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| 5-27-05: Optical scan system hacked (... |
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admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 536
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 73 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, May 27, 2005 - 5:03 pm: | 
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Tallahassee, FL: "Are we having fun yet?"
( SEE TECHNICAL REPORT HERE: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf)
This is the message that appeared in the window of a county optical scan machine, startling Leon County Information Systems Officer Thomas James. Visibly shaken, he immediately turned the machine off.
Diebold's opti-scan (paper ballot) voting system uses a curious memory card design, offering penetration by a lone programmer such that standard canvassing procedures cannot detect election manipulation.
The Diebold optical scan system was used in about 800 jurisdictions in 2004. Among them were several hotbeds of controversy: Volusia County (FL); King County (WA); and the New Hampshire primary election, where machine results differed markedly from hand-counted localities.
New regs: Counting paper ballots forbidden
Most states prohibit elections officials from checking on optical scan tallies by examining the paper ballots. In Washington, Secretary of State Sam Reed declared such spontaneous checkups to be "unauthorized recounts" and prohibited them altogether. New Florida regulations will forbid counting paper ballots, even in recounts, except in highly unusual circumstances. Without paper ballot hand-counts, the hacks demonstrated below show that optical-scan elections can be destroyed in seconds.
A little man living in every ballot box
The Diebold optical scan system uses a dangerous programming methodology, with an executable program living inside the electronic ballot box. This method is the equivalent of having a little man living in the ballot box, holding an eraser and a pencil. With an executable program in the memory card, no Diebold opti-scan ballot box can be considered "empty" at the start of the election.
The Black Box Voting team proved that the Diebold optical scan program, housed on a chip inside the voting machine, places a call to a program living in the removable memory card during the election. The demonstration also showed that the executable program on the memory card (ballot box) can easily be changed, and that checks and balances, required by FEC standards to catch unauthorized changes, were not implemented by Diebold -- yet the system was certified anyway.
The Diebold system in Leon County, Florida succumbed to multiple attacks.
Ion Sancho: Truth and Excellence in Elections
Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho and Information Systems Officer Thomas James had already implemented security procedures in Leon County far exceeding the norm in elections management. This testing, done by a team of researchers including Black Box Voting, independent filmmakers, security expert Dr. Herbert Thompson, and special consultant Harri Hursti, was authorized by Mr. Sancho, in an unusual act of openness and courage, to identify any remaining holes in Leon County's election security.
The results of the memory card hack demonstration will assist elections supervisors throughout the U.S., by emphasizing the critical importance of accounting for each and every memory card and protecting access.
Findings:
Computer expert Harri Hursti gained control over Leon County memory cards, which handle the vote-reporting from the precincts. Dr. Herbert Thompson, a security expert, took control of the Leon County central tabulator by implanting a trojan horse-like script.
Two programmers can become a lone programmer, says Hursti, who has figured out a way to control the entire central tabulator by way of a single memory card swap, and also how to make tampered polling place tapes match tampered central tabulator results. This more complex approach is untested, but based on testing performed May 26, Hursti says he has absolutely no reason to believe it wouldn't work.
Three memory card tests demonstrated successful manipulation of election results, and showed that 1990 and 2002 FEC-required safeguards are being violated in the Diebold version 1.94 opti-scan system.
Three memory card hacks
1. An altered memory card (electronic ballot box) was substituted for a real one. The optical scan machine performed seamlessly, issuing a report that looked like the real thing. No checksum captured the change in the executable program Diebold designed into the memory card.
2. A second altered memory card was demonstrated, using a program that was shorter than the original. It still worked, showing that there is also no check for the number of bytes in the program.
3. A third altered memory card was demonstrated with the votes themselves changed, showing that the data block (votes) can be altered without triggering any error message.
How to "Roll over the odometer" in Diebold optical scan machines
Integer overflow checks do not seem to exist in this system, making it possible to stuff the ballot box without triggering any error message. This would be like pre-loading minus 100 votes for Tom and plus 100 votes for Rick (-100+100=ZERO) -- changing the candidate totals without changing the overall number of votes.
A more precise comparison would be this: The odometer on a car rolls over to zero after 999,999. In the Diebold system tested, the rollover to zero happens at 65,536 votes. By pre-loading 65,511 votes for a candidate, after 25 real votes appear (65,511 plus 25 = 65,536) the report "rolls over" so that the candidate's total is ZERO.
