lies with them, not us. What would this look like if, instead of taking Christian assumptions as the baseline, we let other traditions formulate their own consensus among themselves as to what counts as central concerns? What if Christianity was deemed marginal or insuicient by that exercise? What if, for example, one places ethical canons (halakhah, shāri‘a, dharma-śāstra, vinaya, Confucian codes, even Daoist ethical treatises) at the core of what would constitute a religion? hen Christianity becomes the odd religion out. Christianity emits a great deal of moralism (much of it centred on “bedroom ethics”), but it lacks a foundational ethical canon that plays a comparable role to shāri‘a in Islam, or halakhah in Judaism, or dharmaśāstra in Hinduism, vinaya in Buddhism. hese ethical canons are typically more important than “belief ” in determining the degree of one’s participation in these religions. his is not merely an ethnographic question but has immediate philosophical import. For instance, is it, as some have conjectured, due to the strong emphasis on the ethical in Judaism that Jewish philosophers predominantly embraced Aristotle – rather than Plato or explicit forms of Neo-Platonism – during medieval times, and Kant in modern times? What is lacking, in the Western study of religion Dan Lusthaus 145 or in Western philosophical method, is a well-formed discipline that deals with the canons and reasoning styles of religious jurisprudence. (his is in contradistinction to such well-worn and traditionally Christian disciplines as ontology, myth, epistemology, and exegesis.) As such, this lack is a symptom of an evident myopia, and thus a potentially fatal challenge that is presently threatening to render Western scholars irrelevant to the growing religious confrontations. Such confrontations are occurring not only abroad but within our own shores (despite however relevant we may feel ourselves to be from within our own frameworks). For instance, we become reduced to mouthing questionable ideological, ahistorical claims when we insist that Islamists in Somalia are misusing the term jihad as they declare Holy War on their government and suspected Ethiopian (which, in their eyes, means Christian) interference. As a result, we fail to explain adequately to our students how jurisprudential reasoning works. At the same time, while searching for alternatives to military confrontation, we lack a commonly respected language and the recognized disciplined reasoning skills to address the holders of such worldviews on their own terms. his is very obvious in discussions of the role of women in Islam, caste inequities with Hindutvas, or abortion rights with evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. (In contrast, e.g., Palestinians and Iranians have demonstrated deft command of our rhetorical polemics of rights, self-determination, post-colonial ressentiment, etc.) One might ask therefore whether Kant’s Practical Reason (and its spawn) include or occlude jurisprudential thinking? Is his ethical thinking the same or diferent as ethical thinking within religious traditions? In a lighter but equally serious vein, as one surveys the religions of the world one inds in every religion – except Christianity – a sacred humour tradition. Midrashic and Hasidic tales in Judaism, Zen anecdotes and kōan collections in Buddhism, the ironic parodies in Zhuangzi, the tales of Mullah Nasruddin in Islam, Śiva’s līlā (play), and so on, are best known, but only the tip of a largely unexplored iceberg. For most religions, sacred humour is an important component of the spiritual path, an attunement to the Cosmic Giggle, as some have called it. In contrast, Christians, as Umberto Eco’s Name of the Rose highlighted, have often condemned comedy, laughter, humour, and even smiling as sacrilegious.12 his was not merely a medieval predilection but still inluences contemporary Christianity. When, in the 1950s, inspired by Aldous Huxley’s 146 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES Doors of Perception,13 the British scholar of Indian and Iranian religion, Richard Zaehner, decided to experiment with mescaline under clinical supervision, he subsequently declared the experience “profane” rather than “sacred.” his was largely because all of his attempts to have a “sacred” experience while under the inluence of mescaline (visiting his favourite cathedral, looking at pictures of the Virgin Mary, etc.) resulted in laughter, either an urge within himself, or “hallucinations” of the igures in the stained glass windows laughing at him, etc. he book he wrote on this is in two parts.14 he second part is an abridged but still lengthy transcript of his “trip,” in which one needn’t be a clinical psychologist to discern that his experiences were concertedly advising him to lighten up and enjoy the humour – a message he not only resisted but found shocking and disturbing. he result was the book’s irst part in which, clothed in the guise of objective scholarly discourse, he laid out a hierarchic typology of religious mysticisms, with such labels as “pantheism” and “panentheism.”15 he obvious purpose was to reairm the superiority of the Roman Catholic variety to which he had converted, deeming the mysticisms of other religions less sacred and even profane. His typology was inluential in the ield for some time, but, as an example of bald apologetics, should stand as a cautionary tale for all comparativists. Such assumptions concerning what counts as a religion or as legitimate philosophy lead us to become selective about which literature we pay attention to, and even what parts to focus on in the literature we do select. What is Buddhist or Hindu ontology? Is there a Daoist theory of language? What are Neo-Confucian metaphysics? Such are our typical questions, but are they typical, much less prominent features of these traditions, as our sustained and narrow attention to them would seem to imply? If a Hindu and an observant Jew begin to converse, they would quickly discover that dharma-śāstra and halakhah – which are more constitutive of each’s sense of identity and practice within their own traditions – speak the same language. hey share similar concerns about proper and improper foods, business afairs, daily behaviour, hygiene, familial and social obligations, ways to celebrate, etc. However, a Christian observer of that discussion might wonder what the bulk of their discussion had to do with “religion.” He may be envious of the poignant traditional humour tales they trade. And the Christian would likely overlook or resist that for the Dan Lusthaus 147 Jew and the Hindu, what you do is ininitely more important religiously than what you personally believe. A Hindu can believe in one, many, or no gods, and still be a good Hindu; what he or she cannot do is violate the speciic dictates and mores of his or her caste and still be deemed a “good” Hindu. At the level of dharma-śāstra and halakhah, such matters are no longer ad hoc or sociological (or even ethnographic). hey are instead philosophical, to be attended to with all the rigour of a system of detailed, rational jurisprudence, one which has for millennia pervaded every facet of social, personal, and spiritual life. BOUNDARIES he boundaries between “philosophy” and “religion” (and science, medicine, physics, grammar, linguistics, astronomy, rhetoric, hermeneutics, etc.) are unclear, and the separations between such disciplines that we take for granted today were less clear even in the West a century or so ago. Philosophers and scientists, for instance, were often the same people during the Middle Ages in Islamic and Jewish circles. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroës), Maimonides (Rambam),16 Gersonides (Ralbag), etc., all made major scientiic contributions,17 and, with the exception of Gersonides,18 all were practising physicians esteemed for their medical skills during their day.19 Kant may have been the last of this breed of scientist-philosophers, at least in the Western tradition, since he is credited with discovering the existence of galaxies. (Similarly, all except Ibn Sīnā and Kant were prominent jurisprudents of their day. Maimonides, for example, in his Mishneh Torah, was the irst to organize the full gamut of Jewish law into a systematic code. his, along with his Responsa and other halakhic works, continues to be inluential and studied today.) Nor were such scientiic endeavours done in isolation. While certain Islamic and Jewish religious matters may have been primarily in-group matters, scientiic knowledge was shared and common. Maimonides (1135–1204) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) – contemporaries born in Cordoba, Spain – drew from the same medical well-springs. (his occurred even though Maimonides’ family had to lee Spain due to the persecution of Jews by the Almohades; he completed his secular education at the famous University of Al-Karaouine in Fez, Morocco.) And such knowledge was far more globally disseminated than is usually recognized. 