Page 1

R

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MERICA

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EFENSES

Strategy, Forces and Resources

For a New Century

A Report of

The Project for the New American Century

September 2000

A

BOUT THE

P

ROJECT FOR THE

N

EW

A

MERICAN

C

ENTURY

Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-

profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.

The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project. William Kristol is chairman

of the Project, and Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson and John R.

Bolton serve as directors. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project.

“As the 20

th

century draws to a close, the United States stands as the

world’s most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in

the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does

the United States have the vision to build upon the achievement of

past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a

new century favorable to American principles and interests?

“[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet

both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and

purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national

leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.

“Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its

power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global

leadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America

has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia,

and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite

challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20

th

century should have taught us that it is important to shape

circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they

become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us

to embrace the cause of American leadership.”

– From the Project’s founding Statement of Principles

____P

ROJECT FOR THE

N

EW

A

MERICAN

C

ENTURY

____

1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone: (202) 293-4983 / Fax: (202) 293-4572

R

EBUILDING

A

MERICA

’

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EFENSES

Strategy, Forces and Resources

For a New Century

D

ONALD

K

AGAN

G

ARY

S

CHMITT

Project Co-Chairmen

T

HOMAS

D

ONNELLY

Principal Author

R

EBUILDING

A

MERICA

’

S

D

EFENSES

Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

C

ONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

I. Why Another Defense Review? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Four Essential Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. Repositioning Today’s Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

IV. Rebuilding Today’s Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

V. Creating Tomorrow’s Dominant Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

VI. Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Project Participants

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

i

I

NTRODUCTION

The Project for the New American

Century was established in the spring of

1997. From its inception, the Project has

been concerned with the decline in the

strength of America’s defenses, and in the

problems this would create for the exercise

of American leadership around the globe

and, ultimately, for the preservation of

peace.

Our concerns were reinforced by the

two congressionally-mandated defense

studies that appeared soon thereafter: the

Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review

(May 1997) and the report of the National

Defense Panel (December 1997). Both

studies assumed that U.S. defense budgets

would remain flat or continue to shrink. As

a result, the defense plans and

recommendations outlined in the two reports

were fashioned with such budget constraints

in mind. Broadly speaking, the QDR

stressed current military requirements at the

expense of future defense needs, while the

NDP’s report emphasized future needs by

underestimating today’s defense

responsibilities.

Although the QDR and the report of the

NDP proposed different policies, they

shared one underlying feature: the gap

between resources and strategy should be

resolved not by increasing resources but by

shortchanging strategy. America’s armed

forces, it seemed, could either prepare for

the future by retreating from its role as the

essential defender of today’s global security

order, or it could take care of current

business but be unprepared for tomorrow’s

threats and tomorrow’s battlefields.

Either alternative seemed to us

shortsighted. The United States is the

world’s only superpower, combining

preeminent military power, global

technological leadership, and the world’s

largest economy. Moreover, America stands

at the head of a system of alliances which

includes the world’s other leading

democratic powers. At present the United

States faces no global rival. America’s

grand strategy should aim to preserve and

extend this advantageous position as far into

the future as possible. There are, however,

potentially powerful states dissatisfied with

the current situation and eager to change it,

if they can, in directions that endanger the

relatively peaceful, prosperous and free

condition the world enjoys today. Up to

now, they have been deterred from doing so

by the capability and global presence of

American military power. But, as that

power declines, relatively and absolutely,

the happy conditions that follow from it will

be inevitably undermined.

Preserving the desirable strategic

situation in which the United States now

finds itself requires a globally preeminent

military capability both today and in the

future. But years of cuts in defense

spending have eroded the American

military’s combat readiness, and put in

jeopardy the Pentagon’s plans for

maintaining military superiority in the years

ahead. Increasingly, the U.S. military has

found itself undermanned, inadequately

equipped and trained, straining to handle

contingency operations, and ill-prepared to

adapt itself to the revolution in military

affairs. Without a well-conceived defense

policy and an appropriate increase in

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

ii

At present the

United States

faces no

global rival.