This manipulation can be balanced out by preloading votes for candidate "A" at 65,511 and candidate "B" at 25 votes -- producing an articifial 50-vote spread between the candidates, which will not be obvious after the first 25 votes for candidate "A" roll over to zero. The "negative 25" votes from the odometer rollover counterbalance the "plus 25" votes for the other candidates, making the total number of votes cast at the end of the day exactly equal to the number of voters.
While testing the hack on the Leon County optical scan machine, Hursti was stunned to find that pre-stuffing the ballot box to "roll over the odometer" produced no error message whatsoever.*
*We did not have the opportunity to scan ballots after stuffing the ballot box. Therefore, the rollover to zero was not tested in Leon County. This integer overflow capability is discernable in the program itself. We did have the opportunity to test a pre-stuffed ballot box, which showed that pre-loaded ballot boxes do not trigger any error message.
Simple tweaks to pass L&A test and survive zero tape
Though the additional tweaks were not demonstrated at the Leon County elections office, Hursti believes that the integer overflow hack can be covered up on the "zero tape" produced at the beginning of the election. The programming to cover up manipulations during the "logic & accuracy test" is even simpler, since the program allows you to specify on which reports (and, if you like, date and time of day) the manipulation will affect.
The testing demonstrated, using the actual voting system used in a real elections office, that Diebold programmers developed a system that sacrifices security in favor of dangerously flexible programming, violating FEC standards and calling the actions of ITA testing labs and certifiers into question.
In the case of Leon County, inside access was used to achieve the hacks, but there are numerous ways to introduce the hacks without inside access. Outside access methods will be described in the technical report to be released in mid-June.
Security concerns
Putting an executable program into removable memory card "ballot boxes" -- and then programming the opti-scan chip to call and invoke whatever program is in the live ballot box during the middle of an election -- is a mind-boggling design from a security standpoint. Combining this idiotic design with a program that doesn't even check to see whether someone has tampered with it constitutes negligence and should result in a product recall.
Counties that purchased the Diebold 1.94 optical scan machines should not pay for any upgraded program; instead, Diebold should be required to recall the faulty program and correct the problem at its own expense.
None of the attacks left any telltale marks, rendering all audits and logs useless, except for hand-counting all the paper ballots.
Is it real? Or is it Memorex?
For example, Election Supervisor Ion Sancho was unable to tell, at first, whether the poll tape printed with manipulated results was the real thing. Only the message at the end of the tape, which read "Is this real? Or is it Memorex?" identified the tape as a tampered version of results.
In another test, Congresswoman Corrine Brown (FL-Dem) was shocked to see the impact of a trojan implanted by Dr. Herbert Thompson. She asked if the program could be manipulated in such a way as to flip every fifth vote.
"No problem," Dr. Thompson replied.
"It IS a problem. It's a PROBLEM!" exclaimed Brown, whose district includes the troubled Volusia County, along with Duval County -- both currently using the Diebold opti-scan system.
This system is also used in Congressman John Conyers' home district, in contentious King County, Washington, and in Lucas County, Ohio (where six election officials resigned or were suspended after many irregularities were found.)
Diebold optical scans were used in San Diego for its ill-fated mayoral election in Nov. 2004.
- - - - - - - - - - -
Optical scan systems have paper ballots, but election officials are crippled in their ability to hand count these ballots due to restrictive state regulations and budget limitations.
The canvassing (audit) procedure used to certify results from optical scan systems involves comparing the "poll tapes" (cash register-like results receipts) with the printout from the central tabulator. These tests demonstrate that both results can be manipulated easily and quickly.
Minimum requirements to perform this hack:
1. A single specimen memory card from any county using the Diebold 1.94 optical scan series. (These cards were seen scattered on tables in King County, piled in baskets accessible to the public in Georgia, and jumbled on desktops in Volusia county.)
2. A copy of the compiler for the AccuBasic program. (These compilers have been fairly widely distributed by Diebold and its predecessor company, and there are workarounds if no compiler is available.)
3. Modest working language of any one of the higher level computer languages (Pascal, C, Cobol, Basic, Fortran...) along with introductory-level knowledge of assembler or machine language. (Machine language knowledge needed is less than an advanced refrigerator or TV repairmen needs. The optical scan system is much simpler than modern appliances).