148 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES “he greatest tribute paid to the Indian [medical] system came from Avicenna [Ibn Sīnā], who categorically acknowledged in Al Qanun (he Canon) that he had beneited tremendously from the Indian jogis he used as one of his sources.”20 he convergence of philosophy and medicine was not a creation of the Middle Ages. In the West, philosophy and medicine have been intimately related at least since Diocles of Carystus (fourth century BCE) and Aristotle. As van der Eijk states: “the relationship between Aristotelianism and medicine has long been a neglected area in scholarship on ancient medicine.”21 One might add that the same neglect is evident in scholarship on ancient philosophy. While the present essay cannot substantially remedy that neglect, a few of van der Eijk’s observations about Greek medicine and philosophy – which have striking parallels in the case of India – may help bring some attention to what it is we have been neglecting. … more recently there has been a greater appreciation of the fact that Greek medical writers did not just relect a derivative awareness of developments in philosophy – something which led to the long-standing qualiication of medicine as a ‘sister’ or ‘daughter’ of philosophy – but also actively contributed to the developing concepts and methodologies for the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of the natural world. (Philip J. van der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity, p. 8) Moreover, it would be quite misleading to present the relationship between “doctors” and “philosophers” in terms of interaction between “science” and “philosophy,” the “empirical” and the “theoretical,” the “practical” and the “systematical,” the “particular” and the “general,” or “observation” and “speculation.” To do this would be to ignore the “philosophical,” “speculative,” “theoretical,” and “systematic” aspects of Greek science as well as the extent to which empirical research and observation were part of the activities of people who have gone down in the textbooks as “philosophers.” hus Empedocles, Democritus, Parmenides, Pythagorus, Philolaus, Plato, Aristotle, heophrastus, Strato, but also later thinkers such as Sextus Empiricus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Nemesius of Dan Lusthaus 149 Emesa, and John Philoponus took an active interest in subjects we commonly associate with medicine, such as anatomy and physiology of the human body, mental illness, embryology and reproduction, youth and old age, respiration, pulses, fevers, the causes of disease and of the efects of food, drink and drugs on the body. (p. 10) … Galen … wrote a treatise advocating the view that the best doctor is, or should be, at the same time a philosopher.… It is no coincidence that Aristotle’s comments on the overlap between “students of nature” and “doctors” are made in his own Parva naturalia, a series of works on a range of psycho-physiological topics – sense-perception, memory, sleep, dreams, longevity, youth and old age, respiration, life and death, health and disease – that became the common ground of medical writers and philosophers alike. (p. 11) … interaction… also took place in the ield of methodology and epistemology. As early as the Hippocratic medical writers, one inds conceptualizations and terminological distinctions relating to such notions as a “nature” (phusis), “cause” (aitia, prophasis), “sign” (sēmeion), “indication” (tekmērion), “proof ” (pistis), “faculty” (dunamis), or theoretical relection on epistemological issues such as causal explanation, observation, analogy, and experimentation. his is continued in fourthcentury [BCE] medicine, with writers such as Diocles of Carystus and Mnesitheus of Athens, in whose works we ind striking examples of the use of deinition, explanation, division and classiication according to genus and species relations, and theoretical relection on the modalities and the appropriateness of these epistemological procedures, on the requirements that have to be fulilled in order to make them work. (p. 12) Some [philosophers] are known to have put their ideas into practice, such as Empedocles, who seems to have been engaged in considerable therapeutic activity, or Democritus, who is reported to have carried out anatomical research on a signiicant 150 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES scale, or, to take a later example, Sextus Empiricus, who combined his authorship of philosophical writings on Scepticism with medical practice. (p. 13) It is interesting in this connection that one of the irst attestations of the word philosophia in Greek literature occurs in a medical context – the Hippocratic work On Ancient Medicine. (p. 19) Comparable observations could be made concerning the early Indian medical literature, such as Caraka-saṃhitā and the slightly later Suśrutasaṃhitā, as a survey of those texts, or even their tables of contents, would quickly show. Space limitations preclude documenting that here in detail, but one example should suice. he core of chapter 8 of part 3 (Vimānasthāna) of the CS consists of a rigorous, detailed description of the components of “debate” (vāda). his includes a full discussion of the parts of a formal inference, the pramāṇas, distinguishing sound from unsound arguments, and the value and protocols of argument.22 Passage 68 lists ten topics a physician should explore by the three pramāṇas of authoritative tradition, perception, and inference. (Here, unlike in part 1, chap. 11, where āpta-pramāṇa, ‘authoritative tradition,’ is given great weight, several indications place āpta-pramāṇa in a subservient, even expendable position in relation to perception and inference.23) he ten topics are: kāraṇa (the cause or agent initiating action, i.e., the physician), karaṇa (instrument assisting the agent’s action, e.g., pharmaceuticals), kāryayoni (the matrix from which the action emerges), kārya (what is being done), kāryaphala (the result or purpose of the action), anubandha (what the action is bound to entail), deśa (the locus of the action, viz. the place and the patient), kāla (time, viz. seasonal factors and the state of progress of the disease), pravṛtti (the process), and upāya (procedure or device, i.e., proper preparations and initiation of proper actions). All students of Indian philosophy will instantly recognize these ten terms are central, pervasive categories of Indian philosophy. Here, where a patient’s life or death (not to mention the reputation of the physician, an issue the CS also takes very seriously) hang in the balance, these terms acquire not only concreteness but a sense of urgency. his list could serve as the program for virtually Dan Lusthaus 151 any Indian religion or philosophy. hat the irst ive items are conceptually and etymologically24 linked to the term karma underlines this. Are we failing to produce philosophers of the stature and acuity of Ibn Sīnā and Maimonides because philosophy departments do not require their majors or graduate students to attend medical school, much less seriously practice the hard sciences? What then are the limits or horizons of philosophy proper? Some styles of philosophy strive for univocality. hinking can only be clear, goes the claim, when words are drained of all ambiguity or multivocality. Today the implications of the desire to reduce all voices to one, to eliminate alternatives, or to reduce a word to a single meaning, strike many of us as disconcerting. We learn more from exploring diferent styles of philosophy, diferent ways of accounting for the human condition, than we beneit from silencing alternatives. Are there meaningful lines to be drawn between philosophy and religion? Let me suggest two: (1) Borrowing Neitzschean vocabulary, we might say that religion is a will to meaning, while philosophy is a will to knowledge. hese two types of wills may converge, when either meaning is understood as equivalent to knowledge or vice versa. Yet there are conceivably meaningful endeavours that do not rest on knowledge per se, e.g., romance.25 Religion thus seeks to make life meaningful, to provide purpose and meaning to one’s existence and one’s life experiences. Philosophy, in contrast, seeks to know, to understand, and to make life comprehensible through evidence and reason. When meaning and knowledge converge, the line between religion and philosophy blurs. (2) Religious thinking is ultimately tautological (e.g., “I am that I am”; Being is; scripture is true because it is scripture). Tautology can be a handmaiden to authoritarianism (“It’s so because I say so!”). Philosophy, however, considers tautology a logical error, and thus it prefers (i) reasoning from premises to conclusions. his is Aristotle’s preferred method (derived from the third 152 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES segment of Plato’s divided line) and is a cornerstone of scientiic method. Even more importantly and radically, however, philosophy prefers (ii) reasoning from premises to their presuppositions (as in recovering the