No. 553    13 Nissan-14 Sivan 5767  /  April-May 2007

The Growing al-Qaeda Presence in the Hamas-Controlled Gaza Strip

Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi

• Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of governments is collapsing and therefore its current success in the war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as a surprise.

• Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum that had been created and begun to dispatch its operatives to this territory. By March 2006, no less than the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London Arabic daily al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."

• In the meantime across the Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of the Kashmiri organization Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salah al-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen. The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.

• Significantly, al-Hayat reported on April 4, 2006, "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Interior Ministry disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab had undergone training in the use of weapons and explosives in the Gaza Strip.

• On May 9, 2007, the Army of Islam organization (Jaish al-Islam) published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an official announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the Palestinian sheikh Abu Qatada, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe. Hamas spokesperson Ayman Taha acknowledged the fact that Hamas and the Army of Islam had cooperated on the military operational level.

Increasingly there are signs that al-Qaeda is gaining strength in the Gaza Strip. Amid the decaying internal situation in Gaza, with its regular gun battles between the well-established Hamas and Fatah militias, more incidents are reported of attacks against symbols of Western presence from an UNRWA school to a Christian bookstore. Internet cafés have also been repeatedly bombed. Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of governments is collapsing and therefore its current success in war-torn Gaza should not come as a surprise.¹

Seeming to emulate the al-Qaeda operations in Iraq, the militants in Gaza who belong to these new terrorist organizations are targeting Western reporters as in the famous cases where journalists from FOX News and the BBC were taken hostage. They have even adopted al-Qaeda style death threats, promising to slit the throats of Palestinian women journalists who appear on television without covering their hair.² Even external appearances show al-Qaeda's growing influence as members of its affiliate movements in Gaza often wear the same black head covering that was a trademark of the late al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. All the evidence indicates that rather than challenge al-Qaeda's bid to expand its presence in Gaza, Hamas prefers to collaborate with these new militant groups. 

Al-Qaeda Enters Gaza

Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum that had been created and begun to dispatch its operatives to this territory. The Hamas leader who would later become its first foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, admitted to Corriere della Sera on September 13, 2005, that "a pair of men from al-Qaeda has infiltrated into Gaza." Within a month an organization calling itself al-Qaeda in Palestine was distributing leaflets in a Gaza mosque. By March 2006, no less than the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London Arabic daily al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."

Although Abbas described this as a "very dangerous situation," no Palestinian security service subsequently took any measures against al-Qaeda. Indeed, this became official Palestinian Authority policy especially after Hamas swept the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and formed a new government. A Hamas official, Said Sayyam, who became the Palestinian Authority interior minister at the time, stated openly that he would not order the arrest of terrorist operatives who would attack Israel. This essentially amounted to an open invitation to global jihadi organizations that they could find a new sanctuary in postwithdrawal Gaza, under Hamas rule. It was the first clear indication that Hamas could work together with elements from al-Qaeda coming into the Gaza Strip.

In the meantime throughout the Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of the Kashmiri organization Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salah al-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen who recruited local candidates for al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.³ The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.

Gaza Becomes an International Terrorist Base

There was one question about al-Qaeda's presence in the Gaza Strip during 2006 that needed to be answered. Did it involve a foreign presence of al-Qaeda operatives from other Arab countries or was this Palestinian al-Qaeda affiliate just a group of Gazans who ideologically identified with global jihad but had no actual operational links with Osama bin Laden's organization? For example, some have suggested that al-Qaeda in Gaza is nothing more than members of powerful clans, like that of Mumtaz Dagmoush, who are just using global jihadist rhetoric to distinguish themselves from any central authority whether it is led by Hamas or Fatah. But was the growth of al-Qaeda in Gaza totally a local affair? Significantly, al-Hayat answered this question when it reported on April 4, 2006, "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.

Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Interior Ministry disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab had undergone training in the use of weapons and explosives in Gaza. They confessed to belonging to an organization called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was also an earlier name for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization before it became al-Qaeda Iraq.⁴ Thus al-Qaeda related groups in Gaza appeared to have become involved in military operations and were not only propagating their religious worldview. The rise of this kind of militant jihadism in Gaza comes against the backdrop of repeated calls by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy head of al-Qaeda, to export military operations from the war in Iraq to neighboring countries.

The Ideological Basis for Cooperation

It should not have come as a surprise that Hamas, once in power in the Gaza Strip, would start to host groups identifying with al-Qaeda.⁵ The two movements have much ideological compatibility. Hamas, according to its charter, is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaeda's top leadership came directly from the Muslim Brotherhood, starting with Abdullah Azzam who was a leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood before becoming the mentor of Osama bin Laden in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan during the 1980s. Additionally, Hamas maintained a presence in Sudan after 1991 about the same time as bin Laden.⁶ Both participated in the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference organized by the Sudanese leader Hasan al-Turabi in this period to unite Islamist movements.

