Spinoza's Ethics, Part 1

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as

though it were part of the original text. Occasional bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,

are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the

omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth.

This version contains some awkward repetitions of the word ‘God’. They could be avoided through the use

of pronouns, but they present us with an unattractive choice. Using ‘he’, ‘him’, ‘his’ etc. of God invites the reader,

over and over again, to think of God as a person; while using ‘it’, ‘itself’ etc. pokes the reader in the ribs, over and

over again, with reminders that God is not a person. The former choice misrepresents Spinoza’s doctrine (his other

name for God is ‘Nature’), while the latter misrepresents his style. Writing in Latin, which lacks the distinction

between personal and impersonal pronouns, he didn’t have this problem.

First launched: July 2004

Amended: April 2007

* * * * *

Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order

By Benedict Spinoza

Part I: God

Definitions

D1: In calling something ‘cause of itself’ I mean that its essence involves existence, i.e. that its

nature can’t be conceived except as existing.

D2: A thing is said to be ‘finite in its own kind’ if it can be limited by something else of the same

nature.

For example, every body counts as ‘finite in its own kind’ because we can always conceive

another body that is even bigger. And a thought can be limited by - ·i.e. can count as finite

because of· - another thought ·that somehow exceeds it·. But a body can’t be limited by a thought

or a thought by a body.

D3: By ‘substance’ I understand: what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. that whose

concept doesn’t have to be formed out of the concept of something else.

D4: By ‘attribute’ I understand: what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its

essence.

D5: By ‘mode’ I understand: a state of a substance, i.e. something that exists in and is conceived

through something else.

D6: By ‘God’ I understand: a thing that is absolutely infinite, i.e. a substance consisting of an

infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

I say ‘absolutely infinite’ in contrast to ‘infinite in its own kind’. If something is infinite

only in its own kind, there can be attributes that it doesn’t have; but if something is absolutely

infinite its essence ·or nature· contains every positive way in which a thing can exist - ·which

means that it has all possible attributes·.

D7: A thing is called ‘free’ if its own nature - with no input from anything else - makes it

necessary for it to exist and causes it to act as it does. We say that a thing is ‘compelled’ if

something other than itself makes it exist and causes it to act in this or that specific way.

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D8: By ‘eternity’ I understand: existence itself when conceived to follow necessarily from the

definition of the eternal thing.

A thing is eternal only if it is absolutely (logically) necessary that the thing exists; for

something to be eternal it isn’t merely a matter of its existing at all times - it must necessarily

exist.

Axioms

A1: Whatever exists is either in itself or in something else. ·As we have already seen, a substance

is in itself, a mode is in something else·.

A2: What can’t be conceived through something else must be conceived through itself.

A3: From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and, conversely, if there is no

determinate cause no effect can follow.

A4: Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause.

A5: If two things have nothing in common, they can’t be understood through one another - i.e.

the concept of one doesn’t involve the concept of the other.

A6: A true idea must agree with its object.

A7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing then its essence doesn’t involve existence.

1: A substance is prior in nature to its states.

This is evident from D3 and D5.

2: Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.

This also evident from D3. For each ·substance· must be in itself and be conceived through

itself, which is to say that the concept of the one doesn’t involve the concept of the other.

3: If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them can’t be the cause of

the other.

If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by A5) they can’t be understood

through one another, and so (by A4) one can’t be the cause of the other.

4: Two or more things are made distinct from one another either by a difference in their

attributes or by a difference in their states.

Whatever exists is either in itself or in something else (by A1), which is to say (by D3 and

D5) that outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their states. So there

is nothing outside the intellect through which things can be distinguished from one another

except substances (which is to say (by D4) their attributes) and their states.

5: In Nature there cannot be two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one

another by a difference either in their attributes or in their states (by 4). If they are

distinguished only by a difference in their attributes, then any given attribute can be

possessed by only one of them. Suppose, then, that they are distinguished by a difference in

their states. But a substance is prior in nature to its states (by 1), so we can set the states

aside and consider the substance in itself; and then there is nothing left through which one

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substance can be conceived as distinguished from another, which by 4 amounts to saying

that we don’t have two or more substances ·with a single attribute·, but only one.

6: One substance can’t be produced by another substance.

In Nature there can’t be two substances that share an attribute (by 5), that is (by 2), there

can’t be two substances that have something in common with each other. Therefore (by 3)

one substance can’t be the cause of another, or be caused by it.

Corollary: A substance can’t be produced by anything else.

In Nature there are only substances and their states (as is evident from A1, D3, and D5).

But a substance can’t be produced by a·nother· substance (by 6). Therefore, a substance

can’t be produced by anything else at all.

This corollary is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its

contradictory. If a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it

would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by 4). And so (by D3) it wouldn’t be

a substance.

7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.

A substance can’t be produced by anything else (by the corollary to 6), so it must be its own

cause; and that, by D1, is to say that its essence necessarily involves existence, or that it

pertains to its nature to exist.

8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.

[The difficult demonstration of 8 has this at its core: if x is finite then it is limited by

something of the same kind as itself, i.e. something that shares an attribute with it; but no

substance shares an attribute with any other substance, so no substance can be limited in this

way, so every substance is infinite.]

First note on 7 and 8: Since finiteness is partly negative, while being infinite is an unqualifiedly

·positive· affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from 7 alone that every substance

must be infinite; for in calling a substance ‘finite’ we partly, because of the negative element in

finiteness, deny existence to its nature, and according to 7 that is absurd.