America’s

grand strategy

should aim to

preserve and

extend this

advantageous

position as far

into the future

as possible.

defense spending, the United States has been

letting its ability to take full advantage of the

remarkable strategic opportunity at hand slip

away.

With this in mind, we began a project in

the spring of 1998 to examine the country’s

defense plans and resource requirements.

We started from the premise that U.S.

military capabilities should be sufficient to

support an American grand strategy

committed to building upon this

unprecedented opportunity. We did not

accept pre-ordained constraints that

followed from assumptions about what the

country might or might not be willing to

expend on its defenses.

In broad terms, we saw the project as

building upon the defense strategy outlined

by the Cheney Defense Department in the

waning days of the Bush Administration.

The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) drafted

in the early months

of 1992 provided a

blueprint for

maintaining U.S.

preeminence,

precluding the rise

of a great power

rival, and shaping

the international

security order in

line with American

principles and

interests. Leaked

before it had been

formally approved,

the document was

criticized as an

effort by “cold

warriors” to keep defense spending high and

cuts in forces small despite the collapse of

the Soviet Union; not surprisingly, it was

subsequently buried by the new

administration.

Although the experience of the past

eight years has modified our understanding

of particular military requirements for

carrying out such a strategy, the basic tenets

of the DPG, in our judgment, remain sound.

And what Secretary Cheney said at the time

in response to the DPG’s critics remains true

today: “We can either sustain the [armed]

forces we require and remain in a position to

help shape things for the better, or we can

throw that advantage away. [But] that

would only hasten the day when we face

greater threats, at higher costs and further

risk to American lives.”

The project proceeded by holding a

series of seminars. We asked outstanding

defense specialists to write papers to explore

a variety of topics: the future missions and

requirements of the individual military

services, the role of the reserves, nuclear

strategic doctrine and missile defenses, the

defense budget and prospects for military

modernization, the state (training and

readiness) of today’s forces, the revolution

in military affairs, and defense-planning for

theater wars, small wars and constabulary

operations. The papers were circulated to a

group of participants, chosen for their

experience and judgment in defense affairs.

(The list of participants may be found at the

end of this report.) Each paper then became

the basis for discussion and debate. Our

goal was to use the papers to assist

deliberation, to generate and test ideas, and

to assist us in developing our final report.

While each paper took as its starting point a

shared strategic point of view, we made no

attempt to dictate the views or direction of

the individual papers. We wanted as full

and as diverse a discussion as possible.

Our report borrows heavily from those

deliberations. But we did not ask seminar

participants to “sign-off” on the final report.

We wanted frank discussions and we sought

to avoid the pitfalls of trying to produce a

consensual but bland product. We wanted to

try to define and describe a defense strategy

that is honest, thoughtful, bold, internally

consistent and clear. And we wanted to

spark a serious and informed discussion, the

essential first step for reaching sound

conclusions and for gaining public support.

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

iii

New circumstances make us think that

the report might have a more receptive

audience now than in recent years. For the

first time since the late 1960s the federal

government is running a surplus. For most

of the 1990s, Congress and the White House

gave balancing the federal budget a higher

priority than funding national security. In

fact, to a significant degree, the budget was

balanced by a combination of increased tax

revenues and cuts in defense spending. The

surplus expected in federal revenues over

the next decade, however, removes any need

to hold defense spending to some

preconceived low level.

Moreover, the American public and its

elected representatives have become

increasingly aware of the declining state of

the U.S. military. News stories, Pentagon

reports, congressional testimony and

anecdotal accounts from members of the

armed services paint a disturbing picture of

an American military that is troubled by

poor enlistment and retention rates, shoddy

housing, a shortage of spare parts and

weapons, and diminishing combat readiness.

Finally, this report comes after a

decade’s worth of experience in dealing with

the post-Cold War world. Previous efforts

to fashion a defense strategy that would

make sense for today’s security environment

were forced to work from many untested

assumptions about the nature of a world

without a superpower rival. We have a

much better idea today of what our

responsibilities are, what the threats to us

might be in this new security environment,

and what it will take to secure the relative

peace and stability. We believe our report

reflects and benefits from that decade’s

worth of experience.

Our report is published in a presidential

election year. The new administration will

need to produce a second Quadrennial

Defense Review shortly after it takes office.

We hope that the Project’s report will be

useful as a road map for the nation’s

immediate and future defense plans. We

believe we have set forth a defense program

that is justified by the evidence, rests on an

honest examination of the problems and

possibilities, and does not flinch from facing

the true cost of security. We hope it will

inspire careful consideration and serious

discussion. The post-Cold War world will

not remain a relatively peaceful place if we

continue to neglect foreign and defense

matters. But serious attention, careful

thought, and the willingness to devote

adequate resources to maintaining

America’s military strength can make the

world safer and American strategic interests

more secure now and in the future.

Donald Kagan Gary Schmitt

Project Co-Chairmen

Thomas Donnelly

Principal Author

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

iv

K

EY

F

INDINGS

This report proceeds from the belief that

America should seek to preserve and extend

its position of global leadership by

maintaining the preeminence of U.S.

military forces. Today, the United States

has an unprecedented strategic opportunity.

It faces no immediate great-power

challenge; it is blessed with wealthy,

powerful and democratic allies in every part

of the world; it is in the midst of the longest

economic expansion in its history; and its

political and economic principles are almost

universally embraced. At no time in history

has the international security order been as

conducive to American interests and ideals.

The challenge for the coming century is to

preserve and enhance this “American

peace.”

Yet unless the United States maintains

sufficient military strength, this opportunity

will be lost. And in fact, over the past

decade, the failure to establish a security

strategy responsive to new realities and to

provide adequate resources for the full range

of missions needed to exercise U.S. global

leadership has placed the American peace at

growing risk. This report attempts to define

those requirements. In particular, we need

to:

E

STABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS

for U.S. military forces:

• defend the American homeland;

• fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;

• perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in

critical regions;

• transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs;”

To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary

allocations. In particular, the United States must:

M

AINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a

global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats,

not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.

R

ESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH

of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated in

the “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength

from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.

R

EPOSITION

U.S.

FORCES

to respond to 21

st

century strategic realities by shifting

permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval

deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

v

M

ODERNIZE CURRENT

U.S.

FORCES SELECTIVELY

, proceeding with the F-22 program while

increasing purchases of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarine

and surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weight

ground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey “tilt-rotor” aircraft for the Marine

Corps.

C

ANCEL

“

ROADBLOCK

”

PROGRAMS

such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier,

and Crusader howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon funding

while providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings from these canceled

programs should be used to spur the process of military transformation.

D

EVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES

to defend the American homeland and

American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.

C

ONTROL THE NEW

“

INTERNATIONAL COMMONS

”

OF SPACE AND

“

CYBERSPACE

,” and pave

the way for the creation of a new military service – U.S. Space Forces – with the mission of

space control.

E

XPLOIT THE

“

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

” to insure the long-term superiority of

U.S. conventional forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which

• maximizes the value of current weapons systems through the application of advanced

technologies, and,

• produces more profound improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition

between single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.

I

NCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING

gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross

domestic product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually.

Fulfilling these requirements is essential

if America is to retain its militarily dominant

status for the coming decades. Conversely,

the failure to meet any of these needs must

result in some form of strategic retreat. At

current levels of defense spending, the only

option is to try ineffectually to “manage”

increasingly large risks: paying for today’s

needs by shortchanging tomorrow’s;

withdrawing from constabulary missions to

retain strength for large-scale wars;

“choosing” between presence in Europe or

presence in Asia; and so on. These are bad

choices. They are also false economies.

The “savings” from withdrawing from the

Balkans, for example, will not free up

anywhere near the magnitude of funds

needed for military modernization or

transformation. But these are false

economies in other, more profound ways as

well. The true cost of not meeting our

defense requirements will be a lessened

capacity for American global leadership and,

ultimately, the loss of a global security order

that is uniquely friendly to American

principles and prosperity.

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

1

I

W

HY

A

NOTHER

D

EFENSE

R

EVIEW

?

Since the end of the Cold War, the

United States has struggled to formulate a

coherent national security or military

strategy, one that accounts for the constants

of American power and principles yet

accommodates 21

st

century realities. Absent

a strategic framework, U.S. defense plan-

ning has been an empty and increasingly

self-referential exercise, often dominated by

bureaucratic and budgetary rather than

strategic interests. Indeed, the proliferation

of defense reviews over the past decade

testifies to the failure to chart a consistent

course: to date, there have been half a dozen

formal defense reviews, and the Pentagon is

now gearing up for a second Quadrennial

Defense Review in 2001. Unless this “QDR

II” matches U.S. military forces and

resources to a viable American strategy, it,

too, will fail.

These failures are not without cost:

already, they place at risk an historic

opportunity. After the victories of the past

century – two world wars, the Cold War and

most recently the Gulf War – the United

States finds itself as the uniquely powerful

leader of a coalition of free and prosperous

states that faces no immediate great-power

challenge.

The American peace has proven itself

peaceful, stable and durable. It has, over the

past decade, provided the geopolitical

framework for widespread economic growth

and the spread of American principles of

liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in

international politics can be frozen in time;

even a global Pax Americana will not

preserve itself.

Paradoxically, as American power and

influence are at their apogee, American

military forces limp toward exhaustion,

unable to meet the demands of their many

and varied missions, including preparing for

tomorrow’s battlefield. Today’s force,

reduced by a third or more over the past

decade, suffers from degraded combat

readiness; from difficulties in recruiting and

retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers,

sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effects

of an extended “procurement holiday” that

has resulted in the premature aging of most

weapons systems; from an increasingly

obsolescent and inadequate military

infrastructure; from a shrinking industrial

base poorly structured to be the “arsenal of

democracy” for the 21

st

century; from a lack

of innovation that threatens the techno-

logical and operational advantages enjoyed

by U.S. forces for a generation and upon

which American strategy depends. Finally,

and most dangerously, the social fabric of

the military is frayed and worn. U.S. armed

forces suffer from a degraded quality of life

divorced from middle-class expectations,

upon which an all-volunteer force depends.

Enlisted men and women and junior officers

increasingly lack confidence in their senior

leaders, whom they believe will not tell

unpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. In

sum, as the American peace reaches across

the globe, the force that preserves that peace

is increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks.

This is no paradox; it is the inevitable

consequence of the failure to match military

means to geopolitical ends. Underlying the

failed strategic and defense reviews of the

past decade is the idea that the collapse of

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

2

The multiple challenges of the

post-Cold War world.

the Soviet Union had created a “strategic

pause.” In other words, until another great-

power challenger emerges, the United States

can enjoy a respite from the demands of

international leadership. Like a boxer

between championship bouts, America can

afford to relax and live the good life, certain

that there would be enough time to shape up

for the next big challenge. Thus the United

States could afford to reduce its military

forces, close bases overseas, halt major

weapons programs and reap the financial

benefits of the “peace dividend.” But as we

have seen over the past decade, there has

been no shortage of powers around the

world who have taken the collapse of the

Soviet empire as an opportunity to expand

their own influence and challenge the

American-led security order.

Beyond the faulty notion of a strategic

pause, recent defense reviews have suffered

from an inverted understanding of the mili-

tary dimension of the Cold War struggle

between the United States and the Soviet

Union. American containment strategy did

not proceed from the assumption that the

Cold War would be a purely military strug-

gle, in which the U.S. Army matched the

Red Army tank for tank; rather, the United

States would seek to deter the Soviets

militarily while defeating them economi-

cally and ideologically over time. And,

even within the realm of military affairs, the

practice of deterrence allowed for what in

military terms is called “an economy of

force.” The principle job of NATO forces,

for example, was to deter an invasion of

Western Europe, not to invade and occupy

the Russian heartland. Moreover, the bi-

polar nuclear balance of terror made both

the United States and the Soviet Union

generally cautious. Behind the smallest

proxy war in the most remote region lurked

the possibility of Armageddon. Thus,

despite numerous miscalculations through

the five decades of Cold War, the United

States reaped an extraordinary measure of

global security and stability simply by

building a credible and, in relative terms,

inexpensive nuclear arsenal.

Over the decade of the post-Cold-War

period, however, almost everything has

changed. The Cold War world was a bipolar

world; the 21

st

century world is – for the

moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with

America as the world’s “sole superpower.”

America’s strategic goal used to be

containment of the Soviet Union; today the

task is to preserve an international security

environment conducive to American

interests and ideals. The military’s job

during the Cold War was to deter Soviet

expansionism. Today its task is to secure

and expand the “zones of democratic

peace;” to deter the rise of a new great-

power competitor; defend key regions of

Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and

to preserve American preeminence through

the coming transformation of war made

Cold War

21

st

Century

Security

system

Bipolar

Unipolar

Strategic

goal

Contain

Soviet

Union

Preserve Pax

Americana

Main

military

mission(s)

Deter Soviet

expansionism

Secure and

expand zones

of democratic

peace; deter

rise of new

great-power

competitor;

defend key

regions;

exploit

transformation

of war

Main

military

threat(s)

Potential

global war

across many

theaters

Potential

theater wars

spread across

globe

Focus of

strategic

competition

Europe

East Asia

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

3

Today, America

spends less than

3 percent of its

gross domestic

product on

national defense,

less than at any

time since before

the United States

established itself

as the world’s

leading power.

possible by new technologies. From 1945 to

1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a

single, global war that might be fought

across many theaters; in the new century, the

prospect is for a variety of theater wars

around the world, against separate and

distinct adversaries pursuing separate and

distinct goals. During the Cold War, the

main venue of superpower rivalry, the

strategic “center of gravity,” was in Europe,

where large U.S. and NATO conventional

forces prepared to repulse a Soviet attack

and over which nuclear war might begin;

and with Europe now generally at peace, the

new strategic center of concern appears to

be shifting to East Asia. The missions for

America’s armed

forces have not

diminished so

much as shifted.

The threats may

not be as great,

but there are

more of them.

During the Cold

War, America

acquired its

security

“wholesale” by

global deterrence

of the Soviet

Union. Today,

that same

security can only be acquired at the “retail”

level, by deterring or, when needed, by

compelling regional foes to act in ways that

protect American interests and principles.

This gap between a diverse and

expansive set of new strategic realities and

diminishing defense forces and resources

does much to explain why the Joint Chiefs

of Staff routinely declare that they see “high

risk” in executing the missions assigned to

U.S. armed forces under the government’s

declared national military strategy. Indeed,

a JCS assessment conducted at the height of

the Kosovo air war found the risk level

“unacceptable.” Such risks are the result of

the combination of the new missions

described above and the dramatically

reduced military force that has emerged

from the defense “drawdown” of the past

decade. Today, America spends less than 3

percent of its gross domestic product on

national defense, less than at any time since

before World War II – in other words, since

before the United States established itself as

the world’s leading power – and a cut from

4.7 percent of GDP in 1992, the first real

post-Cold-War defense budget. Most of this

reduction has come under the Clinton

Administration; despite initial promises to

approximate the level of defense spending

called for in the final Bush Administration

program, President Clinton cut more than

$160 billion from the Bush program from

1992 to 1996 alone. Over the first seven

years of the Clinton Administration,

approximately $426 billion in defense

investments have been deferred, creating a

weapons procurement “bow wave” of

immense proportions.