In the last five years there have been indications that this common background is influencing the ideological orientation of the Hamas movement. Hamas publications glorify the legacy of Abdullah Azzam. Hamas posters found in West Bank cities have featured the portrait of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yasin alongside the portraits of Chechen leaders such as Khattab and Shamil Basayev, as well as the portrait of bin Laden. This same Hamas poster has in large print the names of all the confrontation points of global jihad: Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Kashmir, Palestine, and Lebanon.⁷

The Army of Islam and al-Qaeda

This year a new aspect of the al-Qaeda presence in Gaza Strip became evident. On May 9, 2007, the Army of Islam organization (Jaish al-Islam) published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an official announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the Palestinian sheikh Abu Qatada who is being held in a British prison. Abu Qatada is Sheikh Omar Mahmoud Othman, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe. According to testimony given by Jamal al-Fadhl in the Southern District Court of New York, Abu Qatada was a member of the al-Qaeda Fatwa Committee. Some of his tapes were found in the room of Muhammad Ata, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers.⁸ He was a close associate of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, an early religious mentor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.⁹

The announcement by the Army of Islam, which also appeared in a recording delivered to al-Jazeera, made these additional statements:

1.         "We will not sit idle in the face of the Crusader attack. . .Britain more than any other state wanted to humiliate the Muslims...it settled the ‘sons of monkeys and pigs' in Palestine...it fights against Islam and the Muslims...and is a partner to the Crusader war against Islam.

2.         "There is no protection for the British subjects in the Muslim states because the British government is fighting the Muslims, and therefore all of them are fighters [i.e., they have no protection and can be killed].

3.         "Alan Johnston is being held under the laws of the Islamic shari'a concerning prisoners...Britain must release our prisoners and particularly the Palestinian Abu Qatada...We do not forget our prisoners in other countries and we say to release all of them, otherwise we will behave the same way toward all of them without exception."

The form and content of the Army of Islam recording generated press speculation about al-Qaeda in Gaza. A Palestinian security source confirmed yet again in an interview to Al-Quds Al-Arabi (May 12, 2007) that al-Qaeda branches indeed have been set up in Gaza. In fact, it emerges from his statements that there is close cooperation between al-Qaeda in Gaza and Hamas. He identified the Army of Islam directly with al-Qaeda, and also noted that it is the one responsible for kidnapping Johnston and for publishing the demand to release Abu Qatada from prison. The same source verified that the local branch of al-Qaeda was established by activists from various Arab states who came into Gaza from outside the Palestinian Authority. The organization was also responsible for blowing up internet cafés, barbershops, pharmacies, and cellular telephone stores.

The Army of Islam was indeed one of the three organizations that kidnapped the Israeli solder Gilad Shalit in the summer of 2006 together with Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees, which also had contacts with al-Qaeda.¹⁰ This means Hamas and an al-Qaeda branch in Gaza have joined together for operational cooperation in terror attacks against Israel. This fact has been largely overlooked by observers of Middle Eastern affairs. Indeed, Musa Abu Marzuk, the deputy political secretary of Hamas, commented in the newspaper al-Liwa (April 10, 1007) that it is an honor for the Hamas government "that it did not arrest a single jihad fighter nor condemn a single action against the Zionist enemy."

Hamas did not want the impression to be given that it had any coordination at present with local al-Qaeda affiliates. The Hamas leadership was probably relieved when the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, lashed out at it for agreeing to a Palestinian unity government. But its defensive response indicated that it was still committed to the goals of al-Qaeda, namely resistance and jihad: "Be assured, Dr. Ayman...Hamas is still the same movement it has been since its foundation."¹¹

Hamas spokesperson Ayman Taha acknowledged the fact that Hamas and the Army of Islam had cooperated on the military operational level. However, he claimed that "the contacts between Hamas and the Army of Islam existed only in the beginning while abducting Shalit, I think it was ended a while ago."¹²

Moreover, Muhammad al-Madhoun of Hamas, a political adviser to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, confirmed (Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, May 10, 2007) that the demands that were made in the Army of Islam's recording detailing the terms for Johnston's release were the same ones the group conveyed clandestinely to the Hamas government. For Hamas it was clear who was responsible for the abduction. In an official announcement after the video clip was broadcast Hamas said: "the taking of responsibility for Johnston's abduction made it clear and did not leave any room for speculation regarding the organization responsible for the abduction, which we had known from the first moment."¹³

Just after the British journalist was abducted, Hamas on its website called on the Palestinian government "to issue immediate orders and to chase the criminal group that caused harm to the supreme national interest of our people, to arrest them and to beat strongly on their hands so as to make them a lesson for others."¹⁴ However, Hamas kept quiet and never took any action against the Army of Islam. In other words, Hamas knew right from the start about the Army of Islam operation yet did not intervene to free Johnston and dismantle the organization.