Second note on 7 and 8: I’m sure that the proof of 7 will be found difficult to grasp by people

who judge things confusedly and haven’t been accustomed to understanding things through their

first causes. Such people don’t distinguish the qualities of substances from the substances

themselves, and they don’t know how things are produced. This brings it about that they

fictitiously ascribe to substances the ·sort of· beginning that they see natural things to have; for

those who don’t know the true causes of things confuse everything, and have no difficulty

supposing that both trees and men speak, that men are formed both from stones and from seed,

and that anything can be changed into anything else! So, also, those who confuse the divine nature

with human nature easily ascribe human character-traits to God, particularly when they are also

ignorant of how those traits are produced in the ·human· mind.

But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt of the truth

of 7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for everyone . . . . For by ‘substance’ they would

understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. that the knowledge of which

doesn’t require the knowledge of anything else; and by ‘quality’ they would understand what is

in something else, something the concept of which is formed from the concept of the thing in

which it is.

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[Spinoza then has an extremely difficult paragraph, omitted here. Its premises are that

substances exist and are conceived through themselves, and that qualities or states exist and are

conceived through something else. From these Spinoza seems to infer that we can have legitimate

thoughts of states or qualities that ‘don’t actually exist’, presumably meaning that nothing actually

has them, whereas we can’t have the thought of a substance that doesn’t exist ‘outside the

intellect’.]

Hence, if someone said that he had a clear and distinct (i.e. true) idea of a substance, and

nevertheless wondered whether such a substance existed, that would amount to saying that he had

a true idea and wondered whether it was false. (You’ll see that this is right if you think about it.)

Or if someone says that a substance has been created, he is saying that a false idea has become

true! Of course nothing more absurd can be conceived. So it must be admitted that the existence

of a substance is an eternal truth, just as its essence is.

This lets us infer in another way that there can’t be two substances that have the same

nature - I think the inference is worth presenting ·in the remainder of this Note·. Four needed

preliminaries to the argument:

The true definition of each thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the

nature of the thing defined.

From which it follows that

No definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals,

since a definition expresses only the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of

triangle expresses only the simple nature of the triangle, not any particular number of triangles. It

should also be noted that

There must be, for each existing thing, a certain cause for its existing.

Finally, it should be noted that

The cause on account of which a thing exists must either be contained in the very nature

and definition of the existing thing (which means that it pertains to the nature of the thing to

exist) or be outside it.

From these propositions it follows that if in Nature a certain number of individuals exists, there

must be a cause why just those individuals exist and not more or fewer.

For example, if twenty men exist in Nature - and for clarity’s sake let’s assume that they

are the first men to exist and that they all exist at the same time - how are we to explain this? To

show why there are exactly twenty men, no more and no fewer, it doesn’t suffice to show the

cause of human nature in general. For (by

) there must be a cause why each particular man exists.

But this cause (by

and

) can’t be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of

man doesn’t involve the number twenty. So (by

) the cause why these twenty men exist - and

thus why each of them exists - must lie outside each of them.

From that it follows that if something has a nature such that there can be many individuals

·of that nature·, there must be an external cause of its existing. Now, since it pertains to the nature

of a substance to exist (already shown in this note), its definition must involve necessary

existence, and so its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But, as we have shown in

and

, the existence of a number of substances can’t follow from a definition. So it follows from

this that there can exist only one substance having a given nature.

9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.

This is evident from D4.

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10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.

An attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a substance, as constituting its

essence (by D4); so (by D3) it must be conceived through itself.

Note on 10: From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes can be conceived

to be really distinct (each conceived without the aid of the other), we still can’t infer from that

that they constitute - ·i.e. constitute the natures of, i.e. are possessed by· - two different

substances. . . . It is far from absurd to ascribe many attributes to one substance. Indeed, nothing

in Nature is clearer than that each thing must be conceived under some attribute, and the more

reality a thing has the more attributes it has - attributes that express necessity, or eternity and

infinity. So it is utterly clear that an absolutely infinite thing must be defined (as in D6) as a thing

that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

If you want to know how we can tell when there are many substances, read on: in the

following propositions I shall show that in Nature there exists only one substance, which is

absolutely infinite. So there is nothing to ‘tell’.

11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes each of which expresses eternal and

infinite essence, necessarily exists.

If God didn’t exist, then (by A7) God’s essence would not involve existence; and (by 7) that

is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

A second proof: For each thing there must be assigned a cause or reason for its

existence (if it exists) and for its nonexistence (if it doesn’t). . . . This reason or cause must

be either contained in, or lie outside of, the nature of the thing. For example, the very nature

of a square circle indicates the reason why it doesn’t exist, namely because it involves a

contradiction; and the very nature of a substance explains why it does exist, because that

nature involves existence (see 7). But the reason why [

changing Spinoza’s example]

a coin

exists, or why it doesn’t exist, does not follow from its nature but from the order of the

whole of the physical world. For from this ·order· it must follow either that the coin

necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.

These things are self-evident. From them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if

there is no reason or cause that prevents it from existing. So if there is no reason or cause

that prevents God from existing or takes God’s existence away, it certainly follows that

God necessarily exists.

But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to be either in God’s very

nature or outside it and in another substance of a different nature. It couldn’t be in a

substance of the same nature as God’s, for the supposition that there is such a substance is,

itself, the supposition that God exists. So it would have to be a substance of a nature

different from God’s; but such a substance would have nothing in common with God (by 2)

and so could neither give existence to God nor take it away. So a reason or cause that takes

away God’s existence couldn’t lie outside the divine nature.