The existence of the executable program in the memory card was discernable from a review of the Diebold memos. The test hacks took just a few hours for Black Box Voting consultants to develop.
Nearly 800 jurisdictions conducted a presidential election on this system. This system is so profoundly hackable that an advanced-level TV repairman can manipulate votes on it.
Black Box Voting asked Dr. Thompson and Hursti to examine the central tabulator and the optical scan system after becoming concerned that not enough attention had been paid to optical scans, tabulators and remote access.
Thompson and Hursti each found the vulnerabilities for their respective hacks in less than 24 hours.
"Open for Business"
When it comes to this optical-scan system, as Hursti says, "It's not that they left the door open. There is no door. This system is 'open for business.'"
The question now is: How brisk has business been? Based on this new evidence, it is time to sequester and examine the memory cards used with Diebold optical scans in Nov. 2004.
The popularity of tamper-friendly machines that are "open for business" in heavily Democratic areas may explain the lethargy with which Democratic leaders have been approaching voting machine security concerns.
The enthusiasm with which Republicans have endorsed machines with no paper ballots at all indicates that neither party really wants to have intact auditing of elections.
The ease with which a system -- which clearly violates dozens of FEC standards going back to 1990 -- was certified calls into question the honesty, competence, and personal financial transactions of both testing labs and NASED certifiers.
Revamp and update hand-counted paper ballot technology?
Perhaps it is time to revisit the idea of hand-counted paper ballots, printed by machines for legibility, with color-coded choices for quick, easy, accurate sorting and counting. We should also take another look at bringing counting teams in when the polls close, to relieve tired poll workers.
This report is the "non-techie" version of a more formal technical report, which can be found at: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf
PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED AS LONG AS YOU PROVIDE A LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org
Discuss this article here: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/72/5936.html |
rightfoot
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: rightfoot
Post Number: 4
Registered: 05-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 9:01 pm: |
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This story is awesome. What is the next step? |
brantl
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: brantl
Post Number: 21
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 4:46 am: |
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Well done! Now let's see if we can prove where they've done it.
Exactly. You GET IT. So glad to see you here at Black Box Voting! -- Bev Harris |
mac_in_mass
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: mac_in_mass
Post Number: 7
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 6:19 am: |
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Bev, you and the gang are a national treasure.
Someday, you will get the Congressional Medal of Honor...
Thank you. |
spayeur
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: spayeur
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 9:35 am: |
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The statement about Washington procedures is misleading. This directly from Sam Reed's office:
"King County is the government entity that made that argument.
There is a point after the cavassing of votes where state law says the ballots shall be sealed and maitained securely in case of a recount or litigation."
There is a point *after* canvassing votes. It seems that this is how it should be done, to prevent tampering.
Spayeur:
My source, who was the supervisor of elections for King County, quoted Sam Reed directly on this. Now, the "canvassing of the votes" consists of comparing the poll tape result to the central tabulator result. The hacks we demonstrated knocked out both these canvassing tools, manipulating them to be false.
If the canvassing procedures use only the poll tapes (which we succeeded in manipulating) and the tabulator report (which we succeeded in manipulating) and the ballots must be kept sealed, at what point can anyone check the only evidence left?
I think we have a problem. -- Bev Harris |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 549
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 1:53 pm: |
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THE NEXT SEVERAL POSTS ARE CARRIED OVER FROM OTHER FORUMS -- SEE RESPONSES. (We can't post on Daily Kos until tomorrow, and then we'll be on a plane. Look forward to seeing you Ohioans in Cleveland). |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 550
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:16 pm: |
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Post from Daily Kos, response:
CalbraithRodgers - This doesn't make sense
In the aftermath of the 2004 election there was a huge amount of diary space given over to Bev and BBV. What I got from it was that the group was probably well-intentioned, but was unwilling or unable to "put up or shut up" when it came to proving many of their claims.
Like Judicial Watch, the group that counted Florida's ballots, but didn't finish for nearly a year, Black Box Voting is doing hard core research and sorry, we didn't pull out a magic bullet in 10 days or less. Our objective has always been to get at the truth -- not to make sure any particular candidate wins.