archē; the fourth segment of Plato’s divided line). Such a procedure can be found in Nāgārjuna’s quieting of all presuppositions (prapañcopaśama) and perspectival attachments (dṛṣṭi). He undertakes this in order to expose the absurdities masquerading as reasoned positions to which we attach and with which we construct our identities (ātma-dṛṣṭi). It is also found in Husserl’s search for a presuppositionless philosophy in order to ground the sciences, Wissenschaften. With such considerations in mind, we might ask the following questions: (1) Does Hegel’s teleological view of history, as a rediscovery of the self by itself through the other, inally only reairm a Christian tautological telos? (he result here is that history’s destiny is already decided before it has begun, the alpha in the omega, so that the eschaton is preigured in the creation. One moves all the way from one end of history to the other only to rediscover what was already there at the beginning: A = A. History and time become nothing more than the working out of the = that declares tautological self-coincidence as a discovery upon which all history awaits.) (2) What signiicance or insight lurks in the tension between his Being vs. Nonbeing sublating into Becoming, i.e., his famous Aufhebung ofered in the Logic? On the one hand, Hegel seems to suggest that a dynamic process necessarily arises from, and then supersedes static contraries. On the other, he posits Becoming, seen as Geist’s search for itself, as ultimately terminating in a static telos of authentic self-realization at the end of Dan Lusthaus 153 history. Does this result in a terminus in which the movement of mind, spirit, and history itself comes to a stop once reaching its actualized self-recognition? Does Becoming emerge from the tension of two static contraries only to culminate eventually, with historical and ultimate inality, in a new stasis where the contraries have been replaced by a tautological self-coincidence? (his self-identity will have aufheben-ed all contrastive tensions.) Becoming stops becoming. In what way, then, might this terminal historicism of Hegel be compared with the Kashmiri Shaivite idea of līlā, as a game Śiva plays with himself? In this game, Śiva repeatedly, even eternally, alienates himself from himself, multiplying himself into “others” into which he forgets himself in order to ind himself again. He thus continually engenders and wanders through various realms of existence that are the forgotten aspects of himself. Eventually, he rediscovers himself as the source of the game of forgetfulness, only to forget himself again once he is found, in order to keep the game in play. Each of us is nothing more than moves in this game of hide-and-seek, mere facets of Śiva’s forgetfulness. For Hegel, History becomes a inite search by Spirit for itself consisting of a series of logical predictable moves with a guaranteed climax. he notion of Becoming with which Hegel reintroduced Western thought to time and historicality inally leads to its own static culmination. No such inite limits restrict Śiva’s līlā. he divine’s game of hide and seek with himself not only plays out perpetually, restarting once completed, but time and temporality are byproducts of the game. he game is not only a temporal narrative conceived chronologically, but synchronically all levels of the game are at play simultaneously, so that remembering and forgetting happen simultaneously as well as sequentially. History plays out, but full realization is always available and instantaneous. It is a telos that is forever culminating because it never really culminates. he joy of realization is only one more joyous moment in a joyous game. he game and the joy continue nonetheless. he cosmic cards are reshuled. Śiva forgets once again, and the game continues. 154 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES LOGICAL STYLES: ROOT METAPHORS Let me suggest a quick rubric for diferentiating Western philosophy from Indian philosophy, and each from Chinese philosophy, though I will not expand this here into a full analysis. Each is grounded in certain root metaphors, basic models or disciplines which become, from the beginning, fundamental and constitutive of what follows and thereby counts as philosophy in each of these traditions. For the Greeks (and still in the West), the foundational disciplines were physics and mathematics. For India, the root models were grammar and medicine. For China, it was the family viewed, on the one hand, as hierarchical relations (parents over children, elder sibling over younger sibling, etc.), and, on the other hand, as dialectical relations between family members (the give and take between a couple, parents and children, etc.). Family relations, combined hierarchically and dialectically, yield a pattern in which individuals both change and keep roles through a stable system: he youngest daughter, starting out life at the bottom of the family hierarchy, can gradually raise her status until she is matriarch of the family, overlording her sons and their wives. Social order, the web of correlative thinking into which all natural and artiicial entities and forces – including medical theories – were plotted, and ascension through the stages of the spiritual path followed that model. For the West, then, we think we are at our most profound when engaged in questions of ininity, ontology, and the translation of time and space into mathematical equations. his fosters the illusion that soft sciences become hard once they adopt a mathematical method, etc. he sense of profundity that wells up in us when such topics are broached is our inheritance from the Greek presuppositional foundation of mathematics and physics. he word meta-physics resonates. “Ininity,” for instance, has had neither the prominence nor the emotional afect in other cultures that it has held in ours. Kant, having completed the three critiques, still thought his philosophy uninished, “or else a gap will remain in the critical philosophy.”26 In a letter to Kiesewetter, Kant explains what remains to be done: “he transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics must not be left out of the system.… [W]ith that work the task of the critical philosophy will be completed and a gap that now stands open will be illed.”27 He died before completing this task that the Dan Lusthaus 155 Western tradition tacitly insisted he address. It is like a voice of conscience or internalized imperative that had become categorical, unavoidable, an urgent need that now deined him and his system. Conversely, Nathan Sivin has to argue, in his treatment of Chinese science, 28 that Chinese scientists did not deal with “Nature” in the sense of phusis. Understanding what they have been concerned with thus becomes a conceptual stretch for the “Western” mindset. For Indians, grammar disclosed the structure of reality. Just as words are means to apprehend referents (artha), so does perception apprehend objects (artha). he detailed relations and variations denoted by Sanskrit grammatical inlections mirror and reveal the relational realities, variations, and even the eternal verities of the operations of the cosmos. Medicine is about saving beings from sickness, illness, and sufering, restoring them to health. Buddha’s famous four Noble Truths29 is taught these days, in an expanded form, in medical schools throughout the West under the label “Pathological Model,” i.e., symptom, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. When early Buddhist texts spoke of the Buddha as the “Great Physician,” one who turns poison into medicine, etc., they were not speaking metaphorically. Buddhism itself, these texts explain, is “medicine,” consisting of speciic therapeutic devices designed to cure dis-ease (duḥkha). Like all-powerful medicines, it is forged from toxic materials speciically designed to treat speciic illnesses; when the medicine has done its task one should stop taking it, or else it also can make one sick. Hence, that we should ind pramāṇas (means of knowledge) being introduced in the medical text, the CS, should not surprise us. THE CARAKA-SAṂHITĀ, INSANITY, AND THE PRAMĀṆAS I came to the CS as a result of work on the Mano-bhūmika section of Asaṅga’s encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi. Asaṅga is the nominal founder of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, one of the two Mahāyāna systems in India. he Yogācārabhūmi’s irst chapter, on the ive bodily consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna-kāya-bhūmi), discusses the sense organs, perception, karma, and related topics. For the second chapter, the “mental stage” (mano-bhūmi), Asaṅga makes the transition from physical, bodily processes to more exclusively mental conditions through a medical survey of 156 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES psycho-somatic topics, speciically physical conditions that afect mental states, such as intoxication (mādhyati) and insanity (unmādyati). Insanity or mental disorders is a topic to which the CS and Indian