It would, then, have to be in God’s nature itself. That would mean that God’s nature

involved a contradiction, ·like the square circle·. But it is absurd to affirm this of a thing that

is absolutely infinite and supremely perfect. (·That is because a contradiction must involve

something of the form ‘P and not-P - a ‘square circle’ would be something that was ‘square

and not square’ because ‘not square is contained in the meaning of ‘circle’ - and a thing

that is infinite and perfect is one whose nature involves nothing negative, so nothing of the

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contradictory form·.) So there is no cause or reason - either in God or outside God - that

takes God’s existence away. Therefore God necessarily exists.

A third proof [

slightly expanded from Spinoza’s very compact statement of it]

: To be unable

to exist is to lack power, and conversely to be able to exist is to have power (this is self-

evident). Now, suppose that God doesn’t exist but some finite things do exist necessarily. In

that case, these finite things are more powerful than an absolutely infinite thing (because

they can exist and the absolutely infinite thing can’t). But this is self-evidently absurd. So

either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite thing also exists. But we exist, either in

ourselves as substances that necessarily exist or as qualities of something else that

necessarily exists (see A1 and 7). Therefore an absolutely infinite thing - that is (by D6) God

- necessarily exists.

Note on the third proof of 11: In this last demonstration I wanted to show God’s existence a

posteriori (·bringing in the contingent fact that we exist·), so as to make the demonstration easier

to grasp - but not because God’s existence doesn’t follow a priori from the same premises. For

since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing

the more powers it has, of itself, to exist. Therefore an absolutely infinite thing (God) has of itself

an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, God exists absolutely.

Still, there may be many who won’t easily see the force of this proof because they have

been accustomed to think only about things that flow from external causes. And of those things

they see that the ones that quickly and easily come into existence also easily perish. And

conversely, they judge that complicated and intricately structured things are harder to produce,

i.e. that they don’t exist so easily. I might free them from these prejudices by looking into what

truth there is in the proposition that what quickly comes to be quickly perishes, and considering

whether all things are equally easy in respect to the whole of Nature (·I think they are·). But I

shan’t go into any of that. All I need here is to point out that I am here speaking not of things that

come into existence from external causes but only of substances, which (by 6) can’t be produced

by any external cause.

For things that come to exist from external causes - whether they have many parts or few -

owe all their perfection or reality to the power of the external cause; and therefore their existence

arises only from the perfection of their external cause and not from their own perfection. On the

other hand, whatever perfection a substance has is not due to any external cause; so its existence

must follow from its nature alone; so its existence is nothing but its essence.

So perfection doesn’t take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it.

But imperfection takes it away. So there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain

than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite thing, i.e. a perfect thing, i.e. God. For since

God’s essence excludes all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it

removes every cause of doubting God’s existence and gives the greatest certainty concerning it. I

think this will be clear to you even if you are only moderately attentive!

12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the

substance can be divided.

Suppose that a substance can be conceived as being divisible; then either its parts will also

have the nature of the substance or they won’t. If they do, then (by 8) each part will be

infinite, and (by 7) will be its own cause; and (by 5) each part will have to consist of a

different attribute. And so many substances can be formed from one, which is absurd (by 6).

Furthermore, the parts would have nothing in common with their whole (by 2), and the

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whole (by D4 and 10) could exist without its parts and be conceived without them; and no-

one can doubt that that is absurd.

But if on the other hand the parts do not retain the nature of substance, then

dividing the whole substance into equal parts would deprive it of the nature of substance,

meaning that it would cease to exist; and (by 7) that is absurd.

13: A substance that is absolutely infinite is indivisible.

If it were divisible, its parts would either retain the nature of an absolutely infinite substance

or they wouldn’t. If they did, then there would be a number of substances of the same

nature, which (by 5) is absurd. If they didn’t, then (as in 12) an absolutely infinite substance

could ·be divided into such parts and thereby· cease to exist, which (by 11) is also absurd.

Corollary: No substance is divisible, and thus no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance,

is divisible. [

This use of ‘insofar as’ is explained on page 9 below, just above the start of section V.]

Note on 12-13: That substance is indivisible can be understood more simply merely from this:

the nature of substance can’t be conceived other than as infinite, whereas ‘a part of a substance’

can only mean a finite substance, which (by 8) implies a plain contradiction.

14: God is the only substance that can exist or be conceived.

Since God is an absolutely infinite thing, of whom no attribute expressing an essence of

substance can be denied (by 6), and God necessarily exists (by 11), if there were a substance

other than God it would have to be explained through some attribute of God; ·but

explanations can flow only within attributes, not from one attribute to another·; and so two

substances with an attribute in common would exist, which (by 5) is absurd. So no

substance other than God can exist; and none such can be conceived either, for if it could be

conceived it would have to be conceived as existing, and the first part of this demonstration

shows that to be absurd. Therefore, God is the only substance that can exist or be

conceived.

First corollary: God is unique, i.e. (by 6) in Nature there is only one substance, and it is

absolutely infinite.

Second corollary: An extended thing and a thinking thing are either attributes of God or (by A1)

states of God’s attributes.

15: Whatever exists is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.

14 secures that apart from God there cannot exist (or be conceived) any substance, i.e. (by

D3) any thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But (by D5) modes can’t exist

or be conceived without a substance ·that they are modes of·. So modes can exist only in the

divine nature, and can be conceived only through that nature. But (by A1) substances and

modes are all there is. Therefore, everything is in God and nothing can be or be conceived

without God.

Note on 15: [

This text follows Curley in numbering sections of this note, and of the note on 17 and the

Appendix, as an aid to reference.]