The most immediate effect of reduced

defense spending has been a precipitate

decline in combat readiness. Across all

services, units are reporting degraded

readiness, spare parts and personnel

shortages, postponed and simplified training

regimens, and many other problems. In

congressional testimony, service chiefs of

staff now routinely report that their forces

are inadequate to the demands of the “two-

war” national military strategy. Press

attention focused on these readiness

problems when it was revealed that two

Army divisions were given a “C-4” rating,

meaning they were not ready for war. Yet it

was perhaps more telling that none of the

Army’s ten divisions achieved the highest

“C-1” rating, reflecting the widespread

effects of slipping readiness standards. By

contrast, every division that deployed to

Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991

received a “C-1” rating. This is just a

snapshot that captures the state of U.S.

armed forces today.

These readiness problems are

exacerbated by the fact that U.S. forces are

poorly positioned to respond to today’s

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

4

crises. In Europe, for example, the

overwhelming majority of Army and Air

Force units remain at their Cold War bases

in Germany or England, while the security

problems on the continent have moved to

Southeast Europe. Temporary rotations of

forces to the Balkans and elsewhere in

Southeast Europe increase the overall

burdens of these operations many times.

Likewise, the Clinton Administration has

continued the fiction that the operations of

American forces in the Persian Gulf are

merely temporary duties. Nearly a decade

after the Gulf War, U.S. air, ground and

naval forces continue to protect enduring

American interests in the region. In addition

to rotational naval forces, the Army

maintains what amounts to an armored

brigade in Kuwait for nine months of every

year; the Air Force has two composite air

wings in constant “no-fly zone” operations

over northern and southern Iraq. And

despite increasing worries about the rise of

China and instability in Southeast Asia, U.S.

forces are found almost exclusively in

Northeast Asian bases.

Yet for all its problems in carrying out

today’s missions, the Pentagon has done

almost nothing to prepare for a future that

promises to be very different and potentially

much more dangerous. It is now commonly

understood that information and other new

technologies – as well as widespread

technological and weapons proliferation –

are creating a dynamic that may threaten

America’s ability to exercise its dominant

military power. Potential rivals such as

China are anxious to exploit these trans-

formational technologies broadly, while

adversaries like Iran, Iraq and North Korea

are rushing to develop ballistic missiles and

nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American

intervention in regions they seek to

dominate. Yet the Defense Department and

the services have done little more than affix

a “transformation” label to programs

developed during the Cold War, while

diverting effort and attention to a process of

joint experimentation which restricts rather

than encourages innovation. Rather than

admit that rapid technological changes

makes it uncertain which new weapons

systems to develop, the armed services cling

ever more tightly to traditional program and

concepts. As Andrew Krepinevich, a

member of the National Defense Panel, put

it in a recent study of Pentagon experi-

mentation, “Unfortunately, the Defense

Department’s rhetoric asserting the need for

military transformation and its support for

joint experimentation has yet to be matched

by any great sense of urgency or any

substantial resource support.…At present

the Department’s effort is poorly focused

and woefully underfunded.”

In sum, the 1990s have been a “decade

of defense neglect.” This leaves the next

president of the United States with an

enormous challenge: he must increase

military spending to preserve American

geopolitical leadership, or he must pull back

from the security commitments that are the

measure of America’s position as the

world’s sole superpower and the final

guarantee of security, democratic freedoms

and individual political rights. This choice

will be among the first to confront the

president: new legislation requires the

incoming administration to fashion a

national security strategy within six months

of assuming office, as opposed to waiting a

full year, and to complete another

quadrennial defense review three months

after that. In a larger sense, the new

president will choose whether today’s

“unipolar moment,” to use columnist

Charles Krauthammer’s phrase for

America’s current geopolitical preeminence,

will be extended along with the peace and

prosperity that it provides.

This study seeks to frame these choices

clearly, and to re-establish the links between

U.S. foreign policy, security strategy, force

planning and defense spending. If an

American peace is to be maintained, and

expanded, it must have a secure foundation

on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.

Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

5

None of the

defense reviews

of the past

decade has

weighed fully

the range of

missions

demanded by

U.S. global

leadership, nor

adequately

quantified the

forces and

resources

necessary to

execute these

missions

successfully.

II

F

OUR

E

SSENTIAL

M

ISSIONS

America’s global leadership, and its role

as the guarantor of the current great-power

peace, relies upon the safety of the