medicine generally devote great attention.30 Asaṅga gives us a list of possible causes, which includes such things as physical and mental trauma (uttrāsa-bhayata), strikes to vital spots (marmābhighāta), and other external factors such as attacks from ghosts (bhūta-samāveśatayā). He explains the causes of sleep and the causes for awakening from sleep (e.g., a loud noise, bodily discomfort, etc.). He takes this into a somewhat detailed discussion of medical conditions, employing the three doṣa model and various other clearly medical concerns.31 his leads to a discussion of the causes of health and longevity, and the causes of the shortening of life span and death (food, digestive processes, and moral habits are cited as critical factors). Asaṅga even provides a description of how death occurs, how consciousness leaves the body. Interested to discover how typical Asaṅga’s treatment was of Indian medical theory at that time, my search for Buddhist medical literature of that period revealed that there is precious little available today on the Buddhist medical theories and practices of his day. As a result, I turned to the next best thing, the text considered to be the oldest of the Hindu medical texts, the only extant medical treatise generally considered to predate Asaṅga.32 While, unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the Hindu medical theories were a closely related but diferent system (enumerations and models difered), the CS provided charms of its own. As mentioned above, the CS is usually considered to be the irst text to introduce the idea of pramāṇa, the means of acquiring knowledge. his should not come as a surprise, since medicine requires not only a disciplined method of observation to observe symptoms, to take account of treatments and experiments that work or do not work, etc., but it also requires a method by which what is unobserved and even potentially unobservable, namely the cause of a disease, can be inferred and known in order to be treated. he present symptoms displayed by an ill person may have an etiology that lies in the past, and diseases often progress through stages. hus the physician must be able to infer from what presents at the moment to what likely has transpired in the past, just as one would infer a past ire from ashes and smoke. As the CS itself argues, one also has to be able to infer predictability, i.e., from the present to the future, in order to Dan Lusthaus 157 make an accurate prognosis and to have some conidence in the efectiveness of speciic treatments. he current popularity of forensic medicine on television shows such as the CSI-style programs illustrates the power still inherent in such approaches. To the chagrin of idealists and solipsists, physical remainders of past actions can provide deinitive evidence of what happened – evidence suicient to convict a perpetrator “beyond the shadow of a doubt.” Various Indian schools proposed diferent pramāṇas as viable means of acquiring certain knowledge. Virtually all agreed that perception and logical inference were pramāṇas. For example, I know that the table is there because I can see it, feel it, etc. I know it can hold a certain weight, because when I place objects of a certain weight on it, it doesn’t collapse, and I have this knowledge even when nothing is presently on the table. As the CS states, the fact of pregnancy compels one to infer that sexual intercourse has occurred (unless one is a certain type of theologian). To these two pramāṇas, some Indian schools wished to add reliable testimony, meaning testimony from a respectable witness, as in a court proceeding, or a respectable authority, i.e., an expert. In addition, and more importantly, this pramāṇa includes the testimony of scripture. Curiously, the irst school to challenge śabda-pramāṇa (reliable testimony) as a viable source of knowledge was the Vaiśeṣika, a Hindu school that eventually merged with Nyāya. Buddhists, rejecting the validity of Hindu scriptures, also eventually dismissed the validity of śabda-pramāṇa as a pramāṇa (at least after Dignāga, although Asaṅga in his Abhidharmasamuccaya already makes it subsidiary to perception and inference). his was because they argued that claims made by testimony or scripture must themselves be subjected to test by inference and/or perception to be deemed valid. he reliability of a witness must be tested, as must the truth-value of claims made in scripture. Such tests would examine whether the claims conform to what is evident to the senses or to what is reasonable. hus, Buddhists insisted, it is perception and inference that guarantees the validity of knowledge, not the testimony itself. Additional pramāṇas proposed by others included “comparison,” “analogy,” and even “absence,” but for Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists these too are either fallacious or subordinate to perception and inference. Pramāṇa-theory irst appears in the eleventh chapter of the irst part (Sūtra-sthāna) of the CS. Here the CS intriguingly proposes, along with 158 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES the three pramāṇas one would expect (perception, inference, and authoritative testimony), a fourth not found anywhere else: synthetic inductive reasoning (yukta-pramāṇa). Discussion of pramāṇa occurs in two other parts of the CS: part 3, Vimāna-sthāna, chap. 4 and chap. 8, but the unique yukta-pramāṇa is absent from those discussions, a sign of the stratiied nature of the text. he discussion in chap. 11 of the Sūtra-sthāna is interesting because it ofers some explanation for why a discussion of pramāṇas should appear in a medical text. It begins by stating that for humans there are three basic desires or impulses (eṣaṇa): (1) desire for life itself (prāṇaiṣaṇā), (2) desire for material possessions (dhanaiṣaṇā), and (3) desire for (happiness in) the next world (paralokaiṣaṇā) (11:3). Of these, the irst, the impulse for longevity, is most basic since “when life departs, all departs” (11:4). Since life without adequate means is miserable, the second impulse comes next. As to the third impulse, the desire for the next life, CS states that some have doubts whether such a thing is real. To disabuse its readers of such skepticism, CS launches into an attack on all sorts of skepticism (those who disbelieve in gods, sages, siddhis, eicient and material causes, the necessity for examination and investigation, etc.). He argues, for instance, that non-perception does not entail non-existence. here are numerous reasons why something real may be imperceptible. It may be too far way, too close, too small, obstructed by something else, a sense-organ defect, and so on. CS admits that the scriptures are also in conlict on the question of afterlife. Such conlicts, it recommends, should be resolved by reason (yukti). After arguing for the existence of the self (ātman) despite its being perceptually unobservable, and for a world created by purposeful causes, and denouncing the nihilist (nāstika) as “the worst of the sinful,”33 CS states that everything falls into one of two categories: sattva and asattva, i.e., real or unreal, or, perhaps, true and false (11:17). hen the four pramāṇas are introduced, starting with āpta, traditional authority. his, the CS informs us, is knowledge passed on by the experts (śiṣta). Instead of śabda-pramāṇa, CS calls this āptopadeśa, “teachings of the Respected ones,” and a list of the types of people this includes is given (passages 18– 19). hese people are indubitable because they lack tamas and rajas,34 and thus are incapable of lying. Next comes perception (pratyakṣa), which is described as contact between the self and what is present. his is followed Dan Lusthaus 159 by inference (anumāna), which CS says is based on having previously perceived or learned something. CS explains that there are three types of inference, corresponding to inferences about the past, present, and future. “Fire is inferred from smoke, and sexual intercourse from pregnancy” (present and past, respectively), and a future fruit can be inferred from a seed, based on having previously observed, i.e., perceived, that process (11:21–22). he fourth pramāṇa, yukta, is explained with the following examples (11:23–24):35 Growth of crops from the combination of irrigation, ploughed land, seed and seasons; formation of embryo from the combination of six dhātus (ive mahābhūtas and Ātman); Production of ire from the combination of the lower-ire-drill, upper-iredrill and the act of drilling; cure of diseases by fourfold eficient therapeutic measures. Yukta here means something like: the coordination of multiple factors converging into a trajectory in which something is changed or transformed. It is taking into account the coordination of multiple causes, a process with contributive factors that might afect the outcome, as in crops or medical treatments. To plant a crop requires attention to multiple factors, from the time of planting, the type of seed, properly working the land, fortuitous seasonal conditions, and so on. If all the factors