I. Some people imagine a God who is like a man, consisting of a

body and a mind, and subject to passions. But how far they wander from the true knowledge of

God is shown well enough by what I have already demonstrated, and I shan’t talk about them any

more. Everyone who has to any extent contemplated the divine nature denies that God is

corporeal. This is best proved from the fact that by ‘a body’ we understand a quantity that has

length, breadth, and depth, limited by some specific shape. Nothing could be more absurd than

to say this about God, i.e. about a thing that is infinite [

= ‘unlimited’]

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In trying to demonstrate this same conclusion by different arguments from mine, some

people clearly show that ·as well as denying that God is or has a body· they conclude that the

divine nature doesn’t in any way involve corporeal or extended substance. They maintain that the

corporeal world, ·rather than being part of God’s nature·, has been created by God. But by what

divine power could it be created? They have no answer to that, which shows clearly that they

don’t understand what they are saying.

At any rate, I have demonstrated clearly enough - in my judgment, at least - that no

substance can be produced or created by any other (see the corollary to 6 and the second note on

8). Next, I have shown (14) that God is the only substance that can exist or be conceived, and

from this I have inferred in the second corollary to 14 that extended substance is one of God’s

infinite attributes. To explain all this more fully, I shall refute my opponents’ arguments, which all

come down to these two.

II. First, they think that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists of parts.

From this they infer that it cannot be infinite, and thus cannot pertain to God. They explain this

through many examples, of which I shall mention three.

If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let us conceive it to be divided into two parts.

If each part is finite, then an infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If each part

is infinite, then there is one infinite twice as large as another, which is also absurd. Again, if an

infinite quantity is measured by parts each equal to a foot, it will consist of infinitely many of

them, as it will also if it is measured by parts each equal to an inch. So one infinite number will be

twelve times as great as another, which is no less absurd. Finally, suppose that from one point in

something of infinite extent two lines are extended to infinity. Although near the beginning they

are a certain determinate distance apart, the distance between them is continuously increased ·as

they lengthen·, until finally it stops being determinate and becomes indeterminable; ·which is also

absurd·. Since these absurdities follow - so they think - from the supposition of an infinite

quantity, they infer that corporeal substance must be finite and consequently cannot pertain to

God’s essence.

III. Their second argument is also drawn from God’s supreme perfection. For, they say,

God as a supremely perfect thing cannot be acted on. But corporeal substance, since it is divisible,

can be acted on; ·anything that is divisible can be pulled apart by outside forces·. So it follows that

corporeal substance does not pertain to God’s essence.

IV. These are the arguments that I find being used by authors who want to show that

corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot have anything to do with it. But

anyone who is properly attentive will find that I have already replied to them, since these

arguments are based wholly on the supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts,

which I have already (12 and corollary to 13) shown to be absurd. Anyone who wants to consider

the matter rightly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed that’s what they are) from which

they infer that extended substance is finite don’t at all follow from the supposition of an infinite

quantity, but from supposing that an infinite quantity might be measurable and composed of

finite parts. All they are entitled to infer from the absurdities they have uncovered is that infinite

quantity is not measurable and is not composed of finite parts. This is just what I have already

demonstrated above (12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at me turns against themselves. . . .

Others, imagining that a line is composed of points, know how to invent many arguments

showing that a line can’t be divided to infinity. And indeed it is just as absurd to say that corporeal

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substance is composed of bodies, or parts, as it is to say that a body is composed of surfaces, the

surfaces of lines, and the lines of points.

This must be admitted by all those who know that clear reason is infallible, and especially

those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided into parts that

were really distinct, why couldn’t one part be annihilated while the rest remained inter-related as

before (·thus creating a vacuum·)? Why must they all be so fitted together that there is no

vacuum? If two things are really distinct from one another ·rather than being different modes or

aspects of a single substance·, one of them can stay where it is whatever the other does. But there

isn’t any vacuum in Nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere, ·namely in my Descartes’s Principles,

part 2, propositions 2 and 3·); all the parts of Nature do have to hang together so that there is no

vacuum; so it follows that those parts are not really distinct from one another, ·i.e. that they are

not distinct things·, which is to say that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be

divided. [

Spinoza means that it isn’t subject to divisions that go all the way down, so to speak - divisions that

really split it up into separate things. He does allow that corporeal substance - i.e. the entire material world - can be

divided into (for example) wet bits and dry bits, soft bits and hard bits; but none of these bits is an independent and

self-sufficient thing. Its existence consists merely in the fact that the extended world - which is God considered

under the attribute of extension - has a certain property at a certain location.]

V. Why are we by nature so inclined to divide quantity? The answer involves the fact that

we have two ways of thinking about quantity: we can think of it abstractly or superficially, which

is how we depict it to ourselves in our imagination; and we can also think of it as substance,

which is done by the intellect alone without help from the imagination. If we attend to quantity as

it is in the imagination - which we often do, finding it easy - it will be found to be finite, divisible,

and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is

a substance - which we don’t do often, finding it hard - then (as I have already sufficiently

demonstrated) it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible.

This will be clear enough to anyone who knows how to distinguish the intellect from the

imagination - particularly if he bears in mind that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are

distinguished in it only through our conceiving it to have different qualities, so that its parts are

distinguished only modally but not really. [

That is: its parts have different qualities or modes, but are not

genuinely and deeply distinct things. ‘Really’ (Latin realiter) comes from the Latin res, meaning ‘thing’.]

For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another -

considered as water, but not considered as corporeal substance, for considered as substance it is

neither separated nor divided. Again, water considered as water can come into existence and go

out of existence, but considered as substance it can do neither. ·When water considered as water

goes out of existence, what happens at the level of substance is, roughly speaking, that an area in

the one extended substance changes from being wet to being dry·.

