____________________________________________________________

H-DIPLO ROUNDTABLE

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, _The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese
Relations, 2 vols, Volume 1, _Between War and Peace, 1696-1985_, Volume 2,
_Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998 (Berkeley, California: International and
Area Studies Publication, University of California at Berkeley, 1998).

Hiroshi Kimura, _Distant Neighbours, 2 vols, Volume 1, _Japanese-Russian
Relations under Brezhnev and Andropov_, Volume 2, _Japanese-Russian
Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin_ (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2000).

Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux

Reviewers: Tsuneo Akaha, Tuomas Forsberg, Peggy Meyer, Alexei Zagorsky

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Commentary by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

University of California, Santa Barbara

Russo-Japanese relations are not necessarily a hot topic that excites many
specialists in international history. Therefore, I am gratified to read
the reviews of my and Kimura's books. I hope that this roundtable
discussion will generate wide interest in this important, but grossly
neglected subject.

Professor Kimura has been a most generous colleague, who has been willing
to share materials and exchange opinions with me, although he is well
aware that our views are different. I respect his views formed by his long
years of assiduous research. As Peggy Falkenheim Meyer points out, his
views are close to Japan's official position, and have wide support from
the Japanese public.

As the reviewers correctly comment that, although Kimura and I share some
common views on some important points, we have vastly different
interpretations on the history of Russo-Japanese relations, the nature of
the territorial dispute, and the proposed solution to the territorial
problem. It is important, I believe, that these differences should be
openly debated, since these differences have important implications not
only for the future of Russo-Japanese relations, but also for the future
of the international order in Northeast Asia.

Space does not allow me to comment on all the points raised by the
reviewers. I would like to limit myself to the following four points: (1)
significance of Russo-Japanese relations; (2) nature of the territorial
dispute; (3) approaches to the past Russo-Japanese negotiations; and (4)
future prospect for the solution to the territorial dispute.

Significance of Russo-Japanese Relations:

How important are Russo-Japanese relations, and what difference does it
make if they fail to achieve rapprochement? If Russo-Japanese relations
have only marginal significance in world politics and in international
relations in Northeast Asia, who cares whether they have quarreled over
four tiny islands in the Kurils for more than half a century and will
continue to quarrel in the foreseeable future?

My view is that rapprochement between Russia and Japan is the linchpin for
forging a stable international order in Northeast Asia, without which
Russia's entry into the Asian economy, the construction of a stable Asian
security system, Japan's overcoming of the legacy of the past, and hence
Japan's true integration (not merely its economic muscle power) into the
Asian community will unlikely be achieved. If we think that China poses a
great challenge for the future of Asia, and if we believe that diffusing
the crisis in the Korean peninsula is the crucial agenda for the stability
of Asia, the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations cannot be dismissed
as having marginal significance. Russia's weapons export to Asian
countries have a potential danger of destabilizing Asian security.
Depletion of forest and ocean resources in Russia, ecological devastation
that every day accelerates in the Russian Far East with frightening speed,
and the activities of organized crime engaged in exporting contraband
(especially crab), guns, narcotics, have already begun to affect Japan.
Russia's dumping of nuclear waste in the Japan Sea has raised concerns
among Russia's neighbors. The Russian Far East, chronically suffering from
an energy shortage, plans to build nuclear power stations. Given the low
safety culture in Russia, a nuclear disaster of the Chernobyl type cannot
easily be dismissed. And if we are interested in restoring the health of
the Asian economy, we cannot afford to see the Russian Far East sinking
deeper into black hole.

If Russo-Japanese rapprochement has important ramifications in the future
shape of international relations in Northeast Asia and the world, the
argument that Japan has very little to gain from rapprochement with Russia
except for the return of the Northern territories, as Kimura seems to
argue, appears, in my view, irresponsible and short-sighted. To place the
resolution of the Northern Territories dispute as the very top goal of
Japan's foreign policy and making it a precondition for rapprochement with
Russia is putting the cart before the horse.

Nature of the Territorial Dispute:

As for the relative weight of responsibilities for the failure to resolve
the territorial dispute, while Kimura takes the position that the
Russian/Soviet refusal to accept Japan's justifiable demand for the return
of all four disputed islands has been the root cause for the stalemate, I
believe that Japan is more at fault in preventing the resolution of the
dispute.