work properly, the seed turns into a plant that produces the desired crop. Any of the contributing factors (e.g., amount of rainfall) can alter the outcome. here is no strict one-to-one cause-efect relation between the seed and the fruit. he additional factors mediate it. Similarly, an embryo becoming a human undergoes a process requiring multiple factors in addition to the sex act that initiated it. Any of these factors could terminate the pregnancy or inlict permanent damage on the embryo. Producing ire by coordinating ire sticks similarly illustrates the coordination of multiple factors. Treating illness, likewise, requires coordinating conditions across a trajectory in time in order for the person’s condition to change from sickness to health. he physician must recognize and coordinate those conditions: what to watch for in the disease’s progress; what types of treatments are 160 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES most efective, and when to administer them; what habits and regimens, such as diet and exercise, contribute to health or maladies; etc. Inference (anumāna) was treated (vs. 21–22) as inferring from a specific condition or cause to a speciic efect, i.e., a fruit from a seed. And CS also insists that inference requires previous perception (pratyakṣa-pūrva). One recognizes the relation between the fruit and seed on the basis of prior observations of this process, and so one can predict a future fruit is likely from a present planted seed. Although CS’s account is terse, the claim, I believe, is not simply that a seed will become a plant, but the fact that we recognize by looking at a certain type of seed what type of plant it will produce. One sees an acorn and knows that it will produce an oak tree, not a weeping willow. his type of knowledge would be important in medicine, since it is important to know that certain types of treatments, medicines, bodily conditions will become or change into something else. But this does not necessarily happen automatically. Additional contributory causal factors must play a role as well. An acorn sitting on a table does not become an oak; it must be planted, and it must receive nutrients from the soil, heat, water, etc. None of these factors is suicient alone. Each must contribute for the seed to progress along a trajectory in which it changes into something else. Yukta (= yukti), which literally implies to tie together, or connect, and later comes to be one of the numerous terms for “reasoning” or “logic,” is used in CS speciically to denote combining a group of factors that, together, produce a result. A doctor cannot diagnose a disease on the basis of a single symptom but must weigh multiple symptoms together, many (such as headaches, nausea, etc.) that could be shared by numerous diseases. his multitude of factors must be taken into account in order to determine correctly the speciic disease afecting a particular patient. Diagnosis is inductive, not purely deductive, so, to the old debate about whether Indian logic is strictly deductive or includes induction, CS at least provides a case for inductive reasoning. Unfortunately, yukta-pramāṇa never underwent further development in India, appearing nowhere else than in this text. It is rich in analytic possibilities, and one wonders what Indian philosophers, as deeply concerned as most were with causal analyses, might have created had they explored further possibilities of this inductive tool. Dan Lusthaus 161 Since the CS arrived here by attempting to refute skepticism about after-lives, it is not surprising that, having now established a basis for knowledge, the CS next turns to arguing for the validity of rebirth, the issue that instigated this excursion into epistemology in the irst place. To do this, it ofers arguments from each of the pramāṇas in turn, i.e., arguments from authority, perception, inference, and yukta. A modern reader would not ind the arguments very convincing, and apparently neither did the ancients, since we do not ind them repeated, or improved upon, in subsequent literature. In fact, one of the striking things about the CS’s attempt to provide arguments supporting the idea of rebirth and reincarnation is the fact that it does so at all, since such arguments are surprisingly rare in Indian philosophical texts. Indian philosophers seem to have understood that it would be very diicult to mount a reasonable argument for the validity of the theory of reincarnation, and thus largely chose to avoid embarrassing themselves with such attempts. hus the CS’s boldness in this regard is refreshing, even if the arguments themselves are far from compelling. his CS chapter has explained that the pramāṇas can help resolve doubts about the objectives of one of our basic impulses, the desire for the next life. It also demonstrates that, in addition to the pramāṇas employed by some other Indian schools, the physician requires a pramāṇa suited to the needs of his profession. his is yukta-pramāṇa that deals inductively with synthetic judgments about changes and alterations (pariṇāma, etc.) afected, in temporal phases, by multiple contributory causes. Illness is a transformation of bodily factors from a healthy balance to imbalance; restoring health is a transformation back to proper functioning. Birth, life, health, sickness, old age, and death are transformations involving multiple factors that the physician must learn to recognize and manipulate. he physician is a philosopher who lacks the luxury of indulging in speculation. Either his knowledge is true, or the patient dies. But this matter, along with such other fascinating topics in the CS as its use of the idea of “intellectual blasphemy” (prajñā-parādha36) as an explanation for some diseases, must await another occasion. 162 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES CONCLUDING SUMMARY So what does it mean to do comparative philosophy of religion? Since all thinking is comparative, comparative philosophy of religion draws its strength from expanding the range of philosophies and religions it “compares.” Expanding the horizon of our exploration provides more than additional data; it enriches the possibilities of thinking. For a Western philosopher to think about Indian or Chinese or Arabic or Jewish philosophies, etc., is basically no diferent from a North American philosopher thinking about Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, or Wittgenstein. Each task requires looking at the other through similarities and diferences of language, culture, context, foundational categories, historical developments, and a host of other factors. For a Chinese, Indian, Jewish, etc., philosopher to think, philosophically, about Western philosophy is no diferent. Starting from a diferent standpoint, however, might entail that diferent priorities and categories set the agenda. he basic diferences are not between East and West, as is often assumed, but between styles of philosophizing and the root metaphors from which diferent traditions take their orientation. Similarly, philosophy, religion, and medicine have always been intertwined, especially in ancient and medieval philosophy. As homas H. Huxley, the biologist, noted:37 “he only medicine for sufering, crime, and all the other woes of mankind, is wisdom.” Dan Lusthaus 163 Notes 1 2 3 164 Some attempt to date Caraka to as early as the sixth century BCE, though most date the bulk of the Caraka-saṃhitā to ca. the irst century CE, with some obvious later interpolations and additions. Our received edition is based on an eleventh-century CE commentary and redaction by Cakrapāṇi. Tapas eventually came to mean the heat of austerities that burn of bad karma, thus, like the ire of sacriice, purifying the practitioner; but its earlier meaning in the Ṛg Veda is the heat from friction produced in the sex act, which is creation par excellence. Cf. RV 10.129.3: “tuchyenābhvapihitaṃ yadāsīt tapasastanmahinājāyataikam” (“that One which had been covered by the void, through the heat of desire [tapas] was manifested,” trans. Antonio de Nicolas). his is easier to assert once a dominant paradigm or theory has run its course, marked by the repetition, reiteration, and reinement of previous insights rather than the inspirational introduction of truly novel ones, as some view the situation today for both analytic and postmodern styles of philosophy. When caught in the throes of the creative possibilities that are being opened by a new paradigm, the mere implementation of its directives, or putting into motion permutations merely implied by the new paradigm – analogous to Frege’s indication that all of mathematics springs from 1 + [i.e., a unit and a function] – may give the feeling of opening onto limitless horizons with boundless future potential. Hence the exuberance and heady feeling of having brought something new and momentous into the world that often accompanies “movements” in their early phases. 