VI. I think this also answers the second argument - ·the one in III above· - because that is

based on the supposition that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and made up of parts.

Even if this reply were not sufficient, ·the argument would not succeed, because· there is no

reason why divisibility should be unworthy of the divine nature. For (by 14) apart from God there

can be no substance by which the divine nature would be acted on, ·and so God’s being made up

of parts would not bring with it a vulnerability to a dismantling attack from the outside, so to

speak·. All things, I repeat, are in God, and whatever happens does so through the laws of God’s

infinite nature and follows (as I’ll show) from the necessity of God’s essence. So it can’t be said in

any way that God is acted on by something else, or that extension is unworthy of the divine nature

- even if it is supposed to be divisible - provided that God is granted to be eternal and infinite.

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[

In 16 and its appendages, ‘unlimited’ translates a word that often means ‘infinite’.]

16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in

infinitely many ways i.e. everything that can fall under an unlimited intellect.

This proposition must be plain to anyone who attends to the fact that the intellect infers

from a thing’s definition a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e.

from the very essence of the thing); and that the more reality the definition of the thing

expresses, i.e. the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves, the more

properties the intellect infers. But the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6),

each of which also expresses an essence that is infinite in its own kind, and so from its

necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite ways (i.e. everything that can

fall under an unlimited intellect).

First corollary to 16: God is the efficient cause of all things that can fall under an unlimited

intellect. [

An ‘efficient cause’ is just what we today call a cause. It used to be contrasted to ‘final cause’: to assign

an event a final cause was to explain it in terms of its purpose, what it occurred for. See pages 18-19 below.]

Second corollary to 16: God is a cause through himself/itself and not an accidental cause.

Third corollary to 16: God is the absolutely first cause.

17: God acts from the laws of the divine nature alone, and isn’t compelled by anything.

I have just shown (16) that from the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the

same thing) from the laws of God’s nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow; and in

15 I have demonstrated that nothing can be or be conceived without God - that all things

are in God. So there can’t be anything outside God by which God could be caused or

compelled to act. Therefore, God acts from the laws of the divine nature alone, and isn’t

compelled by anything.

First corollary to 17: There is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God

to action, except the perfection of the divine nature.

Second corollary to 17: God alone is a free cause.

God alone exists only from the necessity of the divine nature (by 11 and first corollary to

14), and acts from the necessity of the divine nature (by 17). Therefore (by D7) God alone

is a free cause.

Note on 17: I. Some people think, regarding the things that I have said follow from God’s nature

(i.e. are in God’s power), that God could bring it about that they don’t happen, are not produced

by God; from which they infer that God is a free cause. But this is tantamount to saying that God

can bring it about that the nature of a triangle doesn’t require that its three angles are equal to two

right angles, or that from a given cause the effect would not follow - which is absurd.

Further, I shall show later, without help from 17, that God’s nature doesn’t involve either

intellect or will. I know of course that many think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect

and a free will pertain to God’s nature; for, they say, they know nothing they can ascribe to God

more perfect than what is the highest perfection in us.

Moreover, while thinking of God as actually understanding things in the highest degree,

they don’t believe that God can bring it about that all those understood things exist. For they

think that would destroy God’s power. If God had created all the things in the divine intellect

(they say), then God couldn’t have created anything more, which they believe to be incompatible

with God’s omnipotence. So these thinkers prefer to maintain that God has no leanings in any

direction, not creating anything except what God has decreed to create by some fundamental free

choice.

Page 11

But I think I have shown clearly enough (see 16) that from God’s supreme power or

infinite nature infinitely many things in infinitely many ways - i.e. all ·possible· things - have

necessarily flowed or do always follow, with the same necessity and in the same way as from the

nature of a triangle it follows from eternity that its three angles equal two right angles. So God’s

omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain actual to eternity. I think that this

maintains God’s omnipotence much better ·than does the view that there are things God could do

but chooses not to·.

Indeed - to be frank about it - my opponents seem to deny God’s omnipotence. For they

have to admit that God understands infinitely many creatable things which nevertheless God will

never be able to create. For creating everything that God understands to be creatable would

(according to them) exhaust God’s omnipotence and render God imperfect. To maintain that God

is perfect, therefore, they are driven to maintaining that God cannot bring about everything that

lies within the scope of the divine power. I don’t see how anything more absurd than this, or more

contrary to God’s omnipotence, could be dreamed up!

II. I shall add a point about the intellect and will that are commonly attributed to God. If

‘will’ and ‘intellect’ do pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must understand by each of

these something different from what men commonly understand by them. For the ‘intellect’ and

‘will’ that would constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and

will, not agreeing with them in anything but the name. They wouldn’t match one another any

more than Sirius the ‘dog-star’ matches the dog that is a barking animal. I shall demonstrate this.

We have intellect, and what we understand through it is either earlier than the act of

understanding (as most people think) or simultaneous with it; but if the divine nature includes

intellect, it can’t be like ours in this respect, because God is prior in causality to all things (by the

first corollary to 16). ·So far from its being the case that God’s intellect represents something

because the thing exists·, the fundamental nature of things is what it is because God’s intellect

represents it in that way. So God’s intellect, conceived as constituting the divine essence, is really

the cause of the essence and of the existence of things. Some writers seem to have realized this -

the ones who have said that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same.