Unfortunately, alot of money was sent to this group by Kossacks and others in the blogosphere.
Actually, this keeps getting repeated, but the primary source of our funding has always been donations in response to coverage of our work by mainstream media -- Vanity Fair, Time Magazine, CNN, Good Morning America, the New York Times, PBS broadcasting, and many more. That accounts for about 55 percent of our funding, with another 40 percent coming from grants and about 5 percent from all Internet sources combined.
Now we have a diary that provides a bunch of interesting content with a number of links to show the legitimacy of the content, but guess what? All the links are to BBV. It's deja vu all over again.
"Links?" Our research is primarily field research, not surfing the Internet for links. The formal report is due out in mid-June, and it will contain source code etc. to back up what's in the article. This was for the general public, and source code plus technical specs would confuse, rather than enhance, the article.
... this diary is sadly lacking in verifiable content. I say "sadly" because I think this diary (without any non-BBV links) hurts the cause.
The "hurts the movement" talking point is frequently cited by people who are into turf wars. The point is not to beat our chests and say who got there first, or who's the bestest activist of all. The point is to develop solid research.
The following can be verified from the information provided in the article: The credentials of the experts, whether they participated in tests, whether a congressperson observed the tests, when and where the tests took place, and -- because the complete set of Diebold memos are online -- the existence of the executable program in the memory card can also be verified. Far from "hurting the movement," this important report is moving the ball forward in a very tangible way. We now know where one of the most manipulatable programs is and we now know how it works.
Next we need to examine the memory cards used on Nov 2, 2004. Thanks for the feedback, glad to straighten this out. -- Bev Harris
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admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 551
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:19 pm: |
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by joan reports, from Daily Kos --
No. the tabulators for opti-scans can be corruptible.
If the state laws discourage or impede hand counts of the paper ballots as a check (like Washington state), then opti-scan tabulating needs the same scrutiny as touchscreens.
Opti-scans make sense as long as they're watched, audited – and not black-boxed.
Unfortunately, what this testing showed was that the auditing won't work, because we hacked the audit tools themselves. "Watching" or "auditing" won't work if you do the memory card hack correctly. The only workaround is hand-counting the ballots themselves. -- Bev |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 552
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:33 pm: |
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from Daily Kos - by format flip
this diary is bogus ...
first, i live in new hampshire. there has been no "hotbed of controversy" with the optical scanning machines in our state.
Actually, the Kerry win in the primary raised eyebrows when machine results had Kerry ahead by a large margin, but hand counts had Kerry and Dean neck and neck.
in fact, secretary of state bill gardner has performed numerous recounts and the results from optical scanning machines are usually the same as the hand recounts correct.
Actually, almost all recounts are done by running the ballots through the optical scan machine again. The memory card hack, combined with the tabulator hack, will just result in a hacked result again during the recount. Only hand counting ALL the paper ballots will work, because the double set of books (and ballot chain of custody issues) easily offset a spot-checked hand count.
the problems usually stem from human errors on the ballots - not rigged optical machines. this has been proven again and again and again, recount after recount. gardner has said in interviews that the recounts in the state have proven the machines complete mistake proof.
I'd like to see the studies cited that "prove it again and again." Secretary of State Gardner is using Diebold optical scan software in New Hampshire that has never passed federal certification at all -- even less oversight than most states -- and the federal testing labs really fell apart on this one anyway.
gardner, by the way, is a registered democrat.
This is the single most problematic myth facing the voting integrity movement today. It is NOT a Republican vs. Democrat issue -- it is an issue of maintaining power and it is driven by money, which has infected the system from top to bottom. From all appearances, the hack built into the Diebold optical scans has been there for at least a decade, and has been "open for business" for both parties.
ralph nader also proved that the machines are correct when he went and had a number of precincts around the state recounted. again, the machines were accurate; the only new votes gained for nader, bush, and kerry were human errors and marks on the paper ballots.
Actually, the reason we didn't go to New Hampshire for Nader's recount is that they did not follow any of the reporting, document requests, or chain of custody procedures needed to ensure an accurate recount. The spot-check methodology, combined with lack of documentation on chain of custody, combined with inability to review even basic computer logs, much less the memory cards themselves, rendered the recount pretty useless for proving anything. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 553
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:39 pm: |
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From - Daily Kos, posted by J4K:
The fact that every precinct doesn't have its own scanning machine to "check" the validity of the ballot is the real problem with optical scan voting. What I'd like to know is why hasn't every precinct demanded they have a scanner?