4 “Living adherents,” i.e., old traditions that have modern-day exponents, introduce other sorts of problems, since modern exponents typically are not transplants from another time, but instead embody all sorts of permutations and sensibilities derived from centuries of changing interpretations that become embedded in the transmission. And the modern exponent’s motivations are, consciously or unconsciously, geared toward accommodating modern issues and modes of expression that a careful researcher would have to take into account and isolate. 5 Interest has recently been rekindled in Dignāga’s foundational Buddhist work on pramāṇa-theory. Until a few years ago Pramāṇasamuccaya was only available in two poor Tibetan translations. Jinendrabuddhi’s Sanskrit commentary, found in Tibet, which contains much of Dignāga’s original text, is now coming out. he irst volume has appeared – Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic (eds.), Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭika, chap 1, part 1: Critical Edition; part 2: Diplomatic Edition (Beijing: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 2005) – with more to follow. 6 his is the only “translation” by Xuanzang (600–664) – the famous Chinese pilgrim who travelled to India and, on his return to China, became the most proliic translator PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES of Buddhist texts – that is not a strict translation of a single text but instead a redacted compendium based on a number of Sanskrit commentaries on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (hirty Verses). his “translation” incorporates a host of other materials as well, resulting in an encyclopedic work on the Buddhist Yogācāra system as it was debated in India in the seventh century. Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s French translation, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Le Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang (Paris: Geuthner, 1928, 2 vols.), is overly interpretive, transforming the text into a tract on idealism, an interpretation that has largely stuck. Wei Tat published a bilingual edition, Cheng Wei-shih lun: he Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness (Hong Kong, 1973), that contains an English rendering of Vallée Poussin’s French (minus Vallée Poussin’s extensive annotations) on facing pages with the original Chinese. Swaty Ganguly, Treatise In hirty Verses on Mere-Consciousness (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992), ofers an abridged translation. Francis Cook, hree Texts on Consciousness Only (Berkeley: Numata, 1999), is sometimes an improvement over Vallée Poussin but too frequently follows his misinterpretation. On the philosophy of Yogācāra as relected in Cheng weishilun, see my Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). 7 his has been translated by Wing Tsit-Chan, Relections on hings at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). Zhu Xi’s name may be more familiar to some Western readers by its older transcription: Chu-hsi. his is only one of the many works of Zhu Xi (1130–1200), the most prominent Neo-Confucian thinker. 8 A number of Gersonides’ (i.e., Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, whose name in acrostic is Ralbag; 1288–1344) works have been translated. His major work, he Wars of the Lord, is available as: (1) Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), he Wars of the Lord: Book One: Immortality of the Soul, trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984); (2) Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), he Wars of the Lord: Book Two: Dreams, Divination, and Prophecy; Book hree: Divine Knowledge; Book Four: Divine Providence, trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987); a third promised volume to complete the work has not yet appeared. Book Five of the Wars includes treatises on trigonometry (which sparked the development of trigonometry in Europe); a description of the meguleh ‘amuqot (“revealer of profundities”), a device Gersonides invented to measure the angular distances of heavenly bodies (this also circulated as an independent text); astronomical tables and critiques of astronomical theories. An alternate translation, with analysis, of Book hree of the Wars is Norbert Samuelson, Gersonides on God’s Knowledge (Toronto: Pontiical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1977). His style as a Biblical commentator is displayed in Menachem Kellner (trans.), Commentary on Song of Songs: Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides) (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1998). 9 Harry Wolfson’s translation of Book One of Crescas’ Or Adonai Dan Lusthaus 165 essay’s purpose was an analysis of a particular philosopher, and reverence for a philosopher instead of appreciation for an argument was simply bad taste. Today not only must one recite and acknowledge a pantheon of analytic philosophers to make even the most trivial argument, but publishers are producing an endless stream of books with simple titles such as Quine, Ayer, Strawson, etc., typically with a photo or drawing of that person adorning the cover. he cult of personality is now embraced. While analytic philosophers of the past would ind all that shocking, it is perhaps a belated recognition that philosophy without philosophers is a platonic fantasy, as well as a curious attempt to breathe new life and sustainability into the analytic project. Others would object that even with these changes, unlike philosophers of the past who wrestled with the “big issues” of perennial interest to all thinking individuals, the issues that analytic philosophy engages and the parameters within which it permits what it accepts as legitimate analysis have become so restricted and narrow that few outside the ranks of the analytic philosophers themselves ind their discussions pertinent or even interesting. (Light of Our Lord) – Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle: Problems of Aristotle’s Physics in Jewish and Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929) – is a classic treatment of a work that deeply inluenced Spinoza and moved Western thought closer to the end of the Middle Ages. Crescas’ critique is comparable to al-Ghazzali’s Tahafut al-falsifa (he Incoherence of Philosophy) in that its motive is to purge Aristotelian contamination from religious thought, though it is very diferent in style and conclusion. Crescas (Ḥasdai ben Abraham Crescas, ca.1340–1410/11) delves deeply into Aristotle’s arguments and principles and concludes they are not scientiic enough, i.e., they are merely reiied speculations that inadequately and incorrectly interpret the physical world. 10 166 Defenders of analytic philosophy may contend that it is still going strong, but what is practised under that name today would be unrecognizable to its practitioners of only a couple of decades ago. he label “analytic” philosophy was supposed to signal above all that only the quality of arguments (propositions sequentialized into logical entailments) counted, not personalities or the authors of the arguments. he cult of personality was considered a serious error committed by philosophies of the past. A proper essay, they believed, should begin with a rational exposition accessible to all that subsequently would be developed into more technical implications. he essay’s merit rested in the cogency of the argument, not the weight of its author. Citing others was to be largely avoided, unless the 11 “Spinoza’s distinction between attributes and properties is identical with Crescas’ distinction between attributes subjectively ascribed and their objective reality in God. he connection between Spinoza’s views on creation and free will, on love of God and of others, and those of Crescas has been established by [Manuel] Joël in his ‘[Spinoza’s heologisch-Politischer Tractat auf PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES on. For an overview of Maimonides’ works on medicine, including a translation of two of his treatises, see Ariel Bar-Sela, Hebbel E. Hof, and Elias Faris, “Moses Maimonides’ Two Treatises on the Regimen of Health: Fi Tadbir al-Sihhah and Maqalah i Bayan Ba’d al-A’rad wa-al-Jawad ‘anha” (Philadephia: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, v. 54, 4, 1964), 3–50. Also cf. Gerrit Bos (trans.), Medical Aphorisms: Treatises 1–5 (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 2004) (the irst of six volumes on Maimonides’ summary of Galen); and Fred Rosner, Medicine in the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides (Northvale: NJ: Aronson Press, 1997). Seine Quellen Geprüft] Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza’s’ (Breslau, 1871).” From the article, “Crescas, Ḥasdai ben Abraham,” by Kaufmann Kohler and Emil G. Hirsch, in JewishEncyclopedia.com, http://www. jewishencyclopedia.com [square brackets added]. See also Harry Wolfson, Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes (Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1916); Warren Zev Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Ḥasdai Crescas (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1998). 