Therefore, since God’s intellect is the only cause of things - of their essence as well as of

their existence - God must differ from other things both in essence and in existence. ·I shall

explain this·. Something that is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it gets from the

cause. For example, a man may be the cause of the existence of another man, but not of his

essence - ·i.e. not of the human nature that he has, not of the-possibility-of-being-human· - for the

latter is an eternal truth. So they can agree entirely in their essence, ·having the very same human

nature·. But they must differ in their existences: if one of the men goes out of existence, that need

not destroy the other’s existence. But if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false -

·that is, if it could become the case that there was no such thing as human nature, no possibility-

of-being-human· - then the essence of the other would also be destroyed.

So if something causes both the essence and the existence of some effect, it must differ in

essence and existence from the effect. But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of

the existence of our intellect. Therefore God’s intellect, conceived as constituting the divine

essence, differs from our intellect both in essence and in existence and can’t agree with it in

anything but in name - which is what I said. It is easy to see that there is a similar proof regarding

God’s will and our will.

Page 12

18: God is the in-dwelling and not the going-across cause of all things.

In-dwelling because: everything that exists is in God and must be conceived through God

(by 15), and so (by the first corollary to 16) God is the cause of all things that are in God.

Not going-across because: by 14 there can’t be anything outside God ·for God to act on·.

So God is the in-dwelling and not the going-across cause of all things.

[

The expressions ‘in-dwelling- and ‘going-across’ render technical terms of Spinoza’s that are usually translated

by ‘immanent’ and ‘transeunt’ respectively. The distinction itself is plain: I am the in-dwelling cause of my hand’s

moving when I move it, and the going-across cause of the fall of the tumbler that I knock off the table.]

19: God is eternal, and all God’s attributes are eternal.

God (by D6) is a substance which (by 11) necessarily exists, that is (by 7) to whose nature it

pertains to exist . . . . and therefore (by D8) God is eternal.

Next point: God’s attributes are to be understood (by D4) as what expresses an

essence of the Divine substance. So the attributes partake of the nature of substance, and I

have already shown (7) that eternity pertains to the nature of substance. Therefore each of

the attributes must involve eternity, and so they are all eternal.

Note on 19: This proposition is also utterly clear from my way of demonstrating God’s existence

(11), for that demonstration established that God’s existence is an eternal truth just as God’s

essence is. I have also demonstrated God’s eternity in another way in my Descartes’s Principles,

Part I, proposition 19, and there is no need to repeat that here.

20: God’s existence and God’s essence are one and the same.

God is eternal and so are all of God’s attributes (by 19), that is (by D8) each of God’s

attributes expresses existence. Therefore, the attributes of God that (by D4) explain God’s

eternal essence at the same time explain God’s eternal existence, which is to say that what

constitutes God’s essence also constitutes God’s existence. So God’s existence and God’s

essence are one and the same.

First corollary to 20: God’s existence, like God’s essence, is an eternal truth.

Second corollary to 20: God is unchangeable, i.e. all of God’s attributes are unchangeable.

If they changed as to their existence, they would also (by 20) change as to their essence. . . .

which is absurd.

21: All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have

always had to exist and be infinite, and are through the same attribute eternal and infinite.

[The lengthy and extremely difficult demonstration of this is constructed in the form

‘Suppose this is false . . .’ and then trying to deduce an absurdity from the supposition. For

the first part of the proposition it takes an example of what the ‘something that is finite and

has a limited existence or duration’ might be supposed to be, and makes the first part of the

proposition stand or fall with that example. For the second part of the proposition, it again

lets everything rest on an example, indeed the same example, of something that might be

supposed not to be eternal and infinite. The demonstration also gives trouble by allowing

heavy overlap between the first and second parts of the proposition.]

Page 13

22: Anything that follows from some attribute of God when it is modified ·or enriched or

added to· by a quality which that same attribute causes to exist necessarily and to be

infinite must itself also exist necessarily and be infinite.

The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of 21.

[21 concerns the likes of: what follows from God’s being extended. 22 concerns the likes

of: what follows from God’s involving motion and rest; this is not extension as such,

extension considered ‘absolutely’, but it necessarily follows from extension.]

23: Every mode that exists necessarily and is infinite must have followed either from the

absolute nature of some attribute of God - ·i.e. some attribute taken all by itself· - or from

some attribute that is modified - ·or enriched or added to· - by a quality that exists

necessarily and is infinite.

A mode is in something other than itself, through which it must be conceived (by D5), that

is (by 15) it is in God alone and can be conceived only through God. So if a mode is

thought of as existing necessarily and being infinite, it must be inferred from or perceived

through some attribute of God that is conceived to express infinity and necessity of

existence. It may follow from the absolute nature of the attribute - ·the unadorned

attribute, so to speak· - or from the attribute modified or enriched or added to by some

mediating quality which itself follows from the attribute’s absolute nature and is therefore

(by 22) necessarily existent and infinite.

24: The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

This is evident from D1. For if something’s nature involves existence, is its own cause,

existing only from the necessity of its own nature, ·and so cannot be caused by God·.

Corollary to 24: God is the cause not only of things’ beginning to exist, but also of their

continuing to exist.

If we attend to the essence of any caused thing - not considering whether the thing actually

exists or not - we shall find that this essence involves neither existence nor duration. So

such an essence can’t be the cause either of the thing’s coming into existence or of its

staying in existence; and the only cause of both is God (by the first corollary to 14).

25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence.

Suppose this is wrong. Then God isn’t the cause of the essence of things, and so (by A4)

the essence of things can be conceived without God. But (by 15) this is absurd. Therefore

God is also the cause of the essence of things.

Note on 25: This proposition follows more clearly from 16, which implies that from the given

divine nature both the essence of things and their existence must necessarily be inferred; and, in

brief, God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which God is said to be self-

caused. This will be established still more clearly from the following corollary.