Not really. The memory card hack, done correctly, will impact every precinct-based optical scan. Understand this: The memory cards in each precinct optical scan are created by the "election management software" (GEMS, Central Tabulator). This program runs on an office PC using Windows. The program needed to rewrite all the memory cards can be replaced simply by going into the Windows directory and overwriting it with a new one. You don't even need to go into GEMS. That new program, which can be designed to trigger only on a certain date, will then infect every memory card when you use GEMS to create the memory cards in the first place.
Therefore, you'll have hacked memory cards in every precinct. (Or, in the desired precincts, which would be a more subtle way to do it.) |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 554
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 18 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:45 pm: |
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From Daily Kos - by Jacob Wi
who wrote this message board post? personally, i immediately disregard anything without an author, even a handle or a pseudonym of some sort.
i'm surprised at how eager people are to accept this. is it this same thomas james...http://archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/12/04/voter_file/index2.html
The article is written by Black Box Voting. The specific authors are Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne with guidance and edits by Harri Hursti and Russell Michaels.
Yes, I'm pretty sure it is the same Thomas James. -- Bev |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 555
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 2:51 pm: |
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From Daily Kos - by Eternal Hope
All this proves is the possibility of fraud.
To prove fraud, you must show who, where, what, when, and how.
This article does not prove vote fraud. It does prove certification fraud. The system proved to be in obvious violation of FEC standards. We will point out the specific and obvious FEC violations in the technical report.
Vote fraud not proven, certification fraud proven, and this research now puts us in a position to request the memory cards, and gives us the exact information to look for on them, so that we can prove whether anyone committed election fraud using this built-in feature. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 556
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:01 pm: |
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From Daily Kos -- this is important: Three points of view --
Or ditch the electronic machines and and count the paper ballots...Hand counts - only.
-------------
I agree that this would be the prefered method but there are too many millions of dollars involved at this time to try and go back now. Technology marches on.
------------
HAVA money is just more Federal waste. Think of that Federal funding as just more money thrown down the drain ...
After these hacks, ONLY the paper ballots were left standing.
To simplify: The optical scan system has:
paper ballot --> poll tapes --> tabulator report
We knocked out the poll tapes and the tabulator report. Only paper ballots were left.
It is cheaper and safer to do all hand counts. It would not take "lots of employees" -- a lively discussion under the "Lynn Landes, you were right" thread in our General Discussion forum describes how hand counts can be used. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 557
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:02 pm: |
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From Daily Kos - by politology.us:
unfortunately, ohio showed us that even spot-checking rules would be abused. you're supposed to pick a random representative sample totalling 1% (or whatever) of the vote. So rather than random, they cherry-picked ballots totalling 1%. We just didn't have the strength to put a stop to it.
BINGO! Another one who "gets it"! |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 558
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 3 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:05 pm: |
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from Daily Kos by pigpaste --
Is the opening about "Are we having fun yet" in reference to something that was part of the demonstration, or did it happen during the election?
The "Are we having fun yet" line was inserted by Harri Hursti in the rogue program that he successfully introduced into the optical scan machine via the memory card. It was not from the 2004 election. When Thomas James got startled, Harri quickly explained to him "that's my program, not yours."
Well, of course, that's not really so reassuring, is it? -- Bev |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 559
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:10 pm: |
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From Daily Kos -- here are the most important comments on the whole thread:
by Kaleja -- Hypothetical, but extremely damn suspicious -- From a system design standpoint, leaving a hook for an executable program on a memory card that's supposed to be for tally purposes in an application where security is an issue stinks to high heaven. It should not be easy for an end user to change the behavior of the system. The fact that it is that easy is a lot like finding needles, scorched spoons, and rubber tubing in someone's bedroom.
--------------
by blue florida -- agreed. It's a compelling bit of fact- that the software goes to a removable card for code. It's sure a good answer to why someone would think they could get away with it. It would leave no trace behind.
-------
by Fernando Poo -- True -- And any speculation would be nothing more than a "Conspiracy Theory". Of course, putting somthing like a backdoor into a large volume release would involve a conspiracy by its very nature. And there would be nothing to prove it even happened, only that it was possible.