12 Umberto Eco, he Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (Boston and New York: Harcourt, 1983). While Church complicity in suppressing Aristotle’s lost work on comedy remains speculative, the medieval debates between Dominicans, etc., on whether laughter is permitted or sinful are grounded in history. 13 Aldous Huxley, he Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954, 1956). 14 R.C. Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. Reprint: London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 15 he term “panentheism” was coined by the German philosopher, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781– 1832), a student of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, and one of Schopenhauer’s teachers. 16 Jewish tradition often uses acrostics of the names of prominent igures as their oicial nicknames. Hence Maimonides, e.g., Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon, becomes RaMBaM; Gersonides, Rabbi Levi Ben Gershon, becomes RaLBaG, and so 17 Dan Lusthaus On Ibn Sīnā, see note 19. As Hamed Abdel-reheem Ead, Professor of Chemistry at the Faculty of Science, University of Cairo, Giza, Egypt, and director of the Science Heritage Center, states on a web page (http:// www.levity.com/alchemy/islam21. html) devoted to Ibn Rushd’s medical contributions (slightly modiied): • Ibn Rushd … spent a great part of his fruitful life as a judge and as a physician. Yet he was known in the West for being the grand commentator on the philosophy of Aristotle, whose inluence penetrated the minds of even the most conservative of Christian Ecclesiastes in the Middle Ages, including men like St. homas Aquinas. People went to him for consultation in medicine just as they did for consultation in legal matters and jurisprudence. • Ibn Rushd’s major work in medicine, al-Kulliyyat 167 (“Generalities”), was written between 1153 and 1169. • Two Hebrew versions of alKulliyyat are known, one by an unidentiied translator, another by Solomon ben Abraham ben David. • he Latin translation, Colliget, was made in Padua in 1255 by a Jew, Bonacosa, and the irst edition was printed in Venice in 1482, followed by many other editions. • Ibn Rushd wrote an (abstract) of Galen’s works, parts of which are preserved in Arabic manuscripts. He showed interest in Ibn Sīnā’s Urjūzah fī al-ṭibb (“Poem on Medicine,” Canticum de medicina), on which he wrote a commentary, Sharh Urjuzat Ibn Sina. • It was translated into Hebrew prose by Moses ben Tibbon in 1260; a translation into Hebrew verse was completed at Beziers (France) in 1261 by Solomon ben Ayyub ben Joseph of Granada. • Further, a Latin translation of the same work was made by Armengaud, son of Blaise, in 1280 or 1284, and a printed edition was published at Venice in 1484. • 168 Its subject matter leans heavily on Galen, and occasionally Hippocrates’ name is mentioned. It is subdivided into seven books: Tashrih al-a’lda’ (“Anatomy of Organs”), al-Sihha (“Health”), al-Marad (“Sickness”), al-’Alamat (“Symptoms”), al-Adwiya wa ‘ l-aghdhiya (“Drugs and Foods”), Hifz al-sihha (“Hygiene”), and Shifa al-amrad (“herapy”). • • translated Ibn Rushd’s Maqala ‘ l-tiryaq (“Treatise on Remedies,” Tractatus de theiaca). Another revised Latin translation was made by Andrea Alpago, who • Ibn Rushd’s unsuccessful attempts to defend philosophers against theologians paved the way for a decline in Arabic medicine. • he great image of the Hakim (physician-philosopher), which culminated in the persons of al-Razi and Ibn Sīnā, has been superseded by that of faqih musharik i ‘ l-ulum (a jurist who participates in sciences), among whom were physician-jurists and theologian-physicians. • he German physician Max Meyerhof remarked that: “In Spain, the philosophical bias predominated among medical men. he prototypes of this combination are the two Muslims, Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoar) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës).” • According to Draper, Ibn Rushd is credited with the discovery of sunspots. 18 Gersonides’ main scientiic contributions were in mathematics, astronomy, and logic. For a collection of essays detailing his scientiic achievements, especially his innovative astronomy which inluenced the astronomical revolution we usually associate with Galileo and Copernicus, see Gad Freudenthal, ed., Studies on Gersonides: A Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993). 19 he Wikipedia entry on Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) correctly summarizes his contributions thus <http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avicenna>: PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES Ibn Sīnā … was a Persian polymath and the foremost physician and philosopher of his time. He was also an astronomer, chemist, geologist, logician, paleontologist, mathematician, physicist, poet, psychologist, scientist, soldier, statesman, and teacher. Ibn Sīnā wrote almost 450 treatises on a wide range of subjects, of which around 240 have survived. In particular, 150 of his surviving treatises concentrate on philosophy and forty of them concentrate on medicine. His most famous works are he Book of Healing, a vast philosophical and scientiic encyclopaedia, and he Canon of Medicine [in fourteen volumes], which was a standard medical text at many medieval universities. he Canon of Medicine was used as a text-book in the universities of Montpellier and Louvain as late as 1650. Ibn Sīnā developed a medical system that combined his own personal experience with that of Islamic medicine, the medical system of the Greek physician Galen, Aristotelian metaphysics (Avicenna was one of the main interpreters of Aristotle, and ancient Persian, Mesopotamian and Indian medicine. He was also the founder of Avicennian logic and the philosophical school of Avicennism, which were inluential among both Muslim and Scholastic thinkers.) Ibn Sīnā is regarded as a father of early modern medicine, and clinical pharmacology, particularly for his introduction of systematic experimentation and quantiication into the study of physiology, his discovery of the contagious nature of infectious diseases, the introduction of quarantine to limit the spread of contagious diseases, the introduction Dan Lusthaus of experimental medicine, evidencebased medicine, clinical trials, randomized controlled trials, eicacy tests, clinical pharmacology, neuropsychiatry, risk factor analysis, and the idea of a syndrome, and the importance of dietetics and the inluence of climate and environment on health. He is also considered the father of the fundamental concept of momentum in physics and is regarded as a pioneer of aromatherapy for his invention of steam distillation and extraction of essential oils. He also developed the concept of uniformitarianism and law of superposition in geology. Also, from http://www.isesco.org.ma/ pub/Eng/Architects/P20.htm: Ibn Sīnā mastered medicine in particular. He made new discoveries in this ield; he was the irst to describe a worm that he called the “round worm,” currently known as “anklestoma.” He also studied neurological dysfunctions and was able to reach certain pathologic and psychological facts through psychoanalysis. He believed in the existence of an interaction between psychology and physical health. He also described the brain’s apoplexy resulting from excess in the blood low. Ibn Sīnā made original contributions in medicine, based on his own observations. He founded his conclusions on experiments and was able to reach new observations, including the contagious nature of tuberculosis and the propagation of diseases through water and soil. He also described at length dermatological and sexually transmitted diseases. Moreover, he described the pharmaceutical preparation of some medicines. 169 Ibn Sīnā was also the irst to describe the irritation of the brain’s envelope, distinguishing it from other chronic irritations. He elaborated the irst clear diagnostic of neck’s scleroses and of meningitis He also described the facial paralysis and its causes. He made the distinction between the paralysis caused by a dysfunction in the brain and that resulting Scientiic contributions in other ields. 22 his chapter is important, not only because of its description of debate and its epistemological elements, but because it also informs us that debate (between diferent physicians as well as between physicians and others) was a professional obligation of physicians. It was part of their pedagogy, how they learned, how they defended their theories and practice, and how they practiced medicine. Ibn Sīnā made important contributions in physics, through the study of several natural phenomena such as motion, force, vacuum, ininity, light and heat. He made the observation that if the perception of light is due to the emission of some particles from a luminous source, the speed of light must be inite. 