Corollary to 25: Particular things are nothing but states of God’s attributes, or modes by which

[

= ‘ways in which’]

God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.

The demonstration is evident from 15 and D5.

26: A thing that has been caused to produce an effect has necessarily been caused in this

way by God; and one that has not been caused by God cannot cause itself to produce an

effect.

[The demonstration of this is omitted.]

Page 14

27: A thing that has been caused by God to produce an effect cannot make itself be

uncaused.

This proposition is evident from A3.

28: A particular thing (i.e. a thing that is finite and has a limited existence) can’t exist or be

caused to produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and produce an effect by another

cause that is also finite and has a limited existence; and the latter can’t exist or be caused to

produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and produce an effect by yet another . . . and so

on, to infinity.

[

Somewhat simplified version of the demonstration:]

Anything that follows necessarily from

something infinite and eternal must itself be infinite and eternal; so something that is finite

and has a limited existence - i.e. a finite item that comes into existence, lasts for a while, and

then goes out of existence - can’t be an upshot or effect of something infinite and eternal.

So its source must be of the other sort, i.e. must be finite and non-eternal. And that line of

thought re-applies to the latter item, and then to its source, and so on ad infinitum. Each

finite and temporally limited item is to be thought of not as something entirely other than

God, but rather as God-considered-as-having-such-and-such-attributes-and-modes.

[

In the following note, ‘infinite modes’ replaces Latin meaning ‘certain things’, and ‘finite modes’ replaces Latin

meaning ‘other things’. In an editorial footnote Curley argues that that’s the line Spinoza meant to draw here, and

his argument is overwhelmingly convincing.

]

Note on 28: The infinite modes - i.e. the ones that follow necessarily from God’s nature alone -

had to be produced by God immediately, and the finite modes had to be produced through the

mediation of the infinite modes (though the finite modes also can’t exist or be conceived without

God). Two things follow from this: [Spinoza’s formulations of the two points are hard to follow,

but it is clear enough what they mean:- The first of them brings in the notion of

x is the proximate cause of y in x’s own kind.

The force of in x’s own kind (never mind what exactly it means) is to soften or restrict the

proximate-cause claim; and Spinoza says that this is not the proximate-cause relation between

God and the infinite modes. He insists that

God is absolutely the proximate cause of the infinite modes,

meaning that God is their proximate cause period, with no qualifications or restrictions. The

reason he gives for this is that ‘God’s effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause

(by 15 and 24C)’. The second thing that Spinoza derives from the start of his Note on 28 is that

we should be wary of saying that God is the ‘remote’ or non-immediate or non-proximate cause

of the finite modes. It’s all right to say this if we mean only that the finite modes follow from

God’s nature through the infinite modes; but what is ordinarily meant by ‘x is a remote cause of y’

is that x and y are distinct from one another and are linked by a chain of items that are distinct

from both. And in that sense, Spinoza holds, God isn’t the ‘remote’ cause of anything.]

29: In Nature there is nothing contingent; all things have been caused by the necessity of

the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

Whatever exists is in God (by 15); and (by 11) God exists necessarily, not contingently.

Next, the modes of the divine nature - ·the ways in which God exists· - have also followed

from that nature necessarily (by 16) - either following from the divine nature just in itself

(by 21) or following from it considered as caused to act in a certain way (by 28). Further,

God is the cause not only of the existence of these modes (by corollary to 24) but also of

their having such-and-such causal powers. For if they hadn’t been caused by God, then (by

Page 15

26) they could not possibly have caused themselves. And conversely (by 27) if they have

been caused by God, it is impossible that they should render themselves uncaused. So all

things have been caused from the necessity of the divine nature not only to exist but to exist

in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way; and all of this is necessary, not

contingent. There is nothing contingent.

[At this point Spinoza inserts a note explaining in terms of his philosophy a pair of mediaeval

technical terms, the Latin of which can be translated as ‘naturing Nature’ (Nature as a cause) and

‘natured Nature’ (Nature as an effect) respectively. The distinction has attracted much attention

from scholars, but in itself it is fairly trivial, and it has no structural role in the Ethics. Spinoza

uses the terms only in 31, to which he makes no further reference anywhere in the work. The note

and that proposition are omitted from the present version, as is 30, which has almost no role

except in 31.]

32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.

The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode ·or way· of thinking. And so (by 28) each

volition - ·each act of the will· - can exist and be fit to produce an effect only if it is caused

by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. So the will requires

a cause by which it is caused to exist and produce an effect; and so (by D7) it cannot be

called a ‘free’ cause but only a necessary or compelled one.

That was based on the will’s being a finite entity to which 28 applies. Suppose it is

infinite, making 28 irrelevant to it. Then it falls under 23, which means that it has to be

caused to exist and produce an effect by God - this time by God-as-having-the-infinite-and-

eternal-essence-of-thought rather than God-as-having-this-or-that-temporary-and-local-

quality. So on this supposition also the will is not a free cause but a compelled one.

Corollary to 32: God doesn’t produce any effect through freedom of the will.

Second corollary to 32: Will and intellect are related to God’s nature as motion and rest are, and

as are absolutely all natural things, which (by 29) must be caused by God to exist and produce an

effect in a certain way.