Here, I would like to make only two points. First, although Forsberg makes
the point that "many divergent views are more a matter of emphasis rather
than substance," we must strive to separate indisputable facts (substance)
from other facts over which different interpretations are possible
(emphasis). In my book I made thorough analyses on historical,
geographical, and legal claims advanced by both sides to justify their
respective positions on the territorial dispute, and came to the
conclusion that neither side has the complete monopoly of truth on this
issue. I will not repeat what I said in my book other than to say that it
is clear from historical records that the Japanese official
interpretations on the Shimoda Treaty of 1855, the St. Petersburg Treaty
of 1875, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Gromyko-Matsumoto
exchange of letters to justify its claim are as unconvincing as the Soviet
justification of its claim based on the Yalta agreement. One can disagree
with my views, but one can only do so on the basis of scholarly rebuttal
of the textual and historical evidence on which I base my conclusions.
Kimura's refusal to engage in debate on this issue diminishes the
credibility of his view that Japan's claim to the four islands should be a
self-evident truth.

As Zagorsky agrees with me, no matter how much both sides engage in
arguments on the respective merits of their legal and historical claims,
it is unlikely to come to a settlement of the territorial dispute. On the
contrary, trying to settle the dispute on the basis of law and history
will only reinforce mutual recriminations, as the working group sessions
in 1988-91 clearly demonstrated. I am absolutely convinced that the
resolution of the territorial dispute can be attained only by mutual
concessions.

Why then do I believe, as Kimura does, Japan's claim that the four islands
should be ultimately returned to Japan? My position stems from the
historical fact that the disputed four islands remained, indisputably and
without being questioned by Russia/the Soviet Union, a part of the
Japanese territory before August 1945. This is a widely held consensus in
Japan, and any deviation from this principle is not a politically viable
option.

Kimura is absolutely correct in arguing that until 1945, when the Soviet
troops occupied the disputed islands after the Japanese Emperor accepted
the Potsdam Declaration, the disputed islands had never belonged to Russia
and the Soviet Union. The Soviet acquisition of the Kurils was a
quintessential example of Stalin's expansionism, as Zagorskii and other
Russian scholars themselves have pointed out. I believe that it is the
task of the Russians themselves to remove that stench if the newly created
Russia is serious about overcoming the Stalinist legacy.

But there is a hitch, which is my second point. Russo-Japanese relations
in the past have been characterized by the tragic repetitions of a
zero-sum game, in which the victor of war grabbed a chunk of the other's
territory, provoking the inevitable irredentism. During the Portsmouth
negotiations after the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's chief negotiator,
Sergei Witte, strenuously objected to Japan's claim that southern Sakhalin
be ceded to Japan as a war trophy, arguing that the victor slicing a part
of the territory of a defeated nation would establish a lamentable
precedent that would poison the future relations between the two
countries. Without heeding Witte's prescient warning, Japan forced Russia
to give up southern Sakhalin. (To avoid misunderstanding, I might add here
that the Kurils were never a part of the contested territories between
Russia and Japan until 1945. Russia and Japan drew the border between
Etorofu and Uruppu in 1855, affirming that what is known in Japan as the
Northern Territories belonged to Japan, and in 1875, Russia ceded all the
Kurils to Japan in exchange for Sakhalin.)

The Northern Territories issue, in my view, must be placed in the larger
context of Japan's foreign/military policy in Asia in the 20th century.
Above all, it must be remembered that the loss of the disputed islands
took place during the Pacific War, in which the Soviet actions had the
approval of the United States, Britain, and China. Here is a huge
difference between Kimura and myself. While Kimura isolates Russo-Japanese
relations as bilateral issues, I place them in a broader historical
context. In my view, the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia is
integrally connected with the question of how, and whether Japan will be
able to deal with its own past as much as it is related to Russia's
obligation to come to terms with its Stalinist legacy. One cannot single
out Soviet-Japanese relations, entirely detaching them from this larger
context, treating them as if Soviet-Japanese relations began only after
the Soviet violation of the Neutrality Pact on August 9, 1945.

The reason why I believe the return of all four disputed islands to Japan
should ultimately be realized is to put an end to the patterns of the
past, in which the victor claims a part of the other's territory as a war
trophy, and to found a new partnership on a totally new principle
unencumbered by past tragedies.