23 When we think of “authoritative tradition” in a medical context, rather than, as is more usual, in a religious or philosophical context, the value and indeed necessity of a respect for tradition becomes obvious, since, if every physician had to re-invent the full inventory of medical lore and acquired knowledge all over again, everyone’s health would be at greater risk. Medicine learns from the trial and error of preceding generations; its accumulated knowledge can be supplemented and modiied by fresh observations and discoveries, but accumulated traditional knowledge can only be ignored at the peril of the physician and his patients. 24 Deriving philosophical categories by inlecting a key verb, in this case the verbal root of “action,” karma (from the root √kṛ), is an inheritance from the other great inluence on Indian philosophy, the grammatical tradition. See below under “Logical Styles.” For an example in a decidedly philosophical context that draws on the same root, compare the following kārikā from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (8:4): “If a cause [for an action] does not actualize (asat), the enacted (kārya) and activator (kāraṇa) are not found. | hose not having come Ibn Sīnā made contributions in geology with a treatise on the formation of mountains, precious stones and metals. In this treatise, he discussed the efect of earthquakes, water, the degree temperature, sediments, fossilisation and erosion. Ibn Sīnā was also an outstanding mathematician and astronomer. He studied ininite bodies from religious, physical, and mathematical perspectives. His indings helped Newton and Leibniz to develop ininite numerals in the seventeenth century. 20 Mansura Haidar, “Medical Works of the Medieval Period from India and Central Asia,” Diogenes 55, no. 27 (2008): 28. 21 Philip J. van der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15. 170 PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES to be (abhāva), activity (kṛiya), actor (kartā), and acting (karaṇa) are not found.” (hetāvasati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | tadabhāve kriyā kartā karaṇaṃ ca na vidyate) 25 he Tevijja sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya of the Buddhist Tipiṭaka gives a humorous, satirical parody of religious devotionalism, comparing it to someone who proclaims he is in love with the most beautiful woman in the world, but when asked what does she look like, what type of hair, eyes, and so on does she possess, what is her caste, etc., he replies: “I don’t know.” Devotionalism, Buddha concludes, is as inefective as someone who, wishing to get to the other shore of a river, builds a ire and sits down, chanting to the other shore to “come here,” rather than building a raft and making his way across. 26 Kant, in a letter to Christian Garve. Quoted in Immanuel Kant, Opus postumum, ed. Eckart Förster; trans. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), “Introduction,” p. xvi. 27 Ibid. 28 Geofrey Lloyd and Nathan Sivin, he Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 29 (1) Duḥkha (dis-ease, a.k.a. “sufering”), (2) samudaya (identifying the causes of duḥkha), (3) nirodha (assurance that the causes can be eliminated), and (4) mārga (the way to eliminate the causes). 30 For instance, it is the topic of chap. 7 of part 2 (Nidāna-sthāna) of the Caraka-saṃhitā. 31 he three doṣas – vāta, pitta, and śleṣman, based respectively on the three elements wind, ire-heat, and water – are fundamental categories of Indian medicine into which diseases, symptoms, pharmaceuticals, foods, etc., are classiied and analyzed. For a general discussion that includes Buddhist usages, see Hartmut Scharfe, “he Doctrine of the hree Humors in Traditional Indian Medicine and the Alleged Antiquity of Tamil Siddha Medicine,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 119, no. 4 (1999): 609–29. 32 he next oldest Indian medical text, Suśruta-saṃhitā, contains materials roughly contemporaneous with Asaṇga (4th century) but is recognized to also contain much later material in the redaction that has come down to us. 33 Pātakebhyaḥ paraṃ caitat pātakaṃ nāstikagrahaḥ. I have consulted two editions of the Caraka-saṃhitā, both containing the original text in devanagri and an English translation: (1) Caraka-saṃhitā: Agniveśa’s treatise reined and annotated by Caraka and redacted by Dṛḍhabala: text with English translation, Priyavrat Sharma (editortranslator) (Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1981–83), 4 vols.; and (2) Agniveśa’s Caraka saṃhita: text with English translation & critical exposition based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s Āyurveda dīpikā, Ram Karan Sharma and Bhagwan Dash (trans. and ed.) (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Oice, 1976–2002), 7 vols. he translation above is from passages 14–15 of chap. 11, vol. 1, p. 209 of Sharma and Dash. Dan Lusthaus 171 34 he CS in its available redaction is heavily steeped in Sāṃkhyan theory, which holds that the world consists of varying proportions of three constituent factors: sattva (light, pure, etc.), rajas (passionate, active), and tamas (dark, dull, inert). By implication, CS is claiming that someone devoid of rajas and tamas (skewering passions and stupidity) must be sattvic (pure, enlightened), and thus constitutionally incapable of lying. 35 Sharma and Dash, vol. 1, 213. 36 Prajñā-parādha is translated by Sharma and Dash as “intellectual blasphemy” and “intellectual error” by P.V. Sharma. It literally means “an ofense to reason,” i.e., acting 172 unreasonably. he CS uses the term in a number of ways, but what they seem to have in common is acting or having an attitude that is unreasonable, i.e., endangering one’s health in ways that one should know better than to engage in. E.g., Sūtra-sthāna, chap. 38: 39-40 states: “Due to prajñāparādha, he indulges in unwholesome sense objects, suppression of natural urges and taking up risky jobs. he ignorant one is attached to temporarily pleasing objects but the learned is not so because of his understanding having been clear” (P.V. Sharma, vol. 1, 231). 37 Relection #90, Aphorisms and Relections, selected by Henrietta A. Huxley (London: Macmillan, 1907). PHILOSOPH Y, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, A ND BOU NDA R IES After Appropriation © 2011 Morny Joy University of Calgary Press 2500 University Drive NW Calgary, Alberta Canada T2N 1N4 www.uofcpress.com No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written consent of the publisher. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication After appropriation [electronic resource] : explorations in intercultural philosophy and religion / edited by Morny Joy. Based on papers presented at the workshop: Comparative Philosophy and Relgion, held at the University of Calgary, Calgary, Alta., in 2006. Includes bibliographical references and index. Also issued in print format. ISBN 978-1-55238-503-6 (PDF).--ISBN 978-1-55238-584-5 (PDF).--ISBN 978-1-55238-585-2 (HTML) 1. Religions. 2. Philosophy, Comparative. 3. Philosophy and religion. I. Joy, Morny BL51.A48 2011 201’.61 C2011-906853-2 he University of Calgary Press acknowledges the support of the Government of Alberta through the Alberta Multimedia Development Fund for our publications. We acknowledge the inancial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities. We acknowledge the inancial support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. his book has been published with the aid of a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Cover design, page design, and typesetting by Melina Cusano edited by Morny Joy After Appropriation E XPLOR ATIONS IN INTERCULTUR AL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Morny Joy Comparative Studies in Philosophy/Religion and Dialogue as Mutual “Strangiication” (Waitui 外推) Vincent Shen vii 1 he Philosopher as Stranger: he Idea of Comparative Philosophy Michael McGhee 25 Locating Intercultural Philosophy in Relation to Religion Tinu Ruparell 41 he Connecting Manas: Inner Sense, Common Sense, or the Organ of Imagination Arindam Chakrabarti 57 Studying the “Other”: Challenges and Prospects of Muslim Scholarship on World Religions Ahmad F. Yousif 77 he Vices of Ethics: he Critique of Morality in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Daoism Katrin Froese 95 Comparative Philosophy of Religion and Modern Jewish Philosophy: A Conversation Michael Oppenheim 119 Philosophy, Medicine, Science, and Boundaries Dan Lusthaus 139 v vi Religious Intellectual Texts as a Site for Intercultural Philosophical and heological Relection: he Case of the Śrīmad Rahasyatrayasāra and the Traité de l’Amour de Dieu Francis X. Clooney, S.J. 173 Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi’s Tiantai Philosophy Chen-kuo Lin 203 Ibn Rushd or Averroës? Of Double Names and Double Truths: A Diferent Approach to Islamic Philosophy Tamara Albertini 221 he Use of Lakṣaṇā in Indian Exegesis Christopher G. Framarin 239 Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Explorations in Intercultural Philosophy and Religion Morny Joy 257 Notes on Contributors 281 Index 287 A F T E R A P P R O P R I AT I O N - Morny Joy