Group selectionism is the minority view among
evolutionists that natural selection in humans occurs in the manner of eusocial
species, at the level of groups, not just genes. Eusocial species comprise
primarily the social insects, whose hives’ genetic commonality permits group selection,
which in their case—unlike the human—reduces to the gene level. Social
psychologist Jonathan Haidt in his recent book The Righteous Mind (2013) frames the case for human group selection
with the aphorism “Humans are 90% chimpanzee and 10% bee.” Haidt observes that most
moral arguments are hypocritical, aiming to impress or control others, agents
often ignoring standards when they can avoid punishment for transgressions. Yet
Haidt acknowledges that humans occasionally behave selflessly, as when a
soldier takes huge personal risks for his fellows or zealots lose themselves in
moral or political causes. Haidt thinks these phenomena inexplicable at the
gene or individual level because it would subject agents to strongly adverse
selection pressures, since their altruism fails to serve their individual interests.
Group selectionism is subject to a standard objection: inevitable exploitation
by free riding, which group-selectionist theory must contain a mechanism to
punish. Human societies curtail free riding by social approval and disapproval,
including material rewards and punishments.
According to Haidt (and other strict-adaptationist
theorists), the proclivity to reward and punish transgression against group
interest must arise through group selection because otherwise approval and
disapproval meted out in the group interest would be another form of
self-sacrifice. The habit theory of morality treats
moral approval and disapproval as expressing the same habit set used for self-control, illustrated by the habit
theory of civic morality: U.S. citizens practice habits of frugality in
their personal lives by demanding the government cut spending. The same
equivalence describes moral suasion directed toward individuals.
Ironically, moral hypocrisy provides evidence that self-control
and moral suasion practice a unified moral habit. If hypocritical demands are
seen as purely deceptive, it’s hard
to see how they would serve as a costly
signal; carrying no costs, moral hypocrisy would have no value as a
signal. Hypocrisy has no point if anyone can be a hypocrite cheaply. But if engaging in moral suasion agents rehearse (practice) principles
of integrity that they habitually apply to themselves, the cost of demanding more morality than you want to
give is becoming more moral than you
wish.
The workings become clearer and more plausible with more
concreteness about the structure of the moral habits (or principles of
integrity), and Alan P. Fiske’s relationship-regulation
theory integrates well with the habit
theory. According to Fiske’s model, systems of moral principles are activated when
their associated social relationships are “constituted,” where the systems of
moral principles are Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality. (T.S.
Rai and A.P. Fiske, Moral psychology
is relationship regulation (2011) Psychological
Review, 118: 57 ‒ 75.) Hierarchical principles, for example, are
activated when the appropriate social relations of Authority/Ranking are constituted, so when an agent is involved in an authoritarian relationship, such as between
employees and their boss, the corresponding Hierarchical principles of
unconditional submission and conditional protection dominate. To restate in
habit-theory terms, negotiating hierarchical relationships motivates agents to form
habits based on Hierarchical principles. Most importantly, the Hierarchical
structure is a coherent whole, including facets involving regulation of both self
and others. In the habit theory, other-directed
morality is a spandrel deriving from the primary adaptive value
of self-control.
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