Approaches to Russo-Japanese Relations:

I would like to make an obvious point: in examining bilateral relations,
we must apply the same yardstick equally to both sides. I completely agree
with Kimura's analysis of Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's approach to Japan.
Both consistently placed Japan into the lower priority among competing
foreign policy agenda, postponing this difficult problem until it became
too late; their "learning process" was too slow, and concessions came "too
little, too late." Kimura, however, does not apply the same approach to
the Japanese side. Didn't the Japanese government also place the Soviet
Union constantly as a lower priority item in its foreign policy? Didn't
its "learning process" remain too slow? And didn't its concessions come
"too little and too late"? In fact, I argued in my book at length that at
major turning points Japan's reaction was "too late, too little" to induce
a change of policy on the Russian side. If Kimura blames the
responsibility of "the epistemological community" in the Soviet Union, how
about the responsibility of Japan's influential "epistemological
community" that has insisted, and still insists, on the resolution of the
territorial issue as the precondition of rapprochement?

What separates Kimura and myself is our difference views on the
fundamental nature of Russo-Japanese relations. To Kimura the resolution
of the Northern Territories question is the most fundamental issue that
should govern Japan's policy toward Russia. In my view, this view ignores
the importance of rapprochement between the two countries in the larger
framework of Northeast Asian international relations.

Suggestions for the Solution of the Territorial Dispute:

Agreeing with Kimura's view that the territorial dispute can be solved
only by Russia's accepting Japan's demand for the return of all four
disputed islands, Zagorsky criticizes my proposal for the two-stage
solution as unrealistic. Although I believe that the return of all the
disputed islands is a justifiable demand on Japan's part, I do not believe
that up until now there ever have existed domestic political conditions in
the Soviet Union and Russia to accept that demand. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that in the near future the Russian domestic situation will
drastically change in such a way that a consensus will emerge to accept
Japan's demand. If the Bismarck's dictum that politics is the art of the
possible, then what is the sense of seeking a political goal, however
justifiable, that has no possibility of being achieved? One must also keep
in mind that while Japan was seeking, and seeks this elusive phantom, the
Soviet Union/Russia has occupied, now occupies, and will continue to
occupy the disputed islands.

It is regrettable that the Russian side has not come up with a more
imaginable solution. Nevertheless, as long as it is Russia that occupies
the disputed territory, time is on Russia's side. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon Japan to come up with a more flexible, imaginable
compromise solution, acceptable to the Russian side, at least as the
initial step. The only common ground that both sides can agree on is the
1956 Joint Declaration. That is why I advocate the two stage-solution:
return of two islands (Habomai and Shikotan), as stipulated in the Joint
Declaration of 1956, and continuing negotiations on the other two islands
(Kunashiri and Etorofu), and on that basis to conclude a treaty of peace
and friendship. It is absolutely essential to break the logjam, and
establish a concrete, positive precedent, demonstrating to the Russian
public that the return of the islands will bring great benefits to Russia.
The paradox of the Northern Territories dispute is that as long as Japan
makes it a huge political issue, the Russian side is tempted to exploit it
to its advantage. The less expensive the cost of sacrifice becomes, the
easier it become to resolve the dispute.

Of course, as Zagorsky and Kimura predict, this interim solution will not
remove the irritant between the two countries completely since the two
sides will have to continue negotiations on the other two islands. But as
the realm of cooperation becomes widened and the level of cooperation
intensified, the atmosphere for resolving the remaining issue will become
easier. Moreover, the alternative to my proposal is bleak: it is
tantamount to postponing the resolution of this question indefinitely,
thereby making it impossible to forge a stable international system in
Asia. As I argued in my book, there have been a number of opportunities in
the past that, had Japan accepted a two-stage compromise solution, might
have led to the return of the two smaller islands, thus serving as a
springboard for more vibrant relations between the two countries, and for
the ultimate resolution of the territorial dispute. Ironically, it is
those who have stood firm, shouting loudest for the return of all four
islands that have prevented Japan from gaining any part of the lost
territory.

It is difficult to predict the future prospect of this compromise solution
being accepted by Japan and Russia. The development since (now former)
foreign minister Tanaka Makiko assumed the stewardship of Japan's foreign
policy seems to have set history's clock back to an inflexible position.
Nevertheless, it is also true that there have been some positive signs of
renewed closer cooperation between the two countries after the September
11 event. Perhaps, it is still premature to speak of a breakthrough, given
a number of obstacles that exist on both sides, as all the reviewers
explain. But I am convinced that as long as Japan is not willing to
consider the two-stage solution, and stands firm for the return of all
islands as the first and necessary step for rapprochement, as Kimura and
Zagorsky advocate, the Northern Territories dispute will continue to be
the permanent fixture of international relations in Northeast Asia for a
long time to come. Sadly, the losers in this pessimistic scenario will be
Japan and Russia themselves, and all neighboring nations interested in
forging stable international relations in Northeast Asia.


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