-------
by technopolitical -- Bingo. There is no legitimate reason for that hook to be there, and no half-way competent code review could miss it. The only reason to give control to a removable card is to subvert the machine's internal programming.
Note that the programmers for this are highly skilled and quite sophisticated, with at least two decades of hard core programming experience -- they are not bumblers. I hope we have room in the technical report to show you what we've learned about the skill sets possessed by the programmers, based on other programs they have written for other employers. -- Bev |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 560
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:12 pm: |
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From Daily Kos -- by speranza
proof of concept" hack does not prove a malicious hack took place out in the field...
Correct. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 561
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:15 pm: |
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From Daily Kos -- by Fernando Poo
But an inside hack can't be proven when its inbedded in the code
We think it is most likely provable, if we can obtain 100 percent of the memory cards from a few counties with suspicious results -- and I don't care if the anomaly was for Dems, Republicans, or the dogcatcher. Actually, it might be easier to get the cards if we suspect the dogcatcher... -- Bev |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 562
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:16 pm: |
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From Daily Kos - by Pennacchio for Pennsylvania
ONE PROGRAMMER - All the idiots who kept screaming about how you'd need a conspiracy of thousands to pull this off need to be forced to re-read that line a few hundred times.
One programmer who writes the code. One election official who drops the code (possibly without knowing what it does) into whatever central machine is normally used for programming these cards. One Republican party official to instigate the operation.
Total "mind-bogglingly massive conspiracy" size: three people.
There's no good reason for the program to make this call to the memory card. None at all. Either Liebold's programmers are totally incompetent... Or this was designed to be easy to crack.
Bingo. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 563
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:21 pm: |
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From Daily Kos -
Legitimate Reason: Well, on a piece of consumer electronics hardware, you'd want that kind of flexibility, so you could put expansions, plugins, or patches on memory cards. It'd be limited somehow, or have access to a restricted API, or something. But you'd want that kind of thing.
But for a voting machine, where the code and machine are supposedly certified and sealed? Where the integrity of the machine is of paramount importance? No ••••••• way. You do not want that kind of open access unless you want someone to be able to trivially insert uncertified, unverified code into the machine.
--------------
Like updating your BIOS, yes but from what I read, the programmer could replace an executable module. Vote tabulation is not rocket science, sales forecasting, or payroll. The only flexibility required is the number of rows and choices to be counted, and the verbage associated with each. No logic changes should be required.
--------------------
Exactly... For other things, it can make sense.
For vote tabulation? Nope. No way, no how. Like you say, it's dead simple. The memory card should be completely passive, used just to read data from and write data to. The only reason I can see for doing this is to install uncertified code on the machines.
Bingo. Exactly. and Precisely.
Now you see why I took the time to carry these discussion points over here. This is important stuff, folks, and when you put this together with the concept of "Independent testing labs" and "violations of FEC standards" and "nationally certified" the meaning of the term "conspiracy" starts to take on a new light -- RICO. Racketeering is in the statutes because it happens. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 564
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:25 pm: |
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from Daily Kos - by space
How to get to the bottom of this -- In my opinion there is only one way to solve this issue.
Democratic officials in a blue state need to sue Diebold for providing faulty machines. Then they need to depose every possible person involved in the development of the code. Once you find the smallest evidence of wrongdoing, you bring criminal charges until someone starts talking.
There is ZERO doubt in my mind that these machines were designed to be hacked. The sloppy code merely exists for plausible deniability. And it is working. See how many ••••••• Democrats demand PROOF before they get off their asses to do anything. Despite the fact that the machines were clearly designed to erase the evidence of wrongdoing.
My God, there is a REASON that ATM machines and slot machines don't make "mistakes" like this.
Myth: Blue states are solid citizens when it comes to clean elections. The Diebold optical scan system is extremely popular in urban areas and blue states. Consider the possibility that there might be a reason for that before counting on the Democrats to help solve this. |
admin
Board Administrator
Username: admin
Post Number: 565
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:34 pm: |
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And now we meet fwiffo the troll...
He shows up after a few posts, from Daily Kos:
by Hummingbird -- Do you really think They FORGOT? Don't be naive.
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by Jon Meltzer -- Yes, I do think they "forgot" or never knew in the first place, because the company, trying to maximize its own corporate profits, hired incompetent programmers and gave them obsolete tools.
Try this: The programmers on this bad boy are stockholders and founders that started working on this system in 1987. The tools are obsolete, but deliberately chosen to be obsolete. They selected systems that were already obsolete before they built the system, and we're talking circa 1990.
The 65536 error is the kind of mistake that very inexperienced people make. The programmer didn't have a clue, and no one bothered to test the finished product - because testing costs money, and that expense once again detracts from corporate profit. And everyone expects that the magic code should work all the time, under every condition, without any kind of verification or testing.
Well, actually, no. The programmers are hardly "inexperienced." The system was "tested by Wyle Laboratories" and certified by computer scientists including Dr. Brit Williams.
Every programmer I've talked to about this knows exactly what happened - and all of them know the number without my having to tell them. And none of them think that electronic voting is a proper use of the technology.
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by fwiffo -- Natural limit -- 65535 is the natural limit for an unsigned, 16-bit integer. Most small processors and microcontrollers for this type of device at 16-bit proccessors (some are even 8-bit). Each voting machine never counts more than a few thousand votes (most states have a maximum precinct size of like 1500). It's an elementary programming error and a very common one, and is not likely to be found when testing under ordinary circumstances, because you'd never count that high.
It is an error, and an oversight, but by itself, is not evidence of malice. An intentional security flaw (i.e. a back door) would look much different.
fwiffo goes on to come up with these enlightening comments: I see no reason to work with cranks. I don't care if they're on our side. Bev Harris, from all indications, is a quack. You can't work with people like that. They're crazy. ... Dealing with irrational people is too exhausting for me to bother with.
Serious, real concerns about these voting machines have been transformed into tin-foil hatted loonery. I want the machines fixed, and these people are only hurting that cause!}}
He goes on to state that things like printing a zero tape will protect us. Well, here's the point: The memory card provides a mechanism to hack all of the reports, because it contains the executable program that produces the reports. In fact, that's the main point here: You can change the votes, OR you can hack the way the reports are calculated, or you can do both.
Fwiffo, could you please limit your activities to fixing my appliances, not my elections?Thanks! -- Bev |
bluemanvoter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: bluemanvoter
Post Number: 1
Registered: 06-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 9 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 7:49 pm: |
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Hello,
As a software professional with 30 years of programming experience, I find this news extremely disturbing - not just because of the obviously sloppy and incompetent programming, but because in my judgement there is no legitimate reason for choosing the wide-open, totally insecure architecture they went with. I can only conclude that the Diebold machines were designed to cheat state certification tests. The state inspector can only test the base code that resides on the ROM chip inside the machine. The machine can be programmed to pass the certification tests, then behave in a totally different way when a RAM memory card is inserted. If I had my way, all Diebold machines nationwide would be decertified pending a thorough investigation by each state's attorney general, with criminal charges a possibility. |
pacific_alien
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: pacific_alien
Post Number: 35
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, June 3, 2005 - 5:53 am: |
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Thanks for posting all that Bev. Helped my understanding on several points.
PA |
george_lobuono
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: george_lobuono
Post Number: 1
Registered: 06-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, June 3, 2005 - 9:48 am: |
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The solution to local reluctance to inspect the machines? A federal law. We need a federal law or a consitutional case that requires that all votes be done and counted fairly, with a paper record that can be recounted and stored for a minimum of ten years.
Short of that, we aren't a democracy anymore, just a decaying empire. If allowed to continue as such, we become increasingly dangerous to the rest of the planet. |
pacific_alien
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: pacific_alien
Post Number: 38
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, June 4, 2005 - 6:02 am: |
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Greetings George,
A federal law would indeed be an appropriate tool, but I have grave doubts that this is achievable in the current environment.
New/revised vote legislation/contracts proposed in recent months at any level has appeared to be nearly as flawed as what it is meant to replace, perhaps even worse in some cases.
Look at machine purchase decisions alone, there's enough spin (lies) going on there to pretend that black is white. Robust solutions to the real problems are very hard to find in the propositions.
Hell we are in the middle of 2005. To ensure that the 2006 poll is not corrupt, new laws, systems and oversight will all need to be in place | | |