The will, like everything else, requires a cause by which it is caused to exist and produce an

effect in a certain way. And although from a given will or intellect infinitely many things

may follow, God still can’t be said on that account to act from freedom of the will, any

more than God can be said to act from ‘freedom of motion and rest’ on account of the

things that follow from motion and rest! So will doesn’t pertain to God’s nature any more

than do other natural things; it is related to God in the same way as motion and rest . . . . ·In

short: acts of the will, such as human choices and decisions, are natural events with natural

causes, just as are (for example) collisions of billiard balls. And to attribute will to God,

saying that because the cause of each volition is God (= Nature) therefore God has choices

and makes decisions, is as absurd as to suppose that God is rattling around on the billiard

table·.

33: Things could not have been produced by God in any way or in any order other than

that in which they have been produced.

All things have necessarily followed from God’s given nature (by 16), and have been caused

from the necessity of God’s nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by 29).

To think of them as possibly being different in some way is, therefore, to think of God as

possibly being different; that is to think that there is some other nature that God could have

Page 16

- some other divine nature - and if such a nature is possible then it is actually instantiated,

which means that there are two Gods. But it is absurd to suppose that there could have

been two Gods. So things could not have been produced in any other way or in any other

order than they have been produced.

Note on 33: Since by these propositions I have made it as clear as day that there is absolutely

nothing in things on the basis of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain briefly

what we should understand by ‘contingent’ - but first, what we should understand by ‘necessary’

and ‘impossible’.

A thing is called ‘necessary’ either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For

a thing’s existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given

efficient cause. And a thing is also called ‘impossible’ for these same reasons - namely, either

because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause has been

caused to produce such a thing ·in which case the external causes that do exist will have been

enough to prevent the thing from existing·.

A thing is called ‘contingent’ only because of a lack of our knowledge. If we don’t know

that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction, or if we know quite well that its essence doesn’t

involve a contradiction, but we can’t say anything for sure about its existence because the order of

causes is hidden from us, it can’t seem to us either necessary or impossible. So we call it

‘contingent’ or ‘·merely· possible’.

Second note on 33: From this it clearly follows that things have been produced by God with the

highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a most perfect nature. God’s

producing everything there is doesn’t mean that God is in any way imperfect. The suggestion that

God could have acted differently is, as I have shown, absurd. . . .

I’m sure that many people will reject my view as absurd, without even being willing to

examine it. Of course they will! because they have been accustomed to credit God with having an

absolute will - ·i.e. with just non-causally deciding what to do· - which attributes to God a

‘freedom’ quite different from what I have taught (D7). But I am also sure that if they would

consent to reflect on the matter, and pay proper attention to my chain of our demonstrations, they

would end up utterly rejecting the ‘freedom’ they now attribute to God, not only as futile but as a

great obstacle to science. I needn’t repeat here what I said in the note on 17.

Still, to please them ·or at least meet them half-way·, I shall argue on the basis that God’s

essence does involve will, and shall still prove that it follows from God’s perfection that things

could not have been created by God in any other way or any other order. It will be easy to show

this if we consider ·two things·. First, as my opponents concede, it depends on God’s decree and

will alone that each thing is what it is; for otherwise God wouldn’t be the cause of all things.

Secondly, all God’s decrees have been established by God from eternity; for otherwise God would

be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is neither when, nor

before, nor after, it follows purely from God’s perfection that God could never have decreed

anything different. It is a mistake to think of God as having existed for a while without making

any decrees and then making some.

The opponents will say that in supposing God to have made another nature of things, or

supposing that from eternity God had decreed something else concerning Nature and its order,

one isn’t implicitly supposing any imperfection in God.

Still, if they say this, they will ·have to· concede also that God’s decrees can be changed

by their maker. Their supposition that God could have decreed Nature and its order to be

Page 17

different from how they actually are involves supposing that God could have had a different

intellect and will from those that God actually has; and they - ·the opponents· - hold that this

could have been the case without any change of God’s essence or of God’s perfection. But if that

is right, why can’t God now change God’s decrees concerning created things while remaining just

as perfect? ·It is absurd to suppose that God can do this - e.g. that from now on the laws of

physics will be slightly different every second Tuesday - but my opponents have left themselves

with no basis for ruling this out as the absurdity that it really is·. . . .

Therefore, since things could not have been produced by God in any other way or any

other order, and since the truth of this follows from God’s supreme perfection, we have to accept

that God willed to create all the things that are in God’s intellect, with the same perfection with

which God understands them.

The opponents will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things: what is to

count in things as making them perfect or imperfect, and thus called ‘good’ or ‘bad’, depends only

on God’s will. So God could have brought it about, simply by willing it, that what is now

perfection would have been the greatest imperfection, and conversely that what is now an

imperfection in things would have been the most perfect. ·Thus the opponents·. But God

necessarily understands what God wills; so what the opponents say here is tantamount to saying

outright that God could bring it about through an act of will that God understands things in a

different way from how God does understand them. And this, as I have just shown, is a great

absurdity. . . .

I confess that this opinion that subjects all things to a certain unguided will of God and

makes everything depend on God’s whim is nearer the truth than the view of those who maintain

that God does all things for the sake of the good. For the latter seem to suppose something

outside God, something not depending on God, to which God in acting attends as a model and at

which God aims as at a goal. This is simply to subject God to fate [

Latin fatum, here = ‘something

independently fixed and given’]

. Nothing more absurd can be maintained about God - shown by me to

be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and of their existence. I shan’t waste

any more time refuting this absurdity.

34: God’s power is God’s essence itself.

It follows purely from the necessity of God’s essence that God is the cause of God (by 11)

and (by 16 and its corollary) the cause of all things. So God’s power, by which God and all

things exist and act, is God’s essence itself.

35: Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power, necessarily exists.

Whatever is in God’s power must (by 34) be so related to God’s essence that it necessarily

follows from it, and therefore necessarily exists.

36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.