The Palestinian government, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, has for some time been involved in contacts aimed at freeing Johnston. Haniyeh disclosed in mid-April that there is close cooperation with British officials, who are given relevant information obtained by Palestinian security operatives. At the same time, Hamas knows where Johnston is being kept and is even able to visit him. Indeed, it was reported in a pro-Hamas newspaper that a senior aide of Haniyeh had met with Johnston in Gaza while he was in captivity.¹⁵

The Johnston affair reveals, then, the complexity of the reality of Palestinian terror. The Hamas prime minister is working for the release of a British journalist who was kidnapped by al-Qaeda, which is maintaining close operational cooperation with Hamas. Since it came to power, Hamas has had no interest in acting against the al-Qaeda branch that is functioning in the Gaza Strip but is interested in preventing an international crisis that would likely harm the Palestinian Authority, and it criticizes the Army of Islam only for its "mistaken choice" of a target.

As a result, observers in the Arab world have also taken note of the ambiguities arising from Hamas's position toward al-Qaeda. Writing in al-Hayat, Abdullah Iskandar noted that so far Hamas had not "provide[d] convincing answers about the failure to uncover the circumstances of the abduction of the British journalist, Johnston, in Gaza...." Specifically, Iskandar criticized Hamas's ambiguous stance toward the demand to release Abu Qatada and regarding "the fundamentalist terror in Iraq."¹⁶ With Hamas in control, the Palestinian Authority shows that it has no moral legitimacy to demand to be recognized as a political entity like other nations and that it is an entity providing sanctuary for international terrorism.

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Notes

1 Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007.

2 Nidal al-Mughrabi, "Gaza Reporters Protest at Qaeda-Style Death Threat," Reuters, June 4, 2007.

3 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and al-Qaeda Jihadism," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 5, No. 22, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/Institute for Contemporary Affairs, April 6, 2006.

4 "The Egyptian Interior Ministry exposed operative collaboration between terrorist elements in Sinai (connected to the Global Jihad and suspected of involvement in the attacks at Dahab) and Palestinian terrorist elements in the Gaza Strip (whose identity is unclear)," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), May 26, 2006. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/dahab_250506.htm.

5 Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes, "Will a Gaza ‘Hamas-Stan' Become a Future al-Qaeda Sanctuary?" Jerusalem Viewpoints, No. 524, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 1, 2004.

6 On the Hamas presence, see U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 (Washington, DC, 1995).

7 "Russian president invites Hamas to Moscow-Hamas support for the Chechen separatists and their terrorist tactics did not prevent it from immediately accepting Russian president Vladimir Putin's invitation to visit Moscow." Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), February 10, 2006. See: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/hamas_moscow_e.pdf.

8 "The Army of Islam, a radical Islamic Palestinian terrorist group in the Gaza Strip, claimed responsibility for the abduction of British journalist Alan Johnston. In exchange for his release, they demand the release of global jihad operatives, particularly Abu Qatada (a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, held prisoner in Britain)." Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), May 20, 2007. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/islam_troops_e.htm.

9 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al-Qaida (London: Abacus, 2006), pp. 231-232.

10 http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-24.htm.  http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50340. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3388249,00.html.

11"Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Hamas movement once again, accusing it of abandoning jihad and ‘selling Palestine' for seats in the Palestinian unity government. Hamas spokesmen defended their political activity, stressing the continuing adherence of the movement to its radical principles, namely ‘resistance' and ‘jihad,' and non-recognition of Israel." Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), March 22, 2007. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/al_zawahiri_e.htm.

12 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), May 10, 2007.

13 http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=ar&DSNO=981543.

14 http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7HL2orUHY2IGeTpHIV52PkmUmWJfKM6CzaZSnKT1mY3s02bMI60Bkxu9dnAj4HPB9Xb 6kuLh8ig0MGZqlvOnwllzdBmnMFGfTzfcn5pbwbrw%3d.

15 DPA, "Palestinian Newspaper: Haniyeh Aide Met with Kidnapped BBC Journalist," Ha'aretz.com, May 28, 2007. See: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/864144.html.

16 Abdullah Iskandar, "Hamas' Ambiguity and Guarantees," Dar al-Hayat, May 29, 2007.

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Